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xFOREWORD
Mandated by Section 577 of the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994
(Public Law 103-325), this independent report, Evaluation of Erosion Hazards,
provides a much-needed and valuable assessment of coastal erosion and the
resulting loss of property along our Nation's ocean and Great Lakes shorelines.
I commend the H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the
Environment for its work and for delivering a thought-provoking set of findings,
recommendations and policy options.  The Center's multi-sector, nonpartisan
approach drew experts from around the country to produce, as the Congress
envisioned, an objective, science-based report.
One of the report's most sobering findings is that within the next 60 years
approximately 25 percent of homes located within 500 feet of the coast (excluding
those located in most urban centers) will fall victim to the effects of erosion.
Erosion-induced losses to property owners during this time are expected to be half a
billion dollars annually, an amount nearly equal to the risk of loss from coastal
flooding.  If coastal development continues unabated or if sea levels rise as some
scientists are predicting, damages may be even higher.
Continued coastal erosion has made both coastal structures and ecosystems
vulnerable to storms.  An increase in the number and intensity of hurricanes making
landfall along some of our most erosion-prone coastlines could dramatically affect
those areas.  Unfortunately, such an increase in storm activity is precisely what
many leading experts are predicting over the next 20 years.
This report clearly lays out the hard choices facing the Congress and the Nation.  It
is now time – indeed it is past time – to renew the public dialogue about how we
can lower the risks to life and property and reduce the costs to the Nation from the
inevitable consequences of coastal erosion.
JAMES LEE WITT
Director, The Federal Emergency Management Agency
xi
PREFACE
Coastal erosion and its impact on the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
as well as the economic viability and environmental integrity of coastal
communities is a major concern of the nation.  Homes along our Nation’s ocean
and Great Lakes shorelines face a risk from erosion comparable to the risk from
coastal flooding.  However, the NFIP does not currently map erosion hazard
areas and therefore is unable to inform homeowners of the risk to their property
from erosion.  Moreover, FEMA’s flood insurance rate maps do not inform
current and prospective property owners of erosion risks.  In addition, current
insurance rates do not reflect the magnitude of the erosion risk.  Other NFIP
policyholders or taxpayers will have to subsidize what is likely to become a
substantial cost.
The Heinz Center conducted an analysis of possible changes to the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) based on a national-scale coastal erosion
mapping survey for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  The report
presents a range of policy options for eroding areas, evaluates the effectiveness
of each option in reducing erosion losses, and makes two recommendations.
The report was overseen by a Steering Committee of sixteen experts from
academia, government and the private sector which I chaired.  The committee
and I commend The Heinz Center and its collaborators for their excellent work
on a very complex issue.  The research was conducted by teams at the
University of Georgia (Warren Kriesel and colleagues), the George Washington
University (Joe Cordes and Tony Yezer), The Spatial Data Institute (Bill Fry
and colleagues), a team of actuaries (Dick Roth Sr. and Dick Roth Jr.), the John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Susanne Moser), and
the staff of The Heinz Center.  Many other individuals at FEMA, especially
Mark Crowell, the project officer for this study, and State Coastal Zone
Management Agencies generously contributed time and expertise as well.
The committee believes that this report achieves its goal of providing Congress
with a series of options from which they can choose to address the problem of
coastal erosion.  It is our hope that these recommendations and policy options
will help set a new course for coastal erosion management.
STEPHEN P. LEATHERMAN
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Driven by a rising sea level, large storms, flooding, and powerful ocean waves,
erosion wears away the beaches and bluffs along the U.S. ocean and Great Lakes
shorelines.  Erosion undermines waterfront houses, businesses, and public
facilities, eventually rendering them uninhabitable or unusable.  By moving the
shoreline inland, erosion also brings nearby structures ever closer to the water,
often putting them at greater risk than either their owners or insurers recognize.
Over the next 60 years, erosion may claim one out of four houses within 500 feet
of the U.S. shoreline.  To the homeowners living within this narrow strip, the
risk posed by erosion is comparable to the risk from flooding, especially in beach
areas. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), however, does not map
erosion hazard areas to inform homeowners of the risk they face, nor does it
directly incorporate erosion risks into its insurance ratemaking procedures.  Both
of these shortcomings can be remedied.
BOX S.1   Recommendations
Congress should instruct the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
develop erosion hazard maps that display the location and extent of coastal
areas subject to erosion.  The erosion maps should be made widely available in
both print and electronic formats.
Flood insurance rate maps do not inform current and prospective coastal property
owners of erosion risks. Without such information, state and local decision makers
and the general public are not fully aware of the coastal hazards they face, nor do
they have this information available for land-use planning and erosion hazard
mitigation.  This expenditure is likely to be cost effective.
Congress should require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
include the cost of expected erosion losses when setting flood insurance rates
along the coast.
Despite facing higher risk, homeowners in erosion-prone areas currently are paying
the same amount for flood insurance as are policyholders in non-eroding areas.
FEMA should incorporate the risk from erosion into the cost of insurance along the
coasts.  Otherwise, other NFIP policyholders or taxpayers will have to subsidize
what is likely to become a substantial cost.  Using maps such as those recommended
above, rate increases could be confined to the highest-risk eroding regions.
Alternatively, more modest rate increases could be spread across a larger “Coastal
High Hazard Zone” that includes both the highest-risk flood and eroding regions.
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Congress debated erosion management legislation during the early 1990s, but
could not reach agreement on a course of action.  Deciding that more
information was needed, Congress passed Section 577 of the National Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-325), which requested an analysis of a
series of possible policy changes to address erosion hazards within federal
programs.
This report, by The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the
Environment, is a response to that mandate.  The goal of the study is to improve
understanding of the impacts of erosion and erosion-related flooding on the
NFIP, other federal programs, and coastal communities. The report makes two
recommendations, shown in Box S.1. The report also analyzes the economic
impacts of erosion, presents a range of policy options, and evaluates the
effectiveness of each option in reducing erosion losses.  The key study findings
are summarized in Box S.2.  The policy options evaluated are listed in Box S.3.
The study was conducted in three phases.  In phase 1, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency contracted with state agencies to produce maps for 27
counties along U.S. coastlines.  The maps included projections of how far inland
the coastline may erode over the next 60 years and, where applicable, expected
flood heights from a 1 percent chance  ("100-year") storm today and in the
future.  A sample erosion hazard map is shown in Figure S.1.  The Heinz Center
conducted phases 2 and 3, which included a field survey of over 10,000
structures and analyses of the extent of erosion-related damage and options to
address that damage.
This summary describes the nature of the coastal erosion hazard by region, the
costs of erosion today and in the future, current federal and state policies in
eroding areas, and a series of possible changes to the NFIP to better incorporate
coastal erosion into the existing flood insurance program.  The recommendations
are discussed in greater detail at the conclusion of this summary.
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FIGURE S.1  Sample 60-year erosion hazard map, South Bethany, Delaware
Notes: As shown on this aerial photo of
South Bethany, Delaware, the beach is
expected to erode inland 65 feet (from the
white line on the right to the one on the left)
over the next 60 years.  Two to three rows
of houses, marked with circles, are likely to
be lost to erosion over this period.
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BOX S.2  Summary of Key Study Findings
• Within the first few hundred feet bordering the Nation’s coasts, property owners face as large a
risk of damage from erosion as they do from flooding.  Information about the magnitude of this
risk, which varies widely, is generally not available.
• Roughly 1,500 homes and the land on which they are built will be lost to erosion each year, on
average, for the next several decades.  Costs to coastal property owners will average $530 million
per year.  Additional beach nourishment or structural protection might lead to lower losses;
additional development in the most erosion prone areas will lead to higher losses.
• At current enrollment levels, the National Flood Insurance Program will pay $80 million per year
for erosion-related damage, about 5 percent of today’s premiums.  Total losses will rise with
hoped-for enrollment increases.
• Today’s property values within the areas most susceptible to coastal erosion have been lowered by
a total of $3.3 billion to $4.8 billion nationwide as a result of erosion, a loss of about 10 percent.
• Most of the damage from erosion over the next 60 years will occur in low-lying areas also subject
to the highest risk of flooding.  Some additional damage will also occur along eroding coastal
bluffs.
• Although certain types of erosion damage are not eligible under National Flood Insurance Program
rules, most erosion-related losses sustained by policyholders is reimbursed by the program.
However, erosion damage is not fully reflected in flood insurance rates; current rates are primarily
based on flood risk alone. Thus erosion losses will be subsidized by policyholders in non-eroding
areas or by general taxpayers.
• To fully reflect risk, insurance rates in the highest risk coastal areas must be, on average, twice
today’s rates.  Rate increases could be spread uniformly across the highest risk coastal areas or
varied according to the risk of erosion-related damage.  The rate increases needed to cover
expected erosion losses can be designed to be acceptable to a majority of current policyholders,
based on results of a mail survey.
• The cost of identifying, mapping, disseminating, and maintaining information on the erosion
hazard nationwide is about $5 million per year.  For comparison, if all currently empty lots in areas
most susceptible to erosion are built on, damage from erosion would rise by roughly $100 million
per year for the value of the structures alone.  The cost effectiveness of mapping depends on how
much the maps reduce development (and rebuilding) within eroding areas, but the investment is
likely to be worthwhile.
• Development density in several of the high-risk coastal areas studied by The Heinz Center
increased by more than 60 percent over the last 20 years.  Roughly 15 percent of this increase
appears attributable to the influence of the National Flood Insurance Program.  However, the
building standards and floodplain management requirements that are part of the program have
reduced flood and erosion damage per structure by roughly 35 percent.  Thus, for development
after 1980, the program has lowered damage by about 25 percent below the level that would have
occurred without the program.
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BOX S.3   Policy Options Evaluated
The following nine options were evaluated.  Options 1−5 are mutually exclusive; that
is, only one can be chosen.  Any of options 6−9 could be added to any of the other
policy packages.  Options 2−7 depend on the availability of detailed erosion hazard
maps.
1. Maintain the status quo (i.e., no change in policy)
2. Erosion mapping and dissemination alone
3. Creation of a coastal high hazard zone, including both high flood and erosion
zones
4. Mandatory erosion surcharge on flood insurance in erosion zones
5. Erosion surcharge combined with regulatory measures to reduce damages
6. Flood-related regulatory changes in erosion zones
7. Erosion insurance in bluff areas susceptible to erosion but not flooding
8. Relocation assistance and/or land acquisition
9. Shoreline protection measures (i.e., nourishment, dune restoration, and structural
measures)
THE COASTAL EROSION HAZARD
The erosion hazard was dramatized recently by the predicament of the Cape
Hatteras lighthouse in North Carolina.  When constructed in 1870, the lighthouse
was 1,500 feet from the shore.  Protective measures to reduce the rate of beach
erosion in front of the lighthouse provided a temporary solution, but, by late
1987, the lighthouse stood only 160 feet from the sea and was in danger of
collapsing.  In 1999, after several years of debate and lawsuits aimed at blocking
a relocation, the National Park Service successfully moved the lighthouse back
2,900 feet at a cost of $9.8 million (see Figure S.2).
Approximately 350,000 structures are located within 500 feet of the 10,000-mile
open ocean and Great Lakes shorelines of the lower 48 states and Hawaii. This
estimate does not include structures in the densest areas of large coastal cities,
such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami, which are heavily
protected against erosion.
Of these, about 87,000 homes are located on low-lying land or bluffs likely to
erode into the ocean or Great Lakes over the next 60 years. The breakdown by
region is shown in Table S.1. Assuming no additional beach nourishment or
structural protection, roughly 1,500 homes and the land on which they are built
will be lost to erosion each year. An example of a house threatened by erosion is
shown in Figure S.3.
Within the highest risk flood hazard areas (“V-zones”) of the Atlantic and Gulf
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of Mexico coasts, the risk of damage from erosion is almost equal to, and added
to, that from flooding.  Much of the Pacific and Great Lakes shorelines are
backed by steep cliffs or bluffs susceptible to erosion also.
FIGURE S.2   In 1999 the National Park Service moved the Cape Hatteras
lighthouse back 2,900 feet to a more stable position.
(Photo by Drew Wilson, The Virginia Pilot)











  Miles 2,300 2,000 1,600 3,600 9,500
  Percentage of total 24% 21% 17% 38%
Structures within 500 feet of shoreline
  Number 170,000 44,000 66,000 58,000 338,000
  Percentage of total 50% 13% 20% 17%
Structures within 60-year erosion hazard area (EHA)b
  Number 53,000 13,000  4,600 16,000   87,000
EHA structures as % of those
within 500 feet of shoreline
31% 29%   7% 28%
Structures within 60-year EHA assuming all open lots are filled
  Number 76,000 22,000 5,200 >16,000c >120,000
a  All estimates exclude structures in major urban areas.  The analysis assumes these structures
will be protected from the erosion hazard.
b  The 60-year EHA is determined by multiplying local erosion rates by 60 years.
c  Data on open lots not available in Great Lakes
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
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FIGURE S.3    As a result of erosion, this oceanfront house is now on the beach.
(Photo by The Heinz Center)
The average annual erosion rate on the Atlantic coast is roughly 2 to 3 feet/year.
States bordering the Gulf of Mexico have the nation’s highest average annual
erosion rates (6 feet/year).  The rates vary greatly from location to location and
year to year.  A major storm can erode the coast inland 100 feet or more in a day.
The coastline often accretes partway back over the next decade.  Both the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts are bordered by a chain of roughly 300 barrier islands,
which are composed primarily of loose sand and are the most dynamic land
masses along the open-ocean coast.  Barrier island coastlines have been
retreating landward for thousands of years in response to slowly rising sea levels.
The Pacific coastline consists of narrow beaches backed by steep sea cliffs that
are composed of crumbly sedimentary bedrock and are therefore unstable. In
addition, the cliffs are heavily faulted and cracked, and the resulting breaks and
joints are undermined easily by wave action.  Cliff erosion is site specific and
episodic.  In some locations, the cliffs can retreat tens of feet at one time,
whereas 50 to 100 feet away, there is no retreat at all. As a result, long-term
average annual erosion rates are usually less than 1 foot/year, but these low
averages hide the true nature of large, episodic events.  Similarly, along the
shores of the Great Lakes, rates of bluff and dune erosion vary from near zero to
tens of feet per year because of annual variability in wave climate and lake
levels.
EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS
xxviii
COSTS OF EROSION TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE
Property Losses and Insurance Payouts
Nationwide, erosion may be responsible for approximately $500 million in
property loss to coastal property owners per year, including both damage to
structures and loss of land.  The breakdown by region is shown in Table S.2.
These conclusions are based on detailed field measurements and mail survey
information collected on approximately 3 percent of the buildings located within
500 feet of the shore.  The Heinz Center sent field survey teams to measure and
photograph 11,450 structures in 18 counties.  Additional information on these
same structures was obtained from county assessor and similar offices, and
detailed questionnaires mailed to the owners. Researchers intensively studied
120 miles of shoreline, or about 1 percent of the U.S. coastline outside of Alaska
and Hawaii.  The areas studied are shown in Figure S.4 along with their typical
erosion rates.
Not all of the $500 million in annual property loss will be covered by the NFIP,
however.   First, insurance does not cover loss of land.  In addition, the NFIP
limits coverage to $250,000 and many coastal houses are worth considerably
more.  Finally, results of The Heinz Center’s mail survey indicate that roughly
half the homeowners in high erosion areas on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts
currently purchase flood insurance, which to large extent covers erosion losses,
as well.  On the Pacific and Great Lakes coasts, where bluff erosion is a problem,
10 percent or fewer of at-risk houses are insured.  Assuming that NFIP
enrollment remains at present rates, the payout over the next few decades for
erosion losses is likely to be roughly $80 million per year.
The breakdown by region is shown in Table S.2.  Table S.3 compares estimates
of erosion along the Atlantic coast today to the higher losses projected decades
into the future.  Note that NFIP payments in erosion-prone areas over the last
decade were lower than the losses projected in Tables II and III.  Averaged over
the last decade, premiums paid by owners of houses built after 1981 have been
sufficient to cover losses, as required by law.  However, as the shore erodes
inland, damage to these structures will rise.
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FIGURE S.4   Average Annual Erosion Rates (feet/year) within Counties studied in
The Heinz Center’s Evaluation of Erosion Hazards
TABLE S.2    Nationwide Estimates of Cost of Erosion: Average Annual Losses to












$320 $50 $110  $50 $530
Communityb
$260 $50   $70  $30 $410
National Flood Insurance Fundc, assuming 100% enrollment:
$130 $20   $10  $30 $200
National Flood Insurance Fundc, assuming current enrollment
  $70 $10     $1    $2   $80
a  Loss of structure and land.
b  Loss of structure and land, not including the “amenity value” of the oceanfront, which is
transferred from owner to owner.
c  Payments from the National Flood Insurance Fund are for damage to structures and contents
only.
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
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TABLE S.3   Estimates of Cost of Erosion Along the Atlantic Coast: Variation in
Average Annual Losses Through Time (in Millions of Dollars per Year)
Affected Entity Within 30 Year
 EHA
30 to 60 Years from
Today (Existing
Structures Only)







National Flood Insurance Fundd, assuming 100% enrollment
 $80 $180 $260
National Flood Insurance Fundd, assuming current enrollment
  $40  $90 $130
a  Vacant lots are, on average, about 30 percent of total lots.
b  Loss of structure and land.
c  Loss of structure and land, not including the “amenity value” of the oceanfront, which is
transferred from owner to owner.
d  Payments from the National Flood Insurance Fund are for damage to structures and contents
only.
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
Property losses are just one of the many costs of shore erosion. A recent study by
The Heinz Center (1999), The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards, emphasizes
that many hidden or unreported costs related to coastal hazards are imposed on
the business community, individuals, families and neighborhoods, public and
private institutions, and natural resources and the environment.  Although that
study focused on weather-related coastal hazards, such as hurricanes and other
severe storms, erosion clearly influences the stability and condition of coastal
property and beaches when such disasters strike a community.
Reduced Property Values
Research conducted by The Center’s collaborators at The University of Georgia
shows a strong relationship between house price and the number of years until
the nearest shoreline is likely to erode and reach the house (determined by
dividing the distance from the shore by the erosion rate).  Houses close to a
rapidly eroding shore are worth less today than otherwise identical houses that
are close to shorelines that are relatively stable.  The increased risk of damage is
reflected in sales price.  This relationship for typical waterfront properties – at
the same distance from the water today, but with shores eroding at different rates
– is shown in Figure S.5.
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Along the Atlantic coast, a house that is 50 years from the shoreline is estimated
to be worth about 90 percent of an identical house located 200 years from the
shore; likewise, a house estimated to be within 10 to 20 years of an eroding shore
is worth 80 percent of one located 200 years away.  This varies somewhat from
region to region, but the Atlantic coast results are typical.
By adding up these estimates across the 53,000 structures currently inside the
60-year erosion hazard area on the Atlantic Coast, The Heinz Center estimates a
depression in today’s property values to the owners of these homes of
approximately $1.7 to 2.7 billion. (The 60-year erosion hazard area is the land
expected to be lost to erosion over the next 60 years.)  The estimated depression
in property values for the 87,000 houses within the 60-year erosion hazard area
nationwide is $3.3 to 4.8 billion.  If houses are built on all the remaining empty
lots within the 60-year erosion hazard area, then the loss in property value might
total $4.6 to 6.6 billion. The breakdown by region is shown in Table S.4.
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a Property value for otherwise identical waterfront houses, at the same distance from the
water today, but with shores eroding at different rates.
EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS
xxxii
TABLE S.4   Estimated Economic Impacts of Erosion in 60-Year Erosion Hazard
Areas Nationwide (in Millions of Dollars)
Atlantic Coast Gulf Coast Great Lakes Pacific Coast Total
Loss in property value
$1,700–$2,700 $100–$200 $600–$900 $900–$1,000 $3,300–$4,800
Loss in property value, assuming all empty lots are filled
$2,500–$3,800 $200–$300  $900–1,300a $1000–$1,200 $4,600–$6,600
a  Percentage of empty lots extrapolated from average of other regions.
The loss in property value represents depression in property price prior to any damage.
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
CURRENT POLICIES IN ERODING AREAS
Currently, erosion is addressed in a piecemeal manner by Federal, state, and
local governments as well as private owners.  These activities are summarized in
Table S.5.  Federal activities and programs include:  the NFIP, which reimburses
its policyholders for erosion losses; coastal engineering projects, such as beach
nourishment, that help protect against erosion; funding and technical assistance
to states; and purchase of coastal areas for public ownership.  The Coastal
Barrier Resources Act restricts federal expenditures, including flood insurance
and disaster assistance, within designated Coastal Barrier Resources System
Units.  The system encompasses nearly 1.3 million acres and approximately
1,200 miles of shoreline.
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Approaches to erosion management
Individuals • Protect private property through structural and non-structural
measures




• Establish and enforce building codes and land use regulations
• Enforce NFIP building and floodplain management
requirements
• Participate in federal and non-federal shore protection projects
States • Establish and enforce setback policies
• Regulate the use of shoreline stabilization structures
• Require disclosure of erosion hazards in real estate transactions
• Participate in federal and non-federal shore protection projects
Federal agencies • Provide flood insurance coverage (FEMA – NFIP)
• Prohibit federal expenditures in designated coastal barriers (U.S.
FWS – Coastal Barrier Resources Act)
• Provide disaster response and recovery assistance (FEMA)
• Support state erosion management programs (NOAA – CZMA)
• Participate in federal shore protection projects (U.S. ACE)
Key:
CBRA     Coastal Barrier Resources Act
CZMA      Coastal Zone Management Act
FEMA       Federal Emergency Management
Agency
NFIP       National Flood Insurance Program
NOAA    National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
U.S. ACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. FWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Coastal Erosion and The National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Program was established in 1968 "to provide flood
insurance in communities which adopt and adequately enforce floodplain
management ordinances that meet minimum [program] requirements" (National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968, P.L. 90-448).
The program has three objectives:
• Identify flood risks and disseminate this information to the public, lenders,
insurance and real estate agents, and state and local governments;
• assure the purchase of sufficient insurance and the enrollment of adequate
numbers of communities and individuals to curtail the expansion of federal
disaster relief and flood control programs; and
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• encourage wise use of the floodplain through mitigation requirements and
activities in communities that wish to obtain federally backed flood
insurance.
Erosion is not well addressed by the current NFIP.  Although certain types of
erosion-related damage are not reimbursable under program rules, the NFIP
appears to pay for most erosion-related damage claims in low-lying areas. A
survey of insurance agents by The Heinz Center found no case where policy
holders failed to submit a claim, or the program denied a claim, because of
erosion. However, current insurance rates do not reflect the magnitude of the
erosion risk faced by any individual policyholder.  Thus, future claims by
homeowners in erosion-prone areas will have to be subsidized by others.
Moreover, because current flood maps do not incorporate erosion risk, they are
not only incomplete but also misleading to users.  The next section presents a
comprehensive series of policy options to remedy these shortcomings.  The
Heinz Center’s recommendations are presented at the conclusion of this
summary.
POLICY OPTIONS
Nine policy options, or packages of options, were developed and analyzed.
Options 1−5 are meant to be mutually exclusive; that is, only one can be chosen.
These are ordered roughly from least to most extensive policy intervention.  Any
of options 6−9 could be added to any of the other policy packages.  Options 2−7
depend on the availability of detailed erosion hazard maps.  Each option is
summarized and evaluated below.
To help sort through the nine options, The Heinz Center constructed a series of
evaluation criteria that reflect possible goals for changes to the flood program.
The criteria are as follows:
• Will the public be better informed about the risks of living on the coast?
• Does the change help alleviate economic hardships from erosion damages
that do occur?
• Is the program fairer?
- Will insurance rates more closely reflect risk?
- Are additional restrictions imposed on property owners?
• Does the change lead to reduced damage to structures?
- Does it avert damage to structures not yet built?
- Does it help reduce damage to existing structures?
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• Does the change lead to other desirable outcomes, such as environmental
benefits or enhanced opportunities for recreation?
• Is the change cost effective for affected individuals?
Option 1.  Maintain the Status Quo
Nineteen of 30 coastal states currently incorporate erosion risks into the approval
process for new construction close to the shoreline.  The erosion management
activities undertaken by states and communities are summarized in Box S.4.
However, information about erosion risks is spotty, and both the information and
its usage are inconsistent from state to state.  Although the NFIP appears to
reimburse most erosion-related damage in low-lying areas, current insurance
rates do not reflect the variation in risk among policyholders.  Thus, claims by
homeowners in erosion-prone areas will have to be subsidized by policyholders
in non-eroding areas. The regulatory components of the NFIP have reduced
damage from flooding but are less successful with respect to erosion.
Option 2.  Erosion Mapping and Dissemination Alone
The preparation of maps displaying the location and extent of areas subject to
erosion would be the simplest and least intrusive change to the NFIP.  The maps,
if made widely available, would help to better inform the public about the risks
of living along the coast.  Erosion mapping is also a requisite component of
options 3 through 7.  FEMA estimates that a nationwide erosion hazard mapping
program would cost $44 million.  Assuming that a map is useful for 10 years,
annual costs would be roughly $5 million per year.  Depending on the region, if
such maps discourage more than 2 to 7 percent of development on currently
empty lots within the 60-year erosion hazard area, the investment will be
worthwhile.
Erosion is a highly variable process, thus the maps would reflect only a statistical
"best guess" of how much the shore might erode over the next several decades.
Furthermore, the maps would be based on data from historical maps and aerial
photographs—data that can be sparse and difficult to interpret.  Nevertheless,
such information is extremely helpful to many types of users of flood insurance
rate maps.
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BOX S.4    Present Status of Erosion Management at the
State and Community Levels
Thirty states and five territories border the U.S. coastline. States have adopted land-use
plans, regulations, building standards, and other programs for addressing coastal storms,
floods, and erosion.  Particularly since the passage of the 1972 Coastal Zone Management
Act (P.L. 92-583), coastal states have been central players in the management of coastal
resources and shorefront areas.
State-level responses to erosion range from doing nothing to restricting the use of hard
structures and enforcing erosion-rate based setbacks (e.g., North Carolina), to providing
loans to stabilize the shoreline through cliff-hardening (e.g., the Maryland Chesapeake
Bay).  Nineteen of 30 coastal states currently incorporate erosion risks into the approval
process for new construction close to the shoreline.  However, information about erosion
risks is spotty, and both the information and how it is used is inconsistent from region to
region.
Generally, states have delegated their land-use authorities to local governments.
Therefore, the National Flood Insurance Program requires each community to adopt
floodplain management requirements, including performance standards for new
construction and substantial improvements to existing buildings located in special flood
hazard areas on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps.
Communities or local governments address coastal erosion problems by developing and
enforcing local ordinances to guide decisions on land use, zoning, subdivision practices,
building standards, hazard mitigation, and management of public beach areas.  Through
the Community Rating System (a flood insurance rating and community inspection
program), policyholders receive reductions in their premiums if the community
implements floodplain management activities that exceed the National Flood Insurance
Program’s minimum requirements.
As part of this study, The Heinz Center conducted case studies of community responses to
coastal erosion (Chapter 4 and Appendix F).  These examples show how communities




Option 3.  Creation of a Coastal High Hazard Zone, including both
High Flood and Erosion Risks
FEMA could establish a single "coastal high hazard zone" encompassing the
current highest-risk flood zone (the “V-zone”) and any additional areas highly
susceptible to erosion.  Insurance rates would increase to reflect both risks.   On
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the combined region would be roughly 15 percent
larger than the current high-hazard V-zone.
If Congress directs FEMA to increase insurance rates to fully cover expected
erosion damage, rates in the new area would rise a fixed amount between $.90
and $1.00/year per $100 of coverage.  This is in addition to current rates that
vary by flood risk.  Under this option, all policyholders share the costs of erosion
damage equally.
One advantage of this option is that it contains the cost of erosion to within the
coastal high hazard zone, thus eliminating future subsidies from other NFIP
policyholders (such as inland homeowners).  Because it also requires erosion
hazard mapping (discussed in option 2), the public will be better informed about
the risks of living along the coast.
The main disadvantage of this option is that it does not bring insurance rates
fully into line with the risk faced by individual homeowners within the coastal
high hazard zone.  Thus, policyholders in low erosion areas will still be
subsidizing those located within more erosion-prone ones.
Option 4.  Mandatory Erosion Surcharge on Flood Insurance in
Erosion Zones
Many homeowners pay insurance rates far lower than is necessary to cover the
risks caused by both flooding and erosion.  Thus, either other NFIP
policyholders or taxpayers will subsidize future erosion damages.  Congress
could direct FEMA to impose an erosion surcharge on current flood policies in
erosion-prone areas to cover the additional risks and thus reduce the subsidy.
The surcharge would have to be mandatory because the flood program already
pays for most losses from erosion (in low-lying areas), and few policyholders
would be likely to pay extra for erosion coverage that they get free of charge
today. Moreover, it is not practical to distinguish between damage from flooding
alone and that from erosion-related flooding.
This option would help bring insurance rates closer in line with expected damage
and like the previous two options, would help better inform the public about the
risks of living along the coast.  Fairness is one of the most compelling reasons in
favor of a mandatory erosion surcharge.
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Option 5.  Erosion Surcharge Combined with Regulatory Measures
to Reduce Damages
Under the NFIP, flood insurance is offered to individuals on the condition that
the community adopts regulations to reduce future damage.  Following this
model, other measures—such as setback requirements or building code
changes—could be required in erosion-prone areas as a condition of allowing
residents to remain eligible for combined flood and erosion insurance.  NFIP
elevation and related floodproofing requirements have been effective at reducing
flood damage (see Box S.5) but are not as effective for reducing erosion damage.
Mandatory setbacks determine how close to the shoreline structures can be built
or rebuilt. FEMA could follow one or more of the approaches taken by state
coastal zone management programs in establishing setbacks.  Nineteen of 30
coastal states have setbacks or land use controls in place along the coast (see Box
S.4).   Seven states established setback distances based on expected years from
the shoreline.  Typical setbacks are 30 years for houses and 60 years for larger
structures.  The remainder specify a fixed setback distance in feet from the
shoreline, typically between 25 feet to 100 feet.  Alternatively, the two
approaches may be combined (i.e., no development within 50 feet or within the
30-year EHA) to provide an additional safety margin.
FEMA could also require communities to adopt building code changes to reduce
the impacts of erosion-related damages.  For example, structures could be
designed so that they could be moved and relocated more easily in the event that
an eroding shore gets too close.  Removal of a structure that ends up within, for
instance, the 10-year erosion line could be required.
A key issue associated with this option is whether Congress decides that the
public benefits of setback requirements or mandatory removal of structures
outweigh the potential hardship from imposing restrictions on how individuals
may use their land.  Congress could follow a different path if there is hesitancy
to assign additional regulatory responsibilities to states and localities.  It might
simply choose to deny insurance—for both flooding and erosion—to new
structures in the highest-risk erosion zones.   Building in these areas would not
be prohibited, but the owners of new structures would not be eligible for federal
flood insurance or disaster assistance grants or loans.  This is similar to the
approach followed in the Coastal Barrier Resources Act.
Option 6.  Flood-related Regulatory Changes in Erosion Zones
Erosion not only causes damage directly, but also, over time, increases the risk
from flooding.  The likelihood of damage could be lowered somewhat if
communities were directed to apply building standards appropriate to the flood
conditions expected several decades from now.  Newly constructed houses, or
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houses rebuilt after substantial damage, that are located in flood zones also
susceptible to erosion, could be required to meet building standards with an
added margin of safety based on the anticipated erosion of the coast.
Building in some additional flood resistance is cheaper during the design and
building phases than it is after a structure has been built. However, we were not
able to ascertain how large a margin of safety would be cost effective.
Option 7.  Erosion Insurance in Bluff Areas Susceptible to Erosion
but not Flooding
Although many houses on bluffs overlooking the coast are subject to erosion
damage, homeowners in these areas typically have not purchased flood
insurance.  Only 10 percent or fewer of the susceptible structures in the bluff
areas of the Great Lakes and Pacific coasts are covered, even though annual
erosion damages in these areas may exceed $100 million per year.  Coverage
may be low in bluff areas because the National Flood Insurance Act limits
coverage of erosion damage to that "caused by waves or currents of waters
exceeding anticipated cyclical levels."  Hence, there may be a greater likelihood
of a claim being rejected in bluff areas than in low-lying areas. Insurance
specifically covering erosion risks in bluff areas would be more consistent with
the actual problems in these areas.
Any extension of erosion insurance into bluff areas would need to be pursued
with caution, to make sure it did not encourage development in eroding areas.
The NFIP appears to have contributed modestly to the increase in low-lying
coastal areas, but because of the success of building standards, overall flood
damage is lower than it would have been without the program (see Box S.5).
Building standard changes are not likely to be as effective for lowering erosion
damage, thus the overall effect of extending insurance to bluffs is unclear.
Nevertheless, this option would serve to reduce the hardship if and when damage
does occur.
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BOX S.5   Effects of Erosion Risk, Flood Risk, and
Flood Insurance on Development
The Heinz Center study evaluated some of the effects of the National Flood Insurance Program,
which has never been fully assessed.  A team of researchers at The George Washington
University reconstructed 35-year development histories of 120 blocks of homes within seven of
the counties inventoried.  Four of the counties were on the Atlantic coast, two were on the Gulf
of Mexico, and one on the Pacific coast.
Within these counties, development density more than doubled over the 35 years.  With such
overall growth as background, the researchers used statistical regression methods to examine
whether the amount of land developed in each block was related to the risk of erosion; the risk
of flooding; as well as other factors, such as whether it was a waterfront block.  The research
team also explored whether the availability of flood insurance affected the density of
development.
Just as erosion affects property prices, so, too, does it affect the density of development.  For
blocks within the front (ocean-side) half of the 60-year erosion hazard area, the closer the block
was to the ocean in years, the lower the development density.  Outside the 60-year erosion
hazard area, the closer the block was to the ocean in years, the more rapid the development.
The research team also found that flood risk affects the density of development.  In the absence
of insurance and other programs to reduce flood risk, development density would be about 25
percent lower in the highest-risk zones than in areas less susceptible to damage from coastal
flooding.  After the adoption of the National Flood Insurance Program, development density
was roughly 15 percent lower in areas now classified as highest risk than in other areas.  Thus,
it appears that although development density is still lower than average in high-risk flood areas,
the difference is smaller than it was before the program.
Although development density has increased, flood damage may be lower than it would have
been if the National Flood Insurance Program had never been enacted, because of the program’s
floodplain management and building code requirements.  Structures built after the program’s
building requirements went into effect in 1981 are expected to sustain significantly less damage
during floods than are older structures built prior to the program.  Overall, the net damage to
"post-1981" structures is about 25 percent lower than it would have been if the new
development had occurred at the lower densities, but higher rates of damage per structure, that
would have occurred without the program.
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Option 8.  Relocation Assistance and/or Land Acquisition
The Heinz Center estimates that roughly 10,000 structures are within the
estimated 10-year erosion zone closest to the shore.  A program of relocation
assistance and/or land acquisition could encourage removal of these high-risk
structures before they are destroyed.  Such a program might make the most sense
if linked to some of the regulatory options under Option 5, such as revocation of
insurance once a structure enters the 10-year erosion zone, unless the structure is
relocated.  Buyouts, or acquisition of property, already are used by many states
and the federal government as a risk-reduction strategy.  Under the rules for
buyouts funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the land
purchased is deeded permanently as open space.  Acquisition offers a way to
permanently reduce or eliminate susceptibility to flood damage in the highest-
risk areas.  It also can be used to achieve important community and
environmental protection goals, such as public beach access and preservation of
open space and wildlife habitat.
This option has not been used extensively because of the high costs of coastal
property. Mandatory programs also would provoke objections from private
landowners.  A previous attempt to encourage removal and relocation of
threatened structures—the Upton-Jones Program, which existed from 1987 to
1994–was suspended because of limited usage and unintended outcomes.   A
relocation program, if  pursued, would have to be carefully designed to avoid the
shortcomings of the Upton-Jones Program.
Option 9.  Shoreline Protection Measures (Nourishment, Dune
Restoration, and Structural Measures)
Like relocation, shoreline protection is one of the few options that can reduce
damage to existing structures.  Interest in shoreline protection measures by
current property owners is clear, especially in areas with a high density of
existing structures and limited shoreline.  Protective measures include beach
nourishment, dune restoration, and armoring of the shoreline with hard
structures.  Individuals, communities, and states already build many such
projects.  Protection measures such as dune restoration are likely to lead to
environmental improvements.  However, hard structural measures, such as
groins, bulkheads, and rip-rap, can have negative impacts on the physical and
aesthetic characteristics of beaches by reducing beach width, disrupting sand
supplies, and limiting recreational use of the beach.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers spent about $700 million between 1950 and
1993 (in 1993 dollars) on beach nourishment of about 200 miles of coast.
Continued maintenance and renourishment costs roughly $300,000/year per mile
of coast.  However, expected annual erosion damage exceeds nourishment costs
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in only one of the 10 Atlantic and Gulf coast counties in The Heinz Center
sample.  Thus, nourishment of additional stretches of the coast, if desired at all,
will only pass a benefit-cost test for federal funding in limited, high-density
areas.  Shoreline protection measures can augment, but are not substitutes for,
other options.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the analyses presented in this report, The Heinz Center recommends
that Congress take, at minimum, the following two actions.  The Heinz Center
believes that these two recommendations provide significant benefits, are cost
effective, and are acceptable across most of the political spectrum.  The other
options we presented will lower damage or alleviate economic hardship should
damage occur.  Congress should consider the advantages and disadvantages of
these options within the framework of existing Federal, State, and local
programs.
Congress should instruct the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
develop erosion hazard maps that display the location and extent of coastal
areas subject to erosion.  The erosion maps should be made widely available
in both print and electronic formats.
Flood insurance rate maps do not inform current and prospective coastal
property owners of erosion risks.  The omission is substantial.  Averaged over
the highest hazard flood zone, the risk of erosion-related damage to structures is
roughly equal to the risk of flood damage.  Thus, the current maps, which show
only flood hazards, are misleading.
Without accurate information on erosion, state and local decision makers and the
general public will not be fully aware of the coastal hazards they face, nor will
they be able to make use of this information for land-use planning and erosion
hazard mitigation.
Congress should require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
include the cost of expected erosion losses when setting flood insurance rates
along the coast.
Despite facing higher risk, homeowners in erosion-prone areas currently are
paying the same amount for flood insurance as are policyholders in non-eroding
areas. FEMA should incorporate the additional risk from erosion into the
determination of actuarial rates in high-hazard coastal regions.  This will
eliminate the need for subsidies from other NFIP policyholders or taxpayers to
cover expected erosion losses.
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Erosion risk can be incorporated in several ways. The simplest is to combine the
highest hazard flood zones and erosion hazard areas into a “Coastal High-Hazard
Zone.”   Erosion risk would be shared equally among all policyholders in the
new combined zone. Alternatively, FEMA could charge rates based on a refined
risk classification that separately distinguishes erosion and flood risks.  Only
those policyholders in erosion hazard areas (about one-third of the coastal high-
hazard zone) would be charged an erosion surcharge.
Discussion of Recommendations
Given the magnitude of the risk posed by coastal erosion and the misleading
nature of the current “flood only” coastal hazard maps, FEMA should be
directed to prepare maps of erosion risks of at least the quality of current flood
maps.  Ideally, these maps should display both risks and be made available in
both paper and electronic forms.
FEMA estimates such maps, covering 12,500 miles of U.S. ocean and Great
Lakes shoreline of greatest concern, would cost approximately $44 million—less
than $5 million per year over their expected 10-year useful life.  While it is
difficult to estimate the effect such information would have on future
development decisions, the effect would not have to be large to justify the costs.
If the availability of erosion maps lowers future damage by just a few percent,
the savings would exceed the costs.  Alternative federal erosion-related
expenditures are unlikely to be more cost-effective.  For example, spending an
equivalent amount on beach nourishment would protect roughly another 10
miles of shoreline.  And though these funds could be used to further improve
existing flood maps, far less information about erosion—a risk about equal to
flood in coastal regions—is available.
In addition to the use of erosion maps by individual homeowners and
communities, FEMA must have them if they are to include the costs of erosion
losses when setting coastal insurance rates.  As presented earlier (Table S.2),
FEMA’s liability for erosion losses is likely to average $80 million per year
without any further development in erosion-prone areas.  If erosion hazards are
not adequately factored into current flood insurance rates, losses will have to be
subsidized by other NFIP policyholders or taxpayers.   Losses of this level are a
small fraction of the total earned premiums collected nationwide (currently
about $1.3 billion per year), but within coastal regions, the percentage is
substantial.
Table S.6 includes estimates of insurance rate increases from several alternative
ways to charge policy holders for the cost of erosion damage.  By spreading the
costs over a newly created Coastal High Hazard Zone, rates for all policy
holders in both High Hazard Flood Zones (V-zones) and the 60-year Erosion
Hazard Area will rise roughly $.90/year per $100 of coverage.
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Combined Flood and Erosion
Coastal High Hazard Zone $0.90 $0.90 $0.35
Single Zone Erosion Hazard Area
     0- to 60-year EHA No increase  $2.45 $0.95
Two Zone Erosion Hazard Area
For New Structures
     0- to 20-year EHA No increase $11.40 N.A. c
     20- to 60-year EHA No increase   $1.75 N.A.
a  Surcharges are given in dollars per year per $100 of coverage for a 1-4 family residence.  Rates
for new structures and post-1981 structures are calculated to be revenue neutral within each zone.
Assumptions:  Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) pays for 85 percent of damage  (remainder
is wind damage paid for by private insurers); interest rate is 3 percent; FIA overhead is 35 percent;
subsidized structures pay 38 percent of post-81 rates.
b  Erosion hazard area
c  Not applicable
If Congress chooses to extend subsidies to some existing structures (similar to
the current flood insurance program, which subsidizes many houses built prior to
1981), those structures would pay increases of about $.35/year per $100 of
coverage.
If rate increases are confined to only those structures in the 60-year erosion
hazard area, rates would have to rise by roughly $2.45/year per $100 of coverage
to fully cover expected losses.  Again, if Congress chooses to subsidize some (or
all) current policyholders, following the percentages used elsewhere under the
program would lead to rate increases of roughly $1.00/year per $100 of
coverage.
Congress may prefer to treat future construction differently.  Unlike the owners
of existing houses, builders of new homes can choose where to locate. Congress
can give builders of new homes an incentive to build further back from the
shoreline within eroding areas by charging higher rates closer to the shore and
lower rates further inland.  Rate increases are shown for two zones, 0-20 and 20-
60 years.  Note that rates in the zone closest to the shoreline would have to rise
to $11.40/year per $100 of coverage—over 10 percent of the value of the house
each year.  Rate increases in the zone set back from the shoreline could then be
held to a much more modest rate, $1.75/year per $100 of coverage.
The Heinz Center’s mail survey of homeowners found that about half of flood
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policyholders would be willing to buy optional erosion insurance at a cost less
than $1-$2/year per $100 of coverage (see Figure S.6).  However, at rates
exceeding $5/year per $100 of coverage, voluntary participation would be quite
low.  Thus, most of the rate increases shown in Table S.6 seem within the range
of public acceptability.  While the rate increase for new construction closest to
the shore may at first appear unreasonably high, to many homeowners it may
still be preferable to such alternatives as denial of insurance, or outright bans on
construction, for such risky locations.  Other options for subdividing the erosion
hazard area are described in chapter 6 of the report.
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Coastal erosion is a problem affecting the shores and communities of the United
States and the environmental integrity of its coasts.  Erosion also affects the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and NFIP policyholders by causing
damage that leads to claims.  A series of Congressional actions, particularly the
National Flood Insurance Reform Act (NFIRA) of 1994 (P.L. 103-325), have
been aimed at assessing and reducing erosion-related losses.  Section 577 of the
NFIRA (see Appendix A) mandates that a study be conducted to explore the
effects of erosion and erosion mapping on the NFIP, its policyholders, and
coastal communities prone to erosion.  This report is a response to that mandate.
The policy options and questions contained in Section 577 were presented and
debated in previous legislative proposals for establishing erosion zones within
the NFIP.1  The goal of this study by The H. John Heinz III Center for Science,
Economics and the Environment is to improve understanding of the impacts of
erosion and erosion-related flooding on the NFIP, other federal programs, and
coastal communities.  Rather than prescribe a specific policy, this report presents
a range of policy options and recommendations, and evaluates their economic
impact as well as their effectiveness in reducing erosion losses.  In particular, the
study
• determines the extent of coastal property at risk from erosion and related
hazards, particularly flooding;
• estimates the expected damage from flooding and erosion over the next 60
years;
                                                          
1  House bills: H.R. 4461, 1990; H.R. 1236, 1992; H.R. 62, 1993; HR 3191, 1994.  Senate
bills: S. 1650, 1991; S. 2907, 1992, S. 1405, 1993.
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• evaluates the economic effects of policy changes to the NFIP that would
require erosion mapping; and
• compares these changes to other possible policy measures or actions.
CONDUCT OF THE STUDY
The Evaluation of Erosion Hazards study was conducted in three phases.  In
phase 1, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) contracted with
various state agencies to produce 60-year erosion hazard areas (EHAs) in 27
counties.  The Heinz Center conducted phases 2 and 3, which included a field
survey of structures and an economic analysis of policy changes in EHAs.  The
Heinz Center also performed case studies of community responses to coastal
erosion.  Each phase is described briefly below.
Phase 1:  Mapping Erosion Hazard Areas
In 1995, FEMA initiated the mapping of 27 counties distributed among 18
coastal and Great Lakes states.  The agency allocated funds to state coastal zone
management agencies, or their designees, to map the following features:
• 60-year EHAs, calculated by multiplying erosion rates at each site by 60
years;
• current Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM)-based flood zones, including V-
zone/A-zone2 boundaries and some A-zone/X-zone boundaries, both with
associated base flood elevations (BFEs) and gutter lines (i.e., contour lines
within flood elevations that separate areas with different BFEs); and
• 60-year projected FIRM-based flood zones.  These zones were determined
by projecting the current FIRM-based flood zones landward by
approximately the distance that the beach is expected to erode during the
next 60 years (i.e., the width of the 60-year EHA).
The methods used and results of the phase I erosion hazard area mapping are
described more fully in Appendix B and in Crowell and Leatherman, 1999.
Phase 2:  Structure Inventory and Geographic Information System
Development
Using the 60-year projected erosion hazard zones, the number of structures in
each EHA was approximated for all 27 counties.  The Heinz Center’s
                                                          
2  The various zones, which indicate differing risks of flooding, are defined and discussed in
Chapter 3.
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subcontractor, Spatial Data Institute, conducted field survey measurements of
11,234 structures in or near 60-year EHAs.  Because of cost constraints and the
limited availability of assessment data on structures, field surveys were
conducted in only 18 of the 27 counties (see Figure 1.1).  All geographic regions
of the United States were represented in the study.
Structures were sampled within representative sampling transects distributed
throughout the entire length of mapped coastline.3  The transects included both
eroding and non-eroding areas, as well as varying flood heights and zone
designations (e.g., V-zone, A-zone, and X-zone).  Using the Global Positioning
System and conventional survey techniques, the surveyors located the latitude
and longitude coordinates of each structure accurate to within 3 feet and the
vertical elevation of the lowest floor accurate to within 6 inches.
Detailed structure and parcel attribute information was obtained from each local
government’s tax assessment office.  This information was combined with the
field survey data and plotted on the 60-year EHA maps in a geographic
information system.  A description of attributes collected or calculated for each
structure is provided in Appendix C.
The NFIP policies in force and claims data from the Federal Insurance
Administration for the 27 counties mapped by FEMA also were obtained.
Detailed property attributes, such as sales price and interior features, were
acquired through a mail survey of owners of field-surveyed properties.  Finally, a
database of coastal erosion rates and census block groups adjoining open-ocean
coastlines nationwide was developed to extrapolate nationwide erosion losses
and the effects of policy changes on the NFIP and coastal communities.
                                                          
3  Two counties, Sussex, DE and Glynn, GA, were selected as pilot tests for the field survey
work and were sampled in their entirety.
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FIGURE 1.1  Average Annual Erosion Rates (feet/year) within Counties studied in
The Heinz Center’s Evaluation of Erosion Hazards
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Phase 3:  Analysis of Coastal Erosion Impacts and Potential Policy
Changes
The Heinz Center focused on analyzing the impacts of erosion and the effects of
policy changes on the NFIP and coastal communities.  The economic impact
analysis included two major components:  estimates of the impacts of erosion
and evaluation of the impacts of possible changes in the cost and availability of
flood insurance within the mapped EHAs.  The first component answers the
question, “How big a problem is coastal erosion?”  The second component
develops the “building blocks” needed to address the options suggested by the
U.S. Congress in Section 577.  The analysis of the impacts of erosion considered
the following elements:
• value of the structures damaged by erosion,
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• National Flood Insurance Fund (NFIF) compensation to policyholders for
erosion-related flood losses, and
• changes in the value of residential and commercial properties in communities
with erosion hazards.
The following set of policy options or “packages” (some dependent on mapping
and others not), reflecting a range of possible responses to erosion hazards as
broadly defined by Section 577, were evaluated:
1. maintain the status quo (i.e., no change in policy);
2. erosion mapping and dissemination alone;
3. creation of a coastal high hazard zone, including both high flood and erosion
zones;
4. mandatory erosion surcharge on flood insurance in erosion zones;
5. erosion surcharge combined with regulatory measures to reduce damages;
6. flood-related regulatory changes in erosion zones;
7. erosion insurance in bluff areas susceptible to erosion but not flooding;
8. relocation assistance and/or land acquisition; and
9. shoreline protection measures (i.e., nourishment, dune restoration, and
structural measures).
For each of the eight policy alternatives to the status quo, the three types of
economic impacts listed above were evaluated and compared with the impacts of
erosion under current policies and management regimes.
Community Responses to Coastal Erosion
As part of this study, The Heinz Center conducted five case studies of
community responses to coastal erosion.  The purpose of this research was to
understand more fully how communities currently respond to erosion hazards in
the absence of a comprehensive shoreline protection program coordinated by
federal, state, and local governments; which factors influence local shoreline
protection policy or management; and how changes to the NFIP would affect
local efforts to manage coastal erosion.  The case studies involved interviews of
coastal property owners, community officials, coastal managers,
environmentalists, and others affected by coastal erosion.  Based on these
interviews, Appendix F describes current responses to erosion, how communities
might react to policy changes at the federal level, and how their concerns can be
addressed.  Examples from this study of community responses also can be found
in Chapter 4.
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REPORT ORGANIZATION
This report presents an analysis of the impacts of erosion on the NFIP, related
federal programs (e.g., disaster assistance), and coastal communities (including
individual property owners) as well as the potential effects of policy changes.
The report includes descriptions of the nature and extent of coastal erosion
hazards, the roles of insurance and the federal government in reducing erosion
losses, actions and response measures for reducing erosion losses that are
available to individuals and communities, and how these responses may be
affected by policy changes.  The other chapters of the report and the appendices
address the following topics:
Chapter 2 describes the physical nature of shorelines in context with coastal
development.
Chapter 3 describes the major components and history of the NFIP.  The
program’s current approach to coastal flooding and erosion hazards is described.
Past and current policy reform proposals are reviewed.
Chapter 4 reviews the decision-making context for addressing coastal erosion
hazards.  The current approaches to erosion management are described.  The
causes, effects, and distribution of erosion hazards and current federal, state, and
local management policies and responses also are reviewed.
Chapter 5 analyzes the economic impact of erosion, focusing on the extent of the
coastal erosion problem both today and over the next 60 years assuming that no
changes to current management approaches or policies are made.  Using the data
obtained from the sample of 18 communities and census block groups, the total
expected flood and erosion damage per $100 of house value is estimated and the
results extrapolated nationwide.  The effects of erosion on current house values
and rates of coastal development also are explored.
Chapter 6 describes a series of possible changes in policy, analyzes the potential
impact of each change, and discusses how these changes might alter the trends
observed today.  Floodplain management and mitigation activities, which play
central roles in reducing losses from natural hazards, are addressed in this
analysis.  The costs and benefits of completing the mapping of EHAs nationwide
(which depend on the changes, if any, to NFIP policies) are compared to benefits
that would accrue from equivalent expenditures on other possible erosion and
flood-related mitigation activities not requiring EHA maps.  The Heinz Center’s
recommendations for these changes to the NFIP are presented and discussed.
Appendix A contains Section 577 of the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of
1994 which mandated the Evaluation of Erosion Hazards study.
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Appendix B, Coastal Erosion Hazards Study: Phase One Mapping (Crowell et
al., 1999), describes the initial phase of this study which mapped erosion hazard
areas in 27 coastal counties.
Appendix C, Field Survey of Structures and Geographic Information System
Methods, provides a detailed explanation of the collection of structure data and
the resulting GIS project.
Appendix D, Economic and Actuarial Analysis Methods, contains four reports:
1) Coastal Erosion Hazards: The University of Georgia’s Results examines the
economic effects of flood insurance pricing and availability on housing values,
the local community, and the coastal ecosystem; 2) Flood Insurance, Erosion,
and Coastal Development describes how development in coastal beachfront
areas is affected by erosion and the availability of federal flood insurance; 3)
Estimating Expected Damage to Structures describes the data and methods used
to estimate flood and erosion damage to structures; and 4) Erosion Ratemaking
Procedures and Tables describes the methods used to quantify erosion losses,
and shows, by region and erosion hazard zone, the amount of surcharge on
existing rates needed to insure against erosion losses.
Appendix E lists the communities nationwide that are likely to be identified as
having erosion hazard areas.
Appendix F, Community Response to Coastal Erosion, describes how
communities currently deal with erosion in the absence of a comprehensive
federal-state-local shoreline protection program and explores how a change in
NFIP policy would impact local efforts.
Appendix G is the Questionnaire for Property Owners, part of the National
Coastal Property Survey.
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OF THE UNITED STATES
The shorelines of the United States are dynamic and diverse, shaped by both
natural processes and human intervention.  Principal U.S. shoreline types include
the following (National Research Council,1990):
• crystalline bedrock (e.g., central and eastern Maine coast);
• eroding bluffs and cliffs (e.g., the Great Lakes; outer Cape Cod; parts of
Long Island, New York; the Pacific Coast);
• pocket beaches between headlands (e.g., southern New England, California,
Oregon);
• strandplain beaches attached to mainland (e.g., Myrtle Beach in South
Carolina);
• barrier beaches (e.g., generally along Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts);
coral reef and mangrove (e.g., South Florida); and coastal wetlands (e.g.,
Southern Louisiana, areas landward of barrier beaches).
The physical diversity of shorelines is mirrored by the varied nature and extent
of the erosion problem.  Coastal erosion is a complex physical process
influenced by both natural factors and human activities.  Natural factors
contributing to erosion include sand supply; changes in sea level or Great Lakes
water levels; geologic characteristics; sand-sharing systems of beaches and
dunes; and the effects of waves, currents, tides, and wind.  Table 2.1 lists the
natural factors that affect shoreline change on the ocean coasts.
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TABLE 2.1  Natural Factors Affecting Shoreline Change
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quantities of sediment during
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SOURCE:  Reprinted from National Research Council (1990) with permission.
Copyright © 1990 by the National Academy of Sciences.
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Human activities that can alter natural processes include dredging of tidal
entrances, construction of jetties and groins, hardening of shorelines with
seawalls, beach nourishment, and construction of harbors and sediment-trapping
dams.  Shoreline engineering structures, often built to protect development, can
be undermined by ongoing erosion.  This chapter provides an overview of
shoreline characteristics by region of the United States and the impact of coastal
development on the erosion problem.
The nation’s shorelines are receding at an average rate of slightly more than 1
foot (ft) per year (yr), but rates vary significantly across regions and shoreline
types (Leatherman, 1993).   According to Galgano (1998) and Leatherman
(1993), 80 to 90 percent of the sandy beaches in the United States are eroding.
The East Coast erosion rate averages 2–3 ft/yr.  However, these rates can vary
over short distances (e.g., 1 mile or less) because of geology, inlets, and
engineering structures.  Two types of losses can be caused by erosional
processes.  The first is shoreline retreat, characterized by beach and bluff erosion
that undermines structures (see Figure 2.1).
The second is increased flood damage caused by a combination of erosional
processes, such as scour, and changes in beach profile that increase flood risk.  It
is nearly impossible, however, to separate erosion damages from flood damages
because both tend to occur together during large storms (National Research
Council, 1990).
FIGURE 2.1   The shore eroded
beneath this lighthouse on Morris
Island, SC, placing it hundreds of
feet into the ocean.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1989)
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Severe storm events, such as hurricanes, can cause extensive vertical and
horizontal erosion of the beach and primary dunes.  These erosion events are
followed by extended periods of accretion, in which the beach partially builds
back, but often not completely, to its pre-storm position (see Figure 2.2)
(Douglas et al., 1998; Zhang et al., 1997).  Increased development and
population growth increases the potential of a major disaster from the combined
effects of hurricane force winds, coastal flooding, and erosion of beaches (Dean,
1999; Godschalk et al., 1989; Godschalk et al., 1998).   Many scientists believe
that rising global temperatures may change the frequency and severity of
extreme weather events, leading to increasing damages in the decades ahead,
although observations of hurricane frequency over the past 100 years do not
reveal an upward trend (Zhang et al., 1997).
Although sediment supply and coastal storms are important factors affecting a
specific reach of shoreline, sea level rise affects all shorelines and is perhaps the
dominant process determining the rate of shoreline movement and position
(Zhang et al., 1997).  During the last century, the global average sea level has
risen about 1.0 to 2.5 millimeters per year (Douglas, 1995).  Because of
subsidence, the average rise is approximately 1 ft (approximately 30 centimeters
[cm]) per century along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.  However, some parts of
Maine and the Pacific Northwest actually have experienced relative sea level
decline because of post-glacial rebound or tectonic causes (Leatherman, 1993;
Douglas, 1995).  Other areas, such as Louisiana, are experiencing higher than
average rates of sea level rise because of subsidence caused by natural processes
and human activities (e.g., oil, gas, and groundwater pumping).
FIGURE 2.2  Average shoreline positions in parts of Long Island, NY have
fluctuated over the past 160 years but overall have receded approximately 350 feet.
























SOURCE:   Florida International University Laboratory for Coastal Research, 1998
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Figure 2.3 shows National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration tide gauge data
at selected U.S. cities.  Although the rate of sea level rise seems relatively small—on
the order of centimeters—it is still significant, because a small vertical change in
water level can shift coastlines dramatically inland, depending on the slope of the
coast.
Research has revealed an important relationship between sea level rise and sandy
beach erosion.  On the U.S. East Coast, historical time-series data show that erosion
rates on sandy beaches—uninfluenced by inlets or engineering modifications—are
roughly 150 times the rate of sea level rise (Leatherman et al., 1999).  For example,
a sustained rise of 10 cm in sea level could result in 15 meters of shoreline retreat.
This amount of erosion is more than an order of magnitude greater than would be
expected from a simple response to sea level rise through inundation of the shore.
At present, it is not possible to make a very confident statement about the relative
contributions of specific natural and anthropogenic forcings to observed climate
change (Barnett, et al., 1999).  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
projects a global rise in sea level of between 15 cm and 95 cm, with a “best
estimate” of roughly 50 cm by 2100 (Houghton et al., 1996).  These estimates imply
that current rates of sea level rise will accelerate in the future; this will exacerbate
the present erosion problem by increasing the rate of beach loss (see Box 2.1).
However, the seriousness of coastal erosion calls for urgent action irrespective of
possible acceleration in sea level rise.
FIGURE 2.3  U.S. sea levels generally have been rising during this century (1900–
1997), although there are some isolated exceptions, such as Sitka, Alaska, which are
generally related to tectonic uplift of the land.
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BOX 2.1  Sea level rise and coastal erosion
Observed rates of sea level rise
Global mean surface temperature has increased by between about 0.3 and 0.6oC since the late
19th century.  Over the past 100 years, global sea level has risen between 10-25 cm (about 6
inches),  primarily in response to thermal expansion of the oceans and melting of mountain
glaciers.  The mean trend for global sea level rise was about 1.9 mm/year.  Regional sea level
changes differ from the global mean value for many reasons, such as tectonic uplift or
subsidence of the land surface (see Figure 2.2).
Projected  rates of  sea level rise
Average sea level is projected to rise somewhat more rapidly because of thermal expansion of
the oceans and melting of glaciers and ice-sheets induced by greenhouse gases.  According to
the IPCC’s “business as usual” scenario, sea level is projected to rise by 20 cm by the year
2050, within a range of uncertainty of 7-39 cm (Houghton et al., 1996).  The IPCC “business
as usual” projection for global mean sea level rise for the next 50 years is roughly 10 cm
higher than might be expected from the trends of the last 100 years.  Most of the projected rise
in sea level is because of thermal expansion, followed by increased melting of glaciers and ice
caps.
Implications for erosion hazard areas
Sandy beaches retreat landward in response to sea level rise.   On the Atlantic Coast, long-
term shoreline retreat has averaged about 150 times that of sea level rise (Leatherman et
al.,1999).  Thus, a sustained rise of an additional 10 cm in sea level could result in 15 meters
(about 50 feet) of beach erosion.  Absent protective measures (e.g., shoreline armoring or
beach nourishment), an accelerated rate of sea level rise would result in increased rates of
inland shoreline retreat.
The 60-year erosion maps prepared for this study are based upon historical shoreline records
that typically date from the 1930s or earlier.  These projections reflect historical rates of sea
level rise but do not incorporate the IPCC’s estimates for future rates of sea level rise.   Using
the IPCC sea level rise estimates would increase the rate of shoreline movement by about 1
ft/yr.  For comparison, erosion rates along the Atlantic Coast averaged 2-3 ft/yr over the last
century.  Thus, more existing structures would be vulnerable to erosion damage over the next
60 years than forecasted in this report.
However, the forecasted rates of sea level rise are based on highly uncertain assumptions
regarding rates of thermal expansion of the oceans, melting or accumulation of ice cover, and
surface water and ground water storage.   Tide gauge records show no statistically significant
evidence suggesting global warming has accelerated sea level rise over the past 100 years
(Douglas, 1992; Houghton et al., 1996).   Short term variations in sea level that endure for a
decade or more can distort evidence of sea level rise acceleration.  The range of uncertainty
within sea level rise forecasts is expected to narrow as techniques for measuring and modeling
changes in sea level, climate, and ice sheets improve.
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REGIONAL CHARACTERIZATION OF EROSION AND
RELATED HAZARDS
Coastal erosion hazards and the vulnerability of development and infrastructure
vary significantly by geographic region in the United States.  Five distinct coastal
regions—Atlantic and Gulf, Pacific, Great Lakes, Hawaii, and Alaska—are
described below.
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts
The Atlantic Coast, which spans approximately 3,300 miles (mi) (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1989), is composed of two parts: the glacial
northeast, extending from Maine to northern New Jersey; and the coastal plain,
extending southward from New Jersey to Florida.4  The cliffs along southern New
England generally are composed of eroding glacial deposits, with some exceptions,
such as the rocky headlands in Northern Maine; Point Judith, Rhode Island; and
Cape Anne, Massachusetts.  Much of the New England coast is relatively stable, or
has erosion rates of less than 1 ft/yr.  However, in Massachusetts, long-term erosion
rates average approximately 3 ft/yr along the outer shore of Cape Cod, and often
exceed 6 ft/yr along the south shore of Martha’s Vineyard and 8 ft/yr along the
south shore of Nantucket Island.  Coastal erosion is a continuing problem along the
shores of northern New Jersey and New York, which are among the most urbanized
in the country.  Much of the developed shoreline of New Jersey has been stabilized
with seawalls and other armaments, which in some areas have caused extensive
beach loss (Bush et al., 1996).
The Gulf Coast extends for 2,100 mi (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
1989) and is the lowest-lying area in the United States.  States bordering the Gulf of
Mexico have the highest average erosion rates (about 3 ft/yr) in the nation.  Within
the region, Louisiana has by far the most dynamic coastline and, at up to 50 ft/yr,
holds the distinction of having the most rapid erosion rate in the nation (Dolan et
al., 1985).  This is largely a result of regional subsidence and changes in sediment
delivery.  The state of Louisiana has only two recreational beaches, Grand Isle and
Holly Beach.  Although Grand Isle was nourished recently, the high cost of sand
relative to the value of the property to be protected likely will preclude any future
projects.  Texas has the most extensive sandy coastline in the Gulf, but much of the
area is neither inhabited nor easily accessible.  The city of Galveston has been
effectively protected by a nearly century-old seawall and landfill, but the natural
beach in front of the seawall has been lost (National Research Council, 1990) (see
Figure 2.4).  The west end of Galveston County and other areas, however, are not
protected and are vulnerable to erosion and flood hazards.
                                                          
4  Shore miles are measured as length of open-ocean coastline, as defined by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (1989), and include bay shorelines (e.g., Chesapeake Bay,
Delaware Bay, Long Island Sound).
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FIGURE 2.4  The city of Galveston, Texas, is protected by a seawall but has lost its
natural beach.
(Photo by The Heinz Center)
Barrier islands are the most dynamic land masses along the open-ocean coast.
They consist of a chain of roughly 300 separate, low-lying islands that line the
Gulf and Atlantic coasts from Maine to Texas.  Barrier islands are composed
primarily of loose sand and are subject to multiple natural hazards, including
flooding, wind, waves, and sediment transport, as well as extreme storm events
and long-term sea level rise.  Barrier island coastlines also have been retreating
landward for thousands of years in response to slowly rising sea levels.  They
have been maintained, albeit in more landward positions, through processes of
inlet movement, overwash, and dune migration (Leatherman, 1988).
The change in shoreline position at the Cape Hatteras lighthouse in North
Carolina illustrates the problem of long-term erosion of barrier islands (see
Figure 2.5).  When constructed in 1870, the lighthouse was 1,500 ft from the
shore.  Protective measures to reduce the rate of beach erosion in front of the
lighthouse provided a temporary solution, but, by late 1987, the lighthouse stood
only 160 ft from the sea and was in danger of collapsing because the erosion rate
had averaged 15 ft/yr (National Research Council, 1988).  In 1999, after years of
debate and lawsuits aimed at blocking a relocation, the National Park Service
successfully moved the lighthouse back 2,900 ft at a cost of $9.8 million
(National Park Service, 1999).
The Atlantic and Gulf coasts are at great risk from storm-related erosion because
they are vulnerable to hurricanes as well as winter storm events.  Total insured
property exposures for this region have increased by 70 percent since 1988
(Insurance Research Council and Insurance Institute for Property Loss
Reduction, 1995), and financial exposures are expected to continue to rise as the
coastal population and economic activity increase.  Hurricane Hugo, which
struck the coast in 1989, caused $7 billion in damages to coastal properties in
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North Carolina and South Carolina (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 1990).  Prior to Hugo, the insurance industry never had incurred
a loss from a single disaster that exceeded $1 billion in damages (Kunreuther,
1998).
FIGURE 2.5   Coastal erosion threatens the foundation of the Cape Hatteras
lighthouse, as shown in (a); in response, it was relocated back from the ocean in
1999, as shown in (b).
(a) 1989 - The ocean
encroaches upon the Cape
Hatteras lighthouse, built in
1870.
(Photo by David Policansky)
(b)  1999 - Ten years later,
the National Park Service
moved the Cape Hatteras
lighthouse back 2,900 feet.
(Photo by Drew Wilson, The Virginia Pilot)
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In 1992, Hurricane Andrew became the most costly storm-related disaster in
U.S. history, with (mostly wind-related) damages exceeding $15 billion
(Insurance Research Council and Insurance Institute for Property Loss
Reduction, 1995).  Scientists point out that the past two decades have been a
relatively quiet period for Atlantic hurricane activity; however, some researchers
believe that a new cycle of increased hurricane activity has begun, ushered in by
hurricanes Georges and Mitch in 1998 (Gray et al., 1999).
Table 2.2 shows the frequency of hurricane landfalls by Saffir-Simpson
Category on the mainland United States between 1899 and 1999.  Over short
periods of time, the actual number and timing of landfalls and passages may
deviate substantially from the long-term average; some years have little tropical
cyclone activity, whereas other years might have a number of landfalls.
Pacific Coast
The Pacific coastline of the conterminous United States (California, Oregon, and
Washington) extends for 1,700 mi (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
1989) along the open ocean and encompasses a wide range of shore types,
including mainland beaches, pocket beaches, bluffs and cliffs, and lagoons and
river channels.  Much of the Pacific coastline consists of narrow beaches backed
by steep sea cliffs that are composed of crumbly sedimentary bedrock and are
therefore unstable.  In addition, the cliffs are heavily faulted and cracked, and the
resulting breaks and joints are undermined easily by wave erosion (Flick and
Sterrett, 1994).  The majority of cliff erosion occurs in episodic events, such as
severe winter storms, high rainfall, high tides, and elevated sea levels, especially
during El Niños (Flick and Cayan, 1984; Seymour et al., 1985).  Landslides
triggered by earthquakes, groundwater seepage, or other geologic processes also
can cause bluff failures.  Cliff erosion is site specific and episodic.  In some
locations, the cliffs have retreated tens of feet, whereas 50 to 100 ft away, there
is no retreat at all (Kuhn and Shepard, 1984).  As a result, long-term average
annual erosion rates are usually less than 1 ft/yr, but these low averages hide the
true nature of large, episodic events.
Coastal storms also play a significant role in the erosion of beaches and coastal
cliffs.  The El Niño winter of 1982–1983 set the stage for severe storm-induced
erosion damage to structures along the California coast.  It caused over $100
million in coastal property damages, including the loss of 33 oceanfront homes,
damage to 300 more houses and 900 businesses, and $35 million in losses to
coastal public recreational infrastructure (Flick, 1998).  The 1997–1998 El Niño
again caused extensive erosion of Pacific Coast beaches and left many cliff-top
buildings increasingly exposed to storm- and erosion-related losses.
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TABLE 2.2  Hurricane Direct Hits on the Mainland U.S. Coastline and for Individual
States from 1899-1999 (by Saffir-Simpson Categorya)
Category Number All Major
Area 1 2 3 4 5 1,2,3,4,5 3,4,5
U.S. Total
     (Texas to Maine) 58 36 47 15 2 158 64
Texas 12   9   9   6 0  36 15
     (North)   7   3   3   4 0  17   7
     (Central)   2   2   1   1 0   6   2
     (South)   3   4   6   1 0  14   7
Louisiana   9   5   8   3 1  26 12
Mississippi   1   1   5   0 1   8   6
Alabama   4   1   5   0 0  10   5
Florida 17 16 17   6 1  57 24
     (Northwest) 10   8   7   0 0  25   7
     (Northeast)   2   7   0   0 0   9   0
     (Southwest)   8   3   6   2 1  20   9
     (Southeast)   6 10   7   4 0  27 11
Georgia   1   4   0   0 0   5   0
South Carolina   6   4   2   2 0  14   4
North Carolina 10   5 11   1 b 0  27 11
Virginia   2   1   1 b   0 0   4   1 b
Maryland   0   1 b   0   0 0   1 b   0
Delaware   0   0   0   0 0   0   0
New Jersey   1 b   0   0   0 0   1 b   0
New York   3   1 b   5 b   0 0   9   5 b
Connecticut   2   3 b   3 b   0 0   8   3 b
Rhode Island   0   2 b   3 b   0 0   5 b   3 b
Massachusetts   2   2 b   2 b   0 0   6   2 b
New Hampshire   1 b   1 b   0   0 0   2 b   0
Maine   5 b   0   0   0 0   5 b   0
a  The disaster potential of hurricanes is rated according to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale.
Categories 1 and 2 are relatively minor, with sustained winds of 74 to 110 miles per hour (mph);
Categories 3 through 5 are major, with sustained winds greater than 111 mph.
b   Indicates all hurricanes in this group were moving faster than 30 mph.
Note: State totals will not necessarily equal U.S. totals, and Texas or Florida totals will not
necessarily equal sum of sectional totals because of multiple hurricane landfalls.
SOURCE:  NOAA, 1997, with 1997 -1999 landfall hurricane data from National
Hurricane Center
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Great Lakes
The Great Lakes coasts extend for 3,600 mi (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 1989), and are composed of a variety of shore types, ranging from high
rock bluffs to low plains and wetlands.  Coastal erosion in the Great Lakes is
affected by many factors, including cyclically changing lake levels, disruption of
longshore transport of beach building material, and storms.  Rates of bluff and dune
erosion along the shores of the Great Lakes vary from near zero to tens of feet per
year because of annual variability in wave climate and lake levels (National
Research Council, 1990).  The Great Lakes have experienced a series of high lake
levels in the past two decades, with the highest peak occurring in 1987 (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Detroit District, 1997).  High lake levels increase bluff
recession rates by increasing wave attack on the base of the bluff.
In many areas of the Great Lakes, bluff erosion produces beach-building sediments.
However, both tributary and shoreland sources of sediment are depleted by
navigational improvements and dredged material disposal practices, which remove
these sediments from the littoral system.  Ice ridges that form and break up each
winter along the shoreline also cause erosion by trapping sand in floating fragments
of ice that are carried offshore into deep water.  This continuing natural process is
one of the principal mechanisms by which sand is lost from the nearshore system
(U.S. Geological Survey, 1992).  The hardening of the lakeshore with erosion
control structures can also reduce sediment supply and adversely affect natural
processes.
Hawaii
Coastal erosion is a widespread and locally severe problem in the Hawaiian Islands,
which have 500 mi of coastline (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1989),
and elsewhere in the Pacific tropical region.  The Hawaiian coastline is susceptible
to high waves associated with hurricanes, tsunamis, and large seasonal swells that
can cause extensive short-term erosion.  The average long-term erosion rate in
Hawaii is less than 1 ft/yr (Coyne et al., 1998).  Human activities have aggravated
coastal erosion problems on the Hawaii coastline by restricting sediment supply and
reducing beach width.  Erosion protection measures have focused on constructing
shoreline-hardening structures, such as revetments and seawalls (Coyne et al.,
1998).  Hardening the shoreline restricts the transport of sand located landward of
the vegetation line, thus starving the beach of a sand supply and possibly leading to
total beach loss (Hanson and Kraus, 1986; Bush et al., 1986).  The mean beach
width along armored shorelines is half of the mean beach width adjacent to
unarmored, freely migrating shorelines (Fletcher, 1997).  Beach nourishment and
restoration activity is limited to Waikiki Beach on Oahu, a popular tourist
destination, but efforts are under way to extend that practice (Coyne et al, 1998).
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Alaska
Alaska’s 6,600-mile coastline (excluding bays and fjords) is subject to periodic, yet
severe, erosion (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
1992). Alaska’s northern coastline is icebound for most of the year.  The ice season
lasts from November to April on most of the Bering Sea coast, longer along the
Chukchi Sea, and still longer on the Beaufort Sea coast, where it usually lasts 9 to
10 months (Weller and Anderson, 1998).  Along this northern coastline, Alaska
experiences some of the highest erosion rates in the world during its few ice-free
months (National Research Council, 1995).  The high coastal erosion rates
generally are caused by seasonal storm surges, the thawing of permafrost, and the
breaking off of chunks of shoreline by moving ice; some of the area’s barrier
islands are moving landward at a rate of 23 ft/yr (Williams et al., 1995).  Other
geologic forces such as earthquakes, landslides and land subsidence contribute to
the state’s erosion problems.  In 1964, an earthquake caused huge landslides in
Anchorage.  In coastal areas surrounding the city, enormous blocks of earth that
had been stable for years fell into the sea as the unconsolidated gravel and clay
beneath them gave way.  Fortunately, there are few if any houses or structures at
risk from erosion along this largely barren coastline.
COASTAL DEVELOPMENT AND EROSION HAZARDS
Coastal areas are a popular destination for tourism and recreational activities.  Each
year, approximately 180 million Americans spend approximately $74 billion on
visits to ocean and bay beaches (Houston, 1996).  U.S. coastlines also have growing
appeal as international tourism destinations (Houston, 1996; National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, 1998).  Waterfront property values and vacation
rental rates are substantially greater than those of non-waterfront properties, making
the ocean and Great Lake coasts attractive locations for second homes and
investment properties.
Coastal development and loss of property from storm surge, wind, erosion, and
related hazards are ongoing problems that date back to the early history of the
United States (Leatherman, 1991).  Although erosion rates and storm activity have
varied over time, coastal populations, development, and infrastructure have
increased dramatically since World War II.  Within the United States, coastal
counties have grown at a rate equal to or greater than the national average (National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1998).  Beginning in the 1950s, rising
incomes, improvements to transportation infrastructure and access, increased
automobile ownership, and more leisure time made coastal vacationing desirable
for a growing proportion of the population.  Proximity to urban areas was, and
continues to be, a major factor influencing the rate and nature of coastal
development.  At the same time, access to shore communities has improved greatly.
Bridges, causeways, and other infrastructure (e.g., utilities, sewers) were primary
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factors in determining the location and rate of development in coastal communities
(Cordes and Yezer, 1995; Bush et al., 1996).  These and other factors transformed
many beach communities from sparsely developed summer camps and fishing
villages into moderately to densely populated areas, despite the presence of natural
hazards such as erosion, flooding, and wind (Burton et al., 1969) (see Figure 2.6).
This rapid increase in coastal development began well before the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) was implemented in the early 1970s.
Approximately half a million people live within 500 ft of the 10,000 mile long
ocean and Great Lakes shorelines of the lower 48 states and Hawaii.  Table 2.3
shows the geographic distribution of coastal population within this narrow corridor
by region and state.  This estimate is based on an analysis of “block group level”
housing data, the most detailed publicly available information from the 1990 census
(Bureau of the Census, 1998b).  The data shown exclude the densest parts of urban
areas (e.g., Miami, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago), which are heavily protected
from erosion.
Extensive development has occurred in coastal areas and the trend continues.
Approximately 350,000 structures are located within 500 ft of the shoreline (again,
excluding the densest parts of urban areas).  A large potential for investment return,
combined with favorable tax laws and the common desire to own beachfront
property for personal use, creates strong incentives for individuals to maximize
existing and future shorefront development.  Likewise, communities see benefits in
allowing development in the form of a larger tax base and increased tourism
revenues.
FIGURE 2.6  High-rise buildings line North Miami Beach, Florida.  A “City on the
Beach,” approximately 3.7 million people lived in the Miami – Fort Lauderdale
metropolitan area as of 1998 (Bureau of the Census, 1998a).
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1995)
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TABLE 2.3  U.S. Population Within 500 Feet of the Shoreline, 1990a
Region State Populationb Total
Atlantic Connecticut   7,000
Delaware   1,000
Florida 81,000
Georgia   1,000
Massachusetts 36,000
Maryland   1,000
Maine   4,000
North Carolina   5,000
New Hampshire   1,000
New Jersey 19,000
New York   6,000
Rhode Island   5,000
South Carolina   6,000
Virginia   3,000 176,000
Great Lakes Illinois 14,000
Indiana   3,000
Michigan 34,000
Minnesota   3,000
New York 13,000
Ohio  26,000
Pennsylvania    3,000
Wisconsin  17,000 115,000
Gulf of Mexico Alabama     3,000
Florida   41,000
Louisiana        300
Mississippi     9,000
Texas     2,000 56,000
Pacific Coast California 158,000
Oregon     5,000
Washington   17,000 179,000
Hawaii Hawaii   29,000 29,000
Grand Total                                                                                  555,000
a  Data shown exclude the densest part of urban areas
b  Numbers are rounded to nearest thousand.
SOURCE:  Adapted from Bureau of the Census, 1998b.  Analysis of 1990 U.S.
census block groups by The Heinz Center.
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The costs of natural disasters are rising as more people and structures are
exposed to hazards (Kunreuther, 1998; Godschalk et al., 1998).  Between 1980
and 1998, 14 severe storms (12 hurricanes, 1 Nor’easter, and 1 tropical storm)
caused damages to coastal areas of the United States exceeding $1 billion each.
In aggregate, these storms caused approximately $35 billion in damages
(unadjusted for inflation) and 339 deaths (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 1999).  In addition, numerous smaller tropical and extratropical
storms caused a great deal of damage.  For example, Tropical Storm Frances,
which struck the Gulf of Mexico in October 1998, caused $256 million in
damages in Galveston County, Texas (Figure 2.7).  Lax enforcement, a lack of
incentive to provide protective measures in some communities, and the varying
degrees of success achieved through structural shoreline protection have
increased the probability that losses will be increasingly severe in future flood
disasters (National Research Council, 1990, 1995; Kunreuther, 1998).
FIGURE 2.7  Frances, a tropical storm in 1998, caused extensive damage in one
Texas county.
(Photo by The Heinz Center)
A recent study by The Heinz Center (1999), The Hidden Costs of Coastal
Hazards, points out that an improved understanding of the costs of coastal
hazards is essential for accurate risk assessment and wise investment of
mitigation dollars.  The study emphasizes that many hidden or unreported costs
related to coastal hazards are imposed on the business community, individuals,
families and neighborhoods, public and private institutions, and natural resources
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and the environment.  Although that study focused on weather-related coastal
hazards, such as hurricanes and other severe storms, erosion clearly influences
the stability and condition of coastal property when such disasters strike a
community (see Box 2.2).
Demographic changes in the United States also have played a significant role in
the development of beachfront property and coastal communities.  Beach
visitation and recreation always have been popular activities, but until prior to
World War II, access to coastal resort areas was limited and the few vacation-
oriented coastal communities that did exist were near large urban centers, such
as Avalon, New Jersey, and Galveston, Texas.  At that time, many coastal
communities were settled primarily by fishers and marginal farmers and included
some of the poorest areas in the nation (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 1998).  In remote, little developed areas, it was not uncommon
for coastal counties to give away barrier island land as an additional incentive to
buyers of mainland property within the county.  Currituck County in North
Carolina, for example, gave away barrier island property on the Outer Banks to
farmers purchasing tracts on the mainland.  The U.S. government purchased
several barrier islands (e.g., Chincoteague Island, Maryland) and converted them
into parkland because they had no value for farming and were inaccessible for
commerce or trade (Leatherman, 1997).
Important social, cultural, and environmental values attract people to the shore.
People visit and live near the coast for many reasons, including tourism, fishing,
surfing, and other recreational activities (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
1995).  Coastal areas are aesthetically pleasing places for renewal and relaxation
and offer diverse recreational opportunities, open space, and a milder and more
moderated climate (in certain seasons) than is typical of inland areas.
Conservation of coastal habitats and maintenance of coastal ecosystem services
which can be severely impacted by erosion are growing priorities at the local,
state, and federal levels.  Coastal habitats contain a wealth of biological diversity
and habitat types, including wetlands and estuaries, beaches and dunes, and
uplands.  In the United States, coastal ecosystems support 45 percent of all
species listed as threatened and endangered, including three-fourths of the
federally listed birds and mammals (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1995).
Estuaries and wetlands provide important nursery habitat for fisheries, buffer
upland areas from the effects of storms and flooding, filter water, and reduce
erosion of coastlines by acting as a buffer.  Coastal ecosystems support nearly
two-thirds of all fisheries and half of migratory songbirds, and—despite
increased development—comprise one-third of the nation’s total wetland acreage
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1995).
Decisions about coastal land use and rebuilding are influenced by general
awareness of, and responses to, coastal hazards.  Individual awareness of coastal
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hazards and understanding of erosion processes have improved over the past
three decades.  Early research by Mitchell (1974) and Rowntree (1974) found
that residents of coastal communities had only a modest awareness of coastal
hazards and a poor understanding of the processes contributing to coastal
erosion.  Almost 25 years later, Ives and Furuseth (1988) found that coastal
residents were cognizant of erosion, viewing it as “a continuous, natural process
with which they must cope.”  In their survey, more than 80 percent of the
respondents indicated that they liked their communities and would not leave
because of beach erosion.  Similarly, Miller (1992) found that coastal property
owners were knowledgeable about flood and erosion risks when they purchased
their properties.  It is uncertain, however, whether awareness of the erosion
hazard is sufficient to stimulate changes in land use and siting of new
development (and redevelopment) is uncertain.  The effect of information
programs, such as erosion hazard disclosure requirements, is explored in Chapter
6.
Coastal property owners express strong emotional attachment to their properties
and place psychological value on the oceanfront amenities.  They prefer, if
possible, to redevelop or repair a structure damaged by flooding or erosion rather
than relocate or demolish it.  Coastal property owners who have been forced to
relocate often move a structure only the minimum distance required by law to
protect it from immediate danger (i.e., not as far back on the lot as possible) so
as to maximize their views and other amenities (see Appendix F).  Property
owners repeatedly have indicated a strong preference for building and rebuilding
as close to the oceanfront as possible, despite the threat of floods, erosion, and
other hazards (Ives and Furuseth, 1988; Miller, 1992; Platt, 1998a).
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BOX 2.2  The Costs of Beach and Dune Restoration in the Carolinas after Major Hurricanes
Severe storms and chronic erosion can, and often do, cause extreme damage along the shoreline,
including a loss of beach sand offshore or downdrift, undermining or overwashing of the dunes that
protect uplands, or, in extreme cases, the cutting of new ocean inlets.  In locations where beaches are
backed up by bluffs,  beach erosion leads to bluff undermining, slumping, and upland property loss.
Once a beach or dune is lost, its capacity to buffer the next storm is reduced dramatically.  Following
major erosion events, the recreational value of beaches declines sharply, because of both reduced beach
area and loss of aesthetic appeal.  Local tourist dollars are lost altogether or transferred elsewhere.
North Carolina
Hurricane Fran, which struck Topsail Island, North Carolina, caused significant erosion damage to the
built environment, mostly because the natural buffering capacity of the beach and dune system had been
damaged previously by Hurricane Bertha.   FEMA paid $4.6 million in Public Assistance (PA) funds to
restore a “five-year berm” along 15 miles of Topsail Island, creating a low (4-5 foot) sand ridge of
various grain size and color along the landward edge of the beach just in front of the building line (Platt,
1998b).
South Carolina
Many of these beach and dune impacts—as well as costs—had been experienced after Hurricane Hugo
in 1989.  The storm caused serious beach and dune erosion along 65 miles of South Carolina’s coast.  As
a result of the beach flattening, the beach widened to nearly 500 feet in some locations, more than twice
its normal width.  With such a flat profile and lack of dunes, many properties that were not destroyed by
Hugo were considered at high risk after the storm.  This situation provided the impetus for an
emergency beach and dune restoration program to provide immediate protection for threatened inland
properties and, eventually, efforts to restore the recreational beach.
Following Hugo, South Carolina and the federal government joined in a beach and dune system
restoration that had three phases:  beach scraping and dune shaping, beach nourishment, and dune
revegetation.  This effort cost $9.8 million, comparable to the cost of all South Carolina beach
nourishment projects combined between 1980 and 1988 (Kana, 1990).  The state covered approximately
60 percent of these costs, with the federal government (Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, and taxpayers nationally) picking up the rest.  The return on investment is
likely to be high.  By comparison, the annual benefits of coastal tourism in South Carolina are estimated
at $5 billion annually (Kana, 1990), and beaches are one of the principal attractions.
A number of lessons can be learned from South Carolina’s experience with beach and dune erosion and
subsequent restoration.  Some of these relate to beach processes.  Major storms such as Hugo are rare,
but they intensify or accelerate normal processes, causing permanent coastal changes.  However, much
of the erosion observed after storms reflects a temporary shift of sand to offshore bars.  Most of that
sand will likely return to the beaches, although some may be lost permanently, either downdrift or
offshore.  With respect to shoreline development, one of the lessons from Hugo (as well as chronic, less
powerful storms) is that judicious construction setbacks, elevation of buildings above expected storm
surge heights, and soft stabilization can protect inland property while preserving options for beach and
dune protection and post-storm restoration (Kana, 1990).
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The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968 to deal with
the growing costs of flood disasters to federal, state, and local governments, has
become the primary federal program to reduce the nation’s flood losses.  It was
created "to provide flood insurance in communities which adopt and adequately
enforce floodplain management ordinances that meet minimum NFIP
requirements" (National Flood Insurance Act [NFIA] of 1968 (P.L. 90-448),
United States Code, Title 42, Section 4001 et seq.)5.  The National Flood
Insurance Fund (NFIF), paid for from NFIP policyholder premiums, is the
primary resource used to cover insurance losses as well as most of the
administrative and operating expenses of the program.  The two other major
components of the NFIP are the identification and mapping of flood risks and
hazard mitigation (i.e., actions taken to protect people and property from future
flood losses).
The NFIP was established by the U.S. Congress because no affordable private
insurance was available to homeowners to cover flood damages.  There is no
comparable insurance program in any other country.  After Hurricane Betsy in
1965, the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act (P.L. 89-339) required the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to study alternatives to
post-disaster relief to provide aid to flood victims (Platt, 1994; Pasterick, 1998).
The resulting 1966 HUD report recommended the establishment of a federal
insurance mechanism with two equally important objectives:  “to help provide
financial assistance for victims of flood disasters to rehabilitate their property;
                                                          
5  Henceforth, references to the Code will be abbreviated using the format 42 USC §4001.
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and help prevent unwise use of land where flood damages would mount steadily
and rapidly” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1966).
A companion report by the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Federal Flood
Control Policy (1966) suggested an experimental federal flood insurance
program, not only to reduce flood losses but also to promote wise use of
floodplain areas.  The report recommended that such a program be undertaken
only on a trial basis until it was determined that an insurance mechanism would
not lead to increased floodplain occupancy and flood losses.  It pointed out that
an insurance program, if misapplied, could “aggravate rather than ameliorate the
flood problem” (U.S. Interagency Task Force on Flood Control Policy, 1966).
To date, there has not been a full assessment of the NFIP’s effects.  Plans for the
first comprehensive assessment were announced in 1999.6
PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND CURRENT STATUS
The NFIP provides federal flood insurance in exchange for the adoption of local
floodplain management ordinances and the implementation of minimum flood
mitigation measures (42 USC §4001 et seq.).  The program consists of three
components:  the identification and depiction of flood risks, the insurance itself;
and hazard mitigation requirements and activities in communities that want
federally backed flood insurance.  In addition, FEMA’s Disaster Relief and
Recovery Program provides assistance for emergency relief and reconstruction,
coordinates all other federal agency relief efforts, and provides reconstruction
relief to communities through the Public Assistance Program and to individuals
through the Disaster Housing Program and Individual and Family Grants.  Under
both the insurance and the disaster relief programs, FEMA provides assistance to
states and municipalities to develop and implement mitigation strategies.
Through detailed engineering studies, FEMA prepares maps of flood risk in each
participating community.  Flood risk zones are delineated into special flood
hazard areas (SFHA) and non-special flood hazard areas (non-SFHA).  The
SFHAs show the Base Flood Elevation (BFE), which is defined as the elevation
of a flood that has a 1 percent chance of occurring in any given year, also known
as the 100-year floodplain.  They include A-zones and V-zones.  Although both
zones are subject to inundation by 100-year flooding, V-zones (or high-velocity
zones) are also subject to high-velocity wave action from coastal storms and
seismic sources, whereas in A-zones wave action either does not occur or is less
than 3 feet (ft) high (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, Section 1.1)7.
On Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs), flood hazard area designations appear
                                                          
6  The announcement was made by the administrator of the Federal Insurance Administration
at the Natural Hazards Workshop in Boulder, Colorado, on July 12-13, 1999.
7  Henceforth, references to the Code will be abbreviated using the format 44 CFR §1.1.
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as dark and light tints.  Dark tints indicate V- or A-zones, or special flood hazard
areas; light tints indicate B-, C-, or X-zones, or areas of moderate to minimal
flood risk, or non-special flood hazard areas.  Areas excluded from NFIP
coverage (e.g., units of the Coastal Barrier Resources System, described in
Chapter 4) are also marked on FIRMs; erosion-prone areas, however, are not
(Figure 3.1).  In most coastal communities, the structures most susceptible to
erosion over the next few decades are located in the V-zone, although not all V-
zone structures are susceptible to erosion.
FIGURE 3.1  A schematic flood zone map of a coastal community indicates the
areas where risk is high V-zone and A-zone) or low (X-zone).
More than 19,000 communities (coastal and noncoastal) participated in the NFIP
as of 1999.  The regular program, which applies to a majority of these
communities, begins once FIRMs are issued.  Flood insurance premiums,
building requirements, and floodplain management are based upon FIRMs which
show the expected extent and depth of a flood and are required for every
community before entry to the regular program.  Prior to preparation of a FIRM,
communities were eligible for an “emergency program”.  Under the emergency
program only limited amounts of insurance are available, but at subsidized rates,
and communities only have to adopt minimal floodplain management
regulations.  Fewer than 3 percent of all communities participating in the NFIP
today remain in the emergency program, and FEMA aims to convert them to the
regular program phase as quickly as possible (Mike Robinson, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, personal communication, May 10, 1999).
     SOURCE:  Adapted from FEMA, 1995.
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Once a FIRM has been issued, risk premiums vary by flood risk zone.  Structures
built or substantially improved (i.e., reconstructed) after FIRMs have been
published are called post-FIRM structures.  Post-FIRM structures built or
substantially improved after December 31, 1974, and structures located outside
the SFHA (100-year floodplain), regardless of the date of construction or
substantial improvement, are charged unsubsidized, full-risk (i.e., actuarial)
premiums.  Structures built prior to the NFIP or during its preliminary phase are
considered pre-FIRM structures and are “grandfathered” into the program.  The
program statute requires that pre-FIRM insurance policies be subsidized for the
first layer of coverage (Federal Insurance Administration, 1998a; Pasterick,
1998; Frank Reilly, Federal Insurance Administration (retired), personal
communication, March 28, 1999).  These subsidized rates do not fully reflect the
magnitude of the risk.  However, pre-FIRM structures are subsidized on only the
first $35,000; the remaining value of the building is insured according to
actuarial rates.  Box 3.1 gives examples of premium rates for a typical single
family residential structure in different flood risk zones.
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BOX 3.1  Coverage Limits and Premium Costs in the National Flood Insurance
Program
The following type of buildings are eligible for coverage under the NFIP:  residential
structures including multifamily, single-family homes, townhouses/rowhouses, as well as
condominium association owned structures and non-residential structures.  The current
maximum limit of coverage $250,000 for residential property structure and $100,000 for
contents, and $500,000 for nonresidential properties for both structure and contents.  The





Single-family dwelling   $35,000 $250,000
Multifamily dwelling   $35,000 $250,000
Other residential $100,000 $250,000
Nonresidential $100,000 $500,000
  Contents Coverage
Residential   $10,000 $100,000
Nonresidential $100,000 $500,000
The premium paid by property owners for flood insurance is affected by several factors.  In
general, the higher the flood risk, the higher the price of insurance.  For example, the annual
premium for $100,000 in building coverage for a single-family home varies depending on
where the home is located.  Different zones are delineated on Flood Insurance Rate Maps
(FIRMs), which specify different risk areas.
• If the property is located near the ocean and therefore subject to storm surge and flooding
from hurricanes and coastal storms, then the building may be in a V-zone, where
structures are susceptible to damage from flooding and significant wave action.  V-zones
are the highest-risk areas.  Premiums range from $700 to over $2,000 per year for
$100,000 of building coverage, depending on elevations and year built.
• Structures located near a river, lake, stream, or certain coastal areas may be in an A-zone,
an area subject to inundation by a 100-year flood event where wave action either does
not occur or is less than 3 feet high.  Premiums range from about $300 to $1,000 per year
for $100,000 of building coverage.
• If the property is located in a low-risk area, referred to as B-, C-, X- or A99-zones, then
premiums can be as low as $306 annually using standard rates.  These zones are located
outside the 100-year floodplain.  A preferred risk policy (PRP) is available for some
properties located in these areas; annual premiums for PRPs range from $106 to $326,
depending on the structure.
(continued)
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BOX 3.1, continued
Annual premiums for $100,000 of flood insurance building coverage for a
residential single-family home are shown below.
Pre- or






Pre-FIRM Zone V1-30, VE No enclosure    $750 $0.75
With enclosure    $970f $0.97f
Post-FIRM Zone V1-30,VE At BFEd    $725f $0.73f
Built between
1975 and 1981
1 foot below BFE $2,180f $2.18f
Pre-FIRM Zone A1-30,
AE
No basement   $595 $0.60
With basement    $785f $0.79f
Post-FIRM Zone A1-30, AE At BFE    $376 $0.38
1 foot above BFE    $271 $0.27
1 foot below BFE $1,061 $1.06
Pre-FIRM Zone AO, AH With certificatione    $201 $0.20
Without certification    $585 $0.59
Pre/Post-
FIRM
Zone B, C, X,
A99
No basement    $306 $0.31
With basement    $391 $0.39
a  Flood Insurance Rate Map.  Whether a structure is pre- or post-FIRM is determined by
comparing the date of building construction to the date of the initial FIRM.
b  Older maps use numbered A-zones (e.g., A1, A2, A30) and numbered V-zones (e.g., V1, V2,
V30); newer maps use fewer zone designations for purposes of simplicity.
c  Premium values are based on total written premium plus expense constant, federal policy fee, and
increased cost of compliance premium.  Effective date:  May 1, 1998.
d  Base flood elevation (found on a Flood Insurance Rate Map), which is the surface water
elevation that corresponds to a 1 percent annual chance of flood.
e  Certification can be determined by an elevation certificate completed by a licensed engineer,
surveyor, or architect or by the community or the property owner.
f  Personal communication with Don Beaton, Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 19,
2000.
SOURCE:  Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1998a, 1998d.
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As of September 30, 1998, more than 4.1 million policies had been written in the more than
19,000 communities participating in the NFIP.  The total flood coverage exceeded $482.5
billion, generating a premium income topping $1.59 billion per year.  Single-family residences
account for more than two-thirds of all policies.  Conservative estimates suggest there is an
additional market in SFHAs of 4 million policies (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
1998b; Pasterick, 1998).  Table 3.1 shows the total value of insured structures (coverage),
number of policies written (earned exposures), average premium collected, and losses paid
within the V-zone, the most hazardous coastal flood risk zone.  Two percent of all NFIP
policies are written for structures in the V-zone.
Originally, insurance subsidies were incorporated into the program as incentives for
community participation and to encourage communities to pass floodplain ordinances that
would affect new construction.  Subsidies also were justified as means of preventing the
abandonment of otherwise economically usable floodplains (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 1998d).  Subsidized rates are approximately 38 percent of the full-risk premium
needed to fund the long-term expectation for losses (Federal Insurance Administration, 1998a;
Pasterick, 1998).  As of 1999, the percentage of all insured structures requiring subsidized
rates had declined to 30 percent.  However in V-zones, roughly 70 percent of insured
structures were built prior to 1981 and thus eligible for at least some subsidies.  In 1999, FIA
completed a study of the projected economic impacts of eliminating the subsidies altogether
(as mandated by Section 578 of the NFIRA) (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999).












Earned premiums $233,449,466 $38,382,894 $104,795,499 $376,627,839
Earned exposures         553,762        118,316          149,847          821,925
Average premium per
policy
             $422             $324               $699               $458
Expenses  $69,585,733 $12,450,393  $27,579,340 $109,615,466
Provision for losses $163,863,713 $25,932,501  $77,216,159 $267,012,373
Actual losses incurred $254,459,897 $38,382,894  $35,630,470 $328,473,260
Actual losses adjustment
expenses
    $6,744,821      $934,696    $1,039,938     $8,719,455
Total losses $261,204,718 $39,317,590  $36,670,408 $337,192,715
Net income (deficit)  ($97,341,004) ($13,385,089)  ($40,545,751)  ($70,180,341)
Percentage -41.7% -34.9% 38.7% -18.6%
a Post-FIRM, Post10/81 structures are charged full-risk premiums for V-zones, including risk of
damage from 3-foot breaking waves.
SOURCE: Federal Insurance Administration, 1998a
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COASTAL EROSION AND THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM
Coastal flooding and erosion pose unique challenges for floodplain management
and insurance programs.  Unlike inland areas, many coastal areas are subject not
only to inundation but also to wave attack and related velocity flows.  Although
the NFIP has taken steps to address coastal flooding and storm-induced
erosion—such as the mapping of flood risk and increases in flood elevations for
structures in consideration of wave height—it has not fully incorporated erosion
into floodplain management and insurance rating schemes (nor was it required to
under its enabling legislation).  The risks of damage to structures from coastal
flooding and erosion are summarized below.  (A detailed description and
quantitative analysis of coastal flooding and erosion damages can be found in
Chapter 5.)
Coastal erosion and flooding are related processes that can increase the risk of
damage to structures in the following ways:
• Flood damage.  Waves and storm surge from a storm event of sufficient
magnitude can destroy a house.  Engineering studies by FEMA and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers estimate that a wave 3 ft above the height of the
first floor of a house will have sufficient force to cause damage equal to half
the value of the house.
• Direct erosion damage.  If a storm is of sufficient magnitude to erode the
coastline to a position further inland, then houses in the way will be
damaged.  Some may be left standing, but they probably will not be
habitable due to lack of utilities or might be condemned if they are on the
beach or in public waters.
• Higher wave heights.  Once the coastline has shifted inland, flood
elevations for the same magnitude storm will be higher farther inland and
thus can cause more damage.
• Higher and more powerful waves in areas not previously subjected to
high velocity waves.  Houses that were constructed in lower risk A-zones
with less-stringent building codes may be subjected to waves of V-zone
intensity as the shoreline moves inland.
Erosion and erosion-related flooding are significant concerns for the NFIP’s
floodplain management and mitigation requirements and insurance premium
structure.  Erosion alters both the risk experienced over time by individuals
building in erosion hazard areas and the changing loss potential for the NFIP as a
whole.  Thus, NFIP premiums and building requirements may not reflect the full
risk of building on or near eroding shores.  Thus, policyholders in the V-zone
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pay the same rate and are subject to identical building requirements regardless of
the varying additional risk from coastal erosion (see Figure 3.2).
FIGURE 3.2  Though not reflected in NFIP premiums, erosion can increase the risk
of damage. The two identical houses shown are both located within a V-zone in
which the shore is eroding 5 feet (ft) per year.  The house on the right is located 10 ft
from the shoreline; the one on the left is 200 ft from the shoreline.  Both houses are
elevated to just above base flood elevation.  The houses have identical insurance
policies and premiums, even though the house closer to the shore is at a much
greater risk of being damaged as a result of erosion or erosion-related flooding than
the one located further back.
Erosion may also increase flood risks as the shore erodes inland.  Structures
originally built in compliance with NFIP standards eventually might migrate into
riskier flood zones with more-stringent building requirements.  Only by
identifying areas subject to erosion and determining the rates of erosion can
officials ensure that actuarial rates incorporate the changing risk as erosion
proceeds, but even then risk zone changes may occur faster than flood studies
can be updated and areas remapped.  Even remapping in response to long-term
gradual erosion does not always result in actuarial rates.  For example, a
structure originally built to compliance in an A-zone with a BFE of 13 ft might,
after a period of erosion and subsequent remapping, be located within a V-zone
with a BFE of 15 ft.  As a result, it would now be at greater risk for damage from
flooding and direct erosion. Figure 3.3 (a) and (b) illustrate the effect of erosion
on the location of flood zone boundaries and exposure of structures to coastal
flood hazards.
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FIGURE 3.3  Erosion affects the location of flood zone boundaries and the exposure of
structures to hazards.
(a) The two houses shown are
both post-Flood Insurance
Rate Map (FIRM) structures.
The house on the right is
located within the V-zone and
hence required to be elevated
on pilings. The other house,
located in an A-zone, is not
required to be elevated on
pilings and instead is elevated
on solid perimeter walls.
(b) Thirty years later, the
beach has eroded and the
FIRM for the area has been
revised.  Erosion has
modified the hydrodynamics
of the area and the V-zone
has shifted landward so that
the house on the left now is
located in the V-zone.
However, its owner still pays
A-zone rates (because of
grandfathering), and it is not
built to V-zone standards.  As
a result, there is a much
greater potential for damage
or catastrophic failure.
However, because the Congress allows the “grandfathering” of existing policies,
the owners of structures that change risk zones will continue to pay the same
rates as before, even though the building is not built to V-zone standards and is
no longer above the BFE.  According to FEMA, “The contentious issue for the
insurance component of the NFIP is whether new risk classifications (e.g.,
erosion zones) should be established so that the high costs associated with a
subset of insureds subject to increased flood risk are not spread over a large
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group of insureds that may not be subject to the same degree of risk” (Crowell et
al., 1999).
Prior to 1986, the costs of flood insurance studies, mapping, mitigation, loss
payments, and other operations were covered by policy premiums and federal
appropriations.  From 1986 until June 1990, the cost of flood studies, mapping,
mitigation costs and FEMA NFIP staff and related costs was funded through
transfers of policyholder funds out of the National Flood Insurance Fund.
Beginning in 1991, a federal policy fee was charged to each policyholder paid
for mapping and mitigation.  Since 1986, there have been no federal
appropriations to pay any operating expenses.  All expenses are covered by
policyholders and statutory increases in borrowing authority; any money
borrowed from the federal treasury is paid back with interest.
Incorporation of Erosion into the National Flood Insurance Program
Although the NFIP has not fully incorporated erosion into floodplain
management and insurance rating methods, there are at least four ways in which
erosion is considered indirectly through related program requirements and
activities.  They are:  1) consideration of vertical erosion in V-zone
identification; 2) acceptance of storm-related coastal erosion losses as valid
claims under the insurance coverage; 3) development of methods and guidelines
for erosion mapping; and 4) periodic remapping of coastal flood zones and
shoreline position.  Each is discussed below.
V-zone Identification
Coastal processes are sufficiently different from fluvial processes occurring
during flood events to deserve special attention.  Since 1971, the NFIP has
acknowledged the high risk of wave action to shoreline development (Federal
Register, Volume 64, p. 42632 [1999])8, and, since October of that year, it has
required all development to occur landward of the mean high tide line.  In 1981,
FEMA recognized and adopted a methodology that incorporated wave run-up in
the determination of BFEs and the landward extent of V-zones (Bellomo, et al.,
1999). 
In 1986, FEMA again reevaluated V-zone evaluation methods and, in 1987,
began considering the effects of storm-induced dune erosion in the identification
and mapping of these zones.  Currently, the landward limit of the V-zone is
defined as the most landward of the following three points:
1. the point where a 3-ft high wave might occur during a storm with a 1 percent
chance of annual occurrence;
                                                          
8  Henceforth, references to the Federal Register will be abbreviated using the format 64 Fed.
Reg. 42632 (1999).
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2. the point where the eroded profile (or non-eroded ground profile, if
applicable) is 3 ft below the computed wave run-up elevation during a flood
event with a 1 percent chance of annual occurrence; or
3. the inland limit of the primary frontal dune.
The agency also began to develop performance-based criteria for evaluating
shore protection measures in light of changes in flood hazard areas over time.
Insurance Coverage
Prior to the passage of the 1973 Flood Disaster Protection Act (P.L. 93-234), the
NFIP paid claims involving erosion when a flood was determined to be the cause
of the loss, even though the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 did not
contain any language regarding erosion.  The 1973 Act formalized this approach
by requiring coverage for damages resulting from “erosion or undermining
caused by waves or currents of water exceeding anticipated cyclical levels….”
Thus, FEMA explicitly began recognizing flood-related erosion damages to
structures along the coast.  This was a direct response to the recognition of
cyclical lake level changes and corresponding changes in erosion patterns along
the shores of the Great Lakes.
Insurance coverage is restricted to the principal structure and its contents.
Damage to unattached structures (e.g., walkways, stairs, gazebos) and loss of
land are not covered. Also not covered are “imminent” losses–cases in which
structural damage has not yet occurred but may within the next few years
because of gradual or storm-induced erosion.  Imminent losses were addressed,
however, by the Upton-Jones program from 1988 until the program ended in
1994 (Crowell, 1997).
Damage from erosion unrelated to flooding (as defined in Box 3.2) is considered
under the NFIP to have resulted from “normal erosion” and is supposed to be
denied coverage.  Despite this, erosion is covered in low-lying areas (as shown
in Chapter 6), although coverage is limited on bluffs.  However, current
insurance rates do not reflect the variation in risk among policyholders.
Homeowners in erosion-prone areas are paying the same amount for flood
insurance as are policyholders in non-eroding areas.
Erosion Mapping
The need to map erosion hazards—whether storm-related or gradual—has been
recognized since the inception of the NFIP.  In the mid-1970s,  federal agencies
began working with various regional councils and agencies to map erosion
hazards (e.g., along the Great Lakes, Chesapeake Bay), and a number of states—
New Jersey, Michigan, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Washington, and
others—initiated their own shoreline mapping programs (National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, 1976).  However, no such areas have been
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designated on FIRMs, in part because FEMA has interpreted sections 1360 and
1370 of the NFIA as explicitly excluding damage from “normal” erosion (i.e.,
gradual erosion not related to flood events) as a covered risk.
In 1989, FEMA initiated the development of guidelines and specifications for
erosion studies to promote consistency across the country in the determination of
long-term erosion rates and in the identification of areas subject to erosion.
After several years of research and preparation, this nearly completed effort was
shelved because legislation mandating the mapping of erosion hazard areas was
not enacted.
BOX 3.2  Definition of a “Flood” as Used in the National Flood Insurance Program
The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, Section 59.1, defines a flood as
(a) A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally dry
land areas from
(1) the overflow of inland or tidal waters;
(2) the unusual and rapid runoff of surface waters from any source; or
(3) mudslides (i.e., mudflow) which are proximately caused by flooding as defined
in paragraph
(a)(2) of this definition and are akin to a river of liquid and flowing mud on the
surfaces of normally dry land areas, as when earth is carried by a current of water
and deposited along a path of the current.
(b) The collapse or subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or other body of water
as a result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding
anticipated cyclical levels or suddenly caused by an unusually high water level in a
natural body of water, accompanied by a severe storm, or by an unanticipated force of
nature, such as a flash flood or an abnormal tidal surge, or by some similarly unusual
and unforeseeable event which results in flooding as defined in paragraph (a)(1) of this
definition.
Remapping of Shorelines and Flood Zones
Periodic remapping of flood zones provides a pragmatic mechanism to account
for changes in shoreline position retrospectively, as erosion proceeds.  As of
1994, every community is supposed to be reviewed at least once every 5 years to
determine whether map revisions are necessary.  Currently, 63 percent of
FEMA’s maps are 10 or more years old, and 18,465 map panels (out of
approximately 100,000) need hydrologic/hydraulic restudies and remapping
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999d).  However, communities’
existing FIRMs are frequently amended or revised through Letter of Map
Amendments (indicating that a property either does not fall within the SFHA or
is elevated above the BFE) or Letter of Map Revisions (which apply when
portions of the map have been revised because of changes in flood risk zones,
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floodplain boundary delineations, map features, or BFEs).  These methods are
cheaper than updating an entire FIRM.
Policy Reform Proposals and Recent Developments
Efforts to address coastal erosion are continuing within FEMA, the NFIP, and
the Congress.  A keystone in reform efforts of the 1990s was the report
Managing Coastal Erosion (National Research Council, 1990), which
recommended that an erosion element of the NFIP incorporate the following
objectives:
• transfer economic costs of erosion losses from all federal taxpayers to the
property owners at risk by charging premiums that approximate the risks of
loss;
• discourage inappropriate development from occurring in erosion zones as
delineated by FEMA or the states; and
• promote the improvement of development and redevelopment practices in
erosion-prone areas.
In 1991, bills were introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate (the
National Flood Insurance, Mitigation and Erosion Management Act, H.R. 1236
and S. 1650) that adopted many of the NRC report’s recommendations.  They
included provisions to establish 10-, 30-, and 60-year setbacks and incorporate
the erosion hazard into the insurance premium, prohibit new construction of
structures consisting of one to four dwelling units seaward of the 30-year setback
line, and new construction of large structures seaward of the 60-year setback
line.  The bills also set mitigation requirements, limited insurance availability in
the various setback zones, and required FEMA to establish land management and
land use standards to guide construction away from high erosion hazard areas
(U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 1991).
The House bill passed by a wide margin (388 to 18), but the Senate bill failed to
pass (U.S. Senate, 1992).  Many groups strongly opposed the components of the
legislation that would have incorporated land-use regulations for eroding areas
into the floodplain management requirements of the NFIP.  These provisions
would have denied insurance to owners of existing property located in a “zone of
imminent collapse” if they did not relocate or demolish their property within two
years of the program’s implementation.  New construction, or substantial
improvements, would have been prohibited within eroding areas.
The NFIRA of 1994 strengthened the mandatory purchase requirements of the
1973 Flood Disaster Relief Act by penalizing federally backed lenders if they
failed to disclose and enforce the flood insurance requirement over the entire life
of a loan, not just at its inception (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
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Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 1994).  As a result, there has been a
substantial increase in the number of NFIP policies purchased.  Flood insurance
also can be forced on borrowers who are required to purchase flood insurance
but fail to do so (Pasterick, 1998).  The 1994 bill originally contained a provision
that would have allowed the program to charge for the erosion hazard and
impose setback requirements on erosion-prone properties.  This provision,
however, was removed from the final version.   Other provisions of NFIRA that
may directly impact the NFIP are:
• The Standard Hazard Determination Form
• Codification of the Community Rating System
• Establishment of the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program
• Authorization of Increased Cost of Compliance insurance coverage
• Mandating a five-year map update review
• Establishment of the Technical Mapping Advisory Council.
In 1995, the Congress proposed the Natural Hazards Protection Act (H.R. 1856
and S. 1043), which introduced the concept of multi natural hazard insurance.
The Act was not passed, however, because it lacked land-use regulations and
would have undermined the NFIP (Natural Hazards Observer, 1994, 1995a,
1995b).  However, the multi-hazard concept is gaining prominence, as evidenced
in an effort by FEMA, in cooperation with the National Institute for Building
Sciences (NIBS), to develop a natural hazard loss estimation methodology called
HAZUS which stands for Hazards U.S. (Barbara Schauer, National Institute of
Building Sciences, personal communication, Jan. 7, 1999).  A standardized,
nationally applicable methodology has been developed for estimating earthquake
losses.  In 2002, previews of similar methodologies and models for riverine
flooding and hurricane winds will be released to communities participating in
FEMA’s Project Impact Program.  This tool will compute basic estimates of
potential damage to residential, commercial, and industrial buildings, including
direct economic losses and shelter requirements (National Institute of Building
Sciences, 1999).  These and similar loss potential assessment tools form essential
elements of FEMA’s multi-hazard National Mitigation Strategy, launched in
1996 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1996).
Recently, FIA Administrator Jo Ann Howard initiated a public review of the
NFIP, soliciting input through the Federal Register in September 1998 (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1998c).  Interest groups such as the
Association of State Floodplain Managers—members of which are the state and
local partners of the NFIP—have provided significant input during this appraisal
process (Miller, 1998).  The comments received, some of them specifically on
the coastal erosion issue, are to be summarized in a report by FEMA in 2000
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1998b).
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Coastal Hazards Mitigation
As part of the ongoing effort to lessen the impacts of disasters on people and
property, the NFIP requires participating communities to adopt and enforce
floodplain management regulations and minimum mitigation measures that
either meet or exceed minimum criteria established by FEMA. The building and
development standards developed by FEMA serve as minimum requirements for
local ordinances.  They require, for example, that residential buildings be
elevated to or above the BFE.  Nonresidential buildings can be either elevated or
flood-proofed (i.e., made watertight) to that elevation.  All buildings located in
coastal high hazard areas (V-zones) are subject to additional requirements to
help them withstand wave impacts.  Figure 3.4(a) and Figure 3.4(b) provide
examples of V- and A-zone construction, respectively, incorporating NFIP
building requirements.
Communities also can obtain assistance from FEMA in adopting and enforcing
compliant floodplain management ordinances and coastal construction practices.
The agency is currently publishing its revised Coastal Construction Manual,
which provides guidance on constructing buildings that are resistant to flood
damages.  Like HAZUS, the revised manual will address wind and seismic
hazards, but will also include a detailed discussion of siting issues in coastal high
hazard and erosion-prone areas.
Reviews of mitigation standards in the different flood zones and experience with
pre- and post-FIRM structures during severe coastal storms have shown that
construction standards in the most hazardous areas (V-zones) are effective.
Elevated houses built to code (especially those elevated on adequately anchored
columns or piles) can withstand storm winds, wave attack, and scour for a time
and can remain standing, even over open water.  However, because of septic
system loss or other utility failures, they may be condemned by local or state
authorities and become uninhabitable (see Figure 3.5) (Rogers, 1986; Davison,
1993; Platt, 1998).  Other difficult questions—regarding property rights, the
threat of building collapse and public safety, demolition timing and financing,
and maintenance of utilities and infrastructure supporting these structures—arise
in such situations and are likely to become increasingly prominent in the future.
Thus, the NFIP’s structural mitigation requirements have resulted in fortified
upward construction, but they have not ensured that buildings are located
landward of erosion-prone areas.
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FIGURE 3.4  The National Flood Insurance Program establishes building requirements for
structures in the areas at greatest risk.  V-zone building requirements are depicted in (a),







SOURCE:  Federal Emergency Management Agency (in press).
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FIGURE 3.5  Pilings protect this house from storm waves at Westhampton Beach,
New York, but the loss of land renders it uninhabitable.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1993)
The Community Rating System (CRS), codified in the NFIP by the 1994
National Flood Insurance Reform Act,  recognizes mitigation activities in four
categories (public information; mapping and regulations; flood damage
reduction; and flood preparedness) that communities can implement to reduce
their flood insurance premiums (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
1999a).  Erosion management activities are also recognized.  Each activity is
worth a certain number of credit points, and communities are rated on a 1 to 10
classification scale, 1 being the highest. Communities located in Special Flood
Hazard Areas (SFHAs) receive a 5 percent premium reduction per class, up to 45
percent (class 1).  Communities located outside of the SFHA zones are limited to
a 5% discount no matter how many activities they adopt (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 1999b).
Although communities can get a modest credit for floodplain management,
overall participation in the CRS program is low and the credits that are given are
usually small.  Only a few communities receive premium reductions of 20% or
greater; most receive a 5 to 10 percent decrease.  One reason why the CRS hasn't
been widely adopted is partly because the mitigation actions and cumbersome
participation procedures must be undertaken by communities, whereas the
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incentives for participation go to individual policyholders (Miller, 1998, see
Issue 9).  The 1,004 communities that do participate account for about two-thirds
of the flood insurance policyholders covered by the NFIP.
Developed in 1997, FEMA’s Project Impact: Building Disaster Resistant
Communities is a nationwide initiative that focuses on forming public and
private partnerships to provide local communities, homeowners, and businesses
with disaster prevention tools.  At the time of writing, there were nearly 200
communities participating in Project Impact and over 1,100 business partners.
For more information on this ongoing project, see http://www.fema.gov/impact.
A final method of mitigating against flood and erosion losses is to relocate
buildings away from flood- and erosion-prone locations.  The NFIP has pursued
several policies to implement the relocation option.  First, the NFIP standard
flood insurance policy, unlike the standard homeowner’s insurance policy, does
not require the insured to repair the building on the same premises to qualify for
loss settlement on a replacement cost basis.  This provision was intended to
provide a financial incentive to the insured to relocate and either repair a
substantially damaged or rebuild a totally damaged building at the new location.
Second, Section 1362 (Flood Damaged Property Acquisition Program) of the
NFIA, authorized in 1968, enabled the FIA to purchase buildings that were
substantially or repetitively damaged from willing owners if the community
agreed to accept the title and maintain the land for open space.  This option was
rescinded in 1994 by the National Flood Insurance Reform Act and replaced
with the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program.  Third, the Upton-Jones Program,
an amendment to the NFIP signed into law on February 5, 1988, was available
until the NFIRA in 1994 (see Box 3.3).  The Upton-Jones Program paid
homeowners up to 40 percent of the value of their house to cover the cost of
relocating outside erosion hazard areas.
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BOX 3.3  The Upton-Jones Program
The Upton-Jones Program—a direct response to claims denial problems along the Great Lakes
coasts (Reilly, 1993)—was the federal government’s initial effort to reduce the risk of erosion-
related losses specifically.  It authorized the payment of building demolition and relocation benefits
(including septic system removal) to a flood insurance policyholder whose building was endangered
by imminent collapse or subsidence as a result of erosion caused by a body of water.  With the
Upton-Jones amendment, claims could be paid at the request of the policyholder for buildings that
had not yet experienced any damage.  For the relocation option, policyholders could “receive up to
40% of the value of the structure, with the requirement that the structure be relocated landward of
the 30- or 60-year setback line” (Crowell et al., 1999).  For the demolition option, they could
“receive up to 100% of the value of the structure, plus up to 10% of the value of the structure to pay
for demolition expenses” (Crowell et al., 1999).  The benefit covered only the value of the structure,
not the value of land or any infrastructure.  No additional premium was charged for this benefit, and
no state or community erosion management was required as a quid pro quo for the subsidy.  The
Upton-Jones Program was an attempt by the U.S. Congress to identify those structures most at risk
from erosion and storms and encourage action to reduce losses prior to their total destruction
(National Research Council, 1990).  Claims under the Upton-Jones Program are shown below.
Upton-Jones Program Claims




































  $3 million
$62,000
$43,000
SOURCE:  Crowell et al., 1999.
The Upton-Jones Program was suspended by the Congress in 1994 because of geographically
limited usage; lack of community erosion management requirements; and negative, unintended
outcomes.  For example, property owners tended to “stick it out” in eroding coastal locations as long
as possible, claiming insurance payments until a building was threatened inescapably by collapse.
They also showed great reluctance to give up rental property while it still generated income.  At the
time of desertion, they then used the demolition option (receiving up to 110 percent of the building
value) rather than the relocation option (up to 40 percent of the building value).  Thus, the
amendment actually increased the NFIP’s costs, contrary to its own philosophy.  In addition, Upton-
Jones did not prevent communities from redeveloping the cleared lots; however owners could still
obtain insurance coverage for the redeveloped structure if they met the setback requirements on the
redeveloped lot.
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A variety of approaches are used to cope with the increasingly challenging
problem of coastal erosion and reduce the hazard it poses to humans, their
property, and recreational and aesthetic values.  The National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP), described in Chapter 3, is one of the primary approaches used
at the federal level.  This chapter describes coastal erosion management
strategies and measures other than the NFIP available at all levels of government
and to individuals.  Each approach is evaluated based on the frequency of use,
accumulated experience, obstacles encountered, costs, and effectiveness.
It is important to consider these responses to coastal erosion apart from the
NFIP, for several reasons.  First, floodplain management is an integral
component of any loss reduction strategy.  Second, responses to erosion,
depending on their effectiveness, can either increase or reduce flood losses.
Third, policy changes to the NFIP that affect eroding areas may induce certain
responses by communities.  The intent is usually to reduce erosion-related losses
of shorefront property, including land, structures, infrastructure, and amenities
(e.g., decks and gazebos), but these responses can change significantly the
physical and economic nature of coastal development and potentially increase
costs in other federal programs.
Although erosion affects every state with a shoreline, there is no comprehensive
federal approach to managing coastal erosion per se, indirect benefits of the
NFIP notwithstanding.  Rather, erosion is addressed in a piecemeal manner by
multiple agencies and levels of government.  Similarly, groups of private citizens
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or individuals increasingly are involved in erosion control, but they do not
always act in a concerted, mutually beneficial fashion.  On retreating Gulf of
Mexico and Atlantic coasts, some activities intended to stabilize the shoreline
(e.g., groins, seawalls, and breakwaters) not only have been ineffective but have
exacerbated erosion hazards locally.  There are numerous examples of shoreline
engineering structures that have caused beach loss or increased erosion on
adjacent shores by modifying sediment supply or changing wave refraction
patterns (Bush et al., 1996; Dean, 1999).
Regardless of their effectiveness, responses to coastal erosion are motivated
strongly by the interests of property owners and coastal communities in
protecting valuable shorefront property.  In densely developed areas, such as
Ocean City, Maryland, or Miami Beach, Florida, economists have judged beach
nourishment to be worth the cost for the foreseeable future (Parsons and Powell,
1998).  In other areas, groins, seawalls, bulkheads, and other measures are used
to prevent erosion of the coastline, often at substantial individual or community
expense.  State-level responses to erosion range from doing nothing to restricting
the use of hard structures and enforcing erosion-rate based setbacks (e.g., North
Carolina), to providing no-interest loans and grants to stabilize the shoreline
through cliff-hardening (e.g., the Maryland side of the Chesapeake Bay).  An
overview of these and other basic approaches available to individuals,
communities, states, and the federal government is provided in the following
sections.
APPROACHES AVAILABLE TO INDIVIDUALS
Individuals living on the coast usually do not start worrying about erosion until
their property or home is visibly threatened.  At that point, their choices are more
constrained than they would have been if coastal processes had been considered
prior to building or buying the land and structure.  To have access to the
maximal range of options, individuals need to be informed of erosion and
flooding risks as early and often as possible.  The approaches available to
individuals are constrained by three factors:  local and state rules and regulations
(including building standards) that pertain to land use and development in
shoreline areas, an individual’s economic wherewithal, and the information and
knowledge possessed by that individual regarding the erosion hazard and
adjustment options.  Typically, an individual learns about legal constraints and
technical feasibility from municipal building inspectors, planners, code
enforcement officers, or hired technical consultants and coastal engineers.  To
the extent allowed by local and state codes and personal financial means,
homeowners can implement measures to reduce the erosion hazard when a
structure is first built, redeveloped, or threatened by erosion.
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Erosion prevention or delaying measures include maximizing the distance
between the shoreline and oceanfront side of a structure by building as close to
the inland property line as possible.  Given the average life of a building (70
years), the safest approach available to individuals in eroding areas is to avoid
the risk of erosion damage by setting the structures as far back as possible from
the shore.  In order to be avoid damage effectively, setbacks must be loose
enough to avoid long-term erosion risks over the anticipated life of the structure.
As coastal geologist and engineer Spencer Rogers points out, “a low standard
such as a 30-year setback may delay, but does not eliminate, the long-term
erosion problem” (Sea Grant Media Center, 1999).   Moreover, because dunes
provide the most important natural defense against storm surge and coastal
flooding by buffering wave energy and serving as sand reserves, individuals can
attempt to preserve, rebuild, or stabilize them after construction by using
relatively inexpensive sand fencing and dune planting (see Figure 4.1).
FIGURE 4.1  Sand fencing (shown here in Southampton, N.Y.) encourages dune
growth and revegetation.  It is an inexpensive way to mitigate against future storm
damage with soft structural means.
(Photo by Susanne C. Moser, October 1998)
Individuals also can reduce flood damages by complying with common flood
mitigation standards, which include the construction of sturdy building
foundations or elevation of the structure on strong, deeply driven pilings able to
withstand considerable wave attack and flood-related scour.  Although the initial
costs may discourage the use of such measures, they are generally cost-effective
when considering the reduced loss potential over the life of the structure (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1997).  The Building Performance
Assessment Team (BPAT) program run by the Federal Emergency Management
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Agency (FEMA) has shown that improvements in construction codes and
standards, designs, methods, and materials used for both new construction and
post-disaster repair and recovery have increased the damage resistance of
structures to floods and therefore reduced costs to the NFIP (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 1999).  However, fortifying structures in this manner may
not reduce losses caused by horizontal erosion of the shore, because no
protection is provided against the loss of land.  Although houses may remain
standing, they can be rendered uninhabitable by the loss of utilities or failure of
the septic system.
To the extent that regulations allow, property owners also can build protective
structures parallel to the shore in front of their properties.  These structures can
be hard—in the form of wooden, vinyl, or steel bulkheads; stone revetments; or
bluff-stabilizing structures—or semi-hard (and usually temporary), such as
sandbags of varying sizes or geotubes.  For high-energy and open-coast
environments, steel bulkheads are more effective than short-lived wooden or
vinyl structures.  However, strong storm waves can still overwhelm the
protective structure and cause damage to the buildings behind it (see Figure 4.2).
Bulkheads and seawalls cost $150–$4,000 per foot (ft) and dikes or levees cost
$150–$800/ft, depending on engineering and construction specifications, design
standards, construction materials, and geologic characteristics (Yohe et al.,
1996).  In some communities, small structures (e.g., groins) have been built
perpendicular to the shore to intercept some of the sand transported with the
littoral drift.
Many scientists argue that the construction of hard structures along eroding
shores eventually leads to beach loss (Tait and Griggs, 1990).  Although helpful
in preventing damage to the immediate house and structure, such measures can
accelerate erosion on neighboring properties, lead to the loss of the beach’s
natural capability to protect against storms, produce unsightly oceanfront areas
when the structures become exposed, and have serious economic impacts on the
larger community if the beach is lost (see Figure 4.3).
In locations where hard structures are not allowed, individuals may be allowed to
alter the grade of a retreating bluff or beach scarp or maintain a protective dune
line in front of their properties through sand fencing.  Individuals also may be
able to obtain permits for beach scraping to pile sand mounds in front of their
properties.  Beach scraping is allowed in South Carolina and Texas, for example,
and is being reintroduced on the south shore of Long Island, N.Y. (e.g., Village
of Quogue).  On retreating shorelines, these measures are at best temporary,
although they can help minimize flooding during a storm.  Other measures for
managing erosion differ in the degree to which they interfere with sediment
transport processes.  In some cases, local regulations may allow individuals to
use organic material, such as old Christmas trees, hay bales, or branches, to
reduce the impact of wave attack on their property (see Figure 4.4).  Although
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these materials are readily available and cost little or nothing (e.g., a bale of hay
cost approximately $70 in Texas in 1999), they do not reliably protect shoreline
areas from coastal storms or waves over the long term, and many beach residents
and visitors find them unsightly when exposed.
If a parcel of land is deep enough, then an individual may choose to relocate a
house farther inland, an option that can be more cost-effective, even in the short
term, than hard-engineered structures.  For instance, the cost of moving a single-
family house in North Carolina is between $10,000 and $15,000, excluding the
driving of pilings at the new location.  In Caplen, Texas, owners moved their
homes back from the eroding bluff at a cost of $25,000 per 1,200-ft2 home
(Burrus, 1999) (see Figure 4.5).  Relocation is technically feasible in most cases,
but shallow lot size or a lack of comparable lots further inland is frequently a
limiting factor.  In addition, lots further inland are less valuable than are those
closer to water, so property owners often prefer not to relocate because it would
reduce their rental income.  This economic incentive encourages owners to keep
their oceanfront property as long as possible.
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FIGURE 4.2  This bulkhead
in Scituate, Massachusetts
did not prevent damage to
the houses from powerful
storm waves that
overtopped the structure
during a winter storm.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, February 1978)
FIGURE 4.3  A groin field
at Westhampton Beach,
N.Y., has created an
“erosion hot spot”
downdrift.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1993)
FIGURE 4.4  Hay bales are
used as the core of artificial
dunes on Galveston Island,
Texas.  Hay bales are an
inexpensive means of
rebuilding dunes and
encouraging the regrowth of
dune vegetation, but they
are limited in long-term
effectiveness and unsightly
when exposed.
(Photo by Susanne C. Moser, February 1999)
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FIGURE 4.5  This single-family home in Caplen, Texas, which has 1,440 square
feet of living space, was relocated at a cost exceeding $20,000.
(Photo by The Heinz Center, October 1998)
Many states and communities require individuals to exhaust all retreat options
before attempting structural shoreline protection.  Government funds (local,
state, and federal) may be available to defray some of the relocation or
mitigation costs.  If relocation within a lot is not possible, then municipalities or
other public institutions may buy out a property owner and offer a property of
comparable value farther inland in exchange, thus possibly averting several
problems that tend to arise in eroding areas, including a loss of beach, hardening
of the shoreline, and legal “takings” challenges by property owners.  In addition,
private individuals can choose to protect their coastal properties from future
development by either donating or selling them at a discount to a government or
private conservation agency, or using conservation easements (Dean, 1999).
Individuals also can choose to purchase flood insurance to spread the risk of loss.
Federally backed flood insurance, reviewed in Chapter 3, covers storm-related
erosion damages to structures but not to the land.  Flood insurance reduces the
economic consequences of storm-induced flood and erosion losses at relatively
low expense, but, unless combined with mitigation actions, does not reduce
overall damages.
Lastly, private individuals or property owners along a stretch of eroding
oceanfront may organize into groups (e.g., homeowners’ associations) to pursue
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a common approach to the erosion problem and generate the funds necessary to
finance neighborhood-wide beach nourishment or more expensive projects,
including the acquisition of land, that may be out of reach for a single individual.
Within the constraints of local regulations, these nongovernmental associations
may choose to lobby local governments for increased beach management efforts
or self-impose a tax to finance such projects.  For example, shorefront property
owners on Bogue Island, North Carolina, initiated self-taxation for beach
nourishment, prompting the municipal government to participate in, and
contribute financially to, a wider beach management effort.  In Santa Barbara,
California, residents moved quickly when a 69-acre parcel of coastline—the last
piece of undeveloped coastline in town, and one used by many residents—came
up for sale.  The community raised $3.5 million from the county government and
individuals to purchase the land (Dean, 1999).  The conservation of this beach
has created a recreation area and an erosion buffer zone for this community.
Table 4.1 summarizes the approaches available to individuals for coping with
coastal erosion.  To reiterate, these approaches are constrained and guided by the
regulations and policies devised by governments.  Individuals cannot regulate
one another’s activities, impose land-use plans, provide incentive programs, or
do public outreach.
TABLE 4.1  Summary of Erosion Management Approaches Available to Individuals
Intervention Response measure Basis and Constraints
Pre-construction Setbacks; building behind frontal












Property protection Dune restoration, fencing;











Loss reduction Relocation of building, insurance
coverage for storm-related flood
and erosion damages; hazard
information gathering
Local/state/federal regu-
lations and policies offer
assistance and insurance
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APPROACHES AVAILABLE TO COMMUNITIES
Communities or local governments address coastal erosion problems by
developing and enforcing local ordinances to guide decisions on land use,
zoning, subdivision practices, building standards, hazard mitigation, and
management of public beach areas.  Local ordinances typically vary as to
whether they address erosion problems and shore protection on a case-by-case
basis (i.e., property by property) or through a broader, community-wide
approach.  Communities often use both approaches.  These ordinances may be
either constrained or facilitated by programs and statutes at the state level.  Local
governments also may be empowered to implement state laws (e.g., coastal zone
management statutes) and federal programs that relate to shoreline protection,
hazard mitigation, or coastal management (e.g., the NFIP).
When communities use a case-by-case approach in dealing with erosion
problems, the decisions dictate the choices available to individuals (discussed in
the previous section).  These decisions concern matters such as the
implementation or enforcement of setbacks, building standards, or permits for
shorefront protection of individual properties with soft- or hard-engineered
structures (see Box 4.1).  Local authorities also have the power to grant
variances from local regulations or impose conditions on a permit application;
this power frequently is exercised to mitigate the environmental impacts of
development.
When communities use more comprehensive, community-wide approaches to
erosion management, they have an opportunity to consider the cumulative
impacts of shorefront development and protection measures and develop broader
flood and erosion hazard mitigation programs.  For example, they can use zoning
ordinances to restrict certain types of development in the most hazardous areas
(e.g., prohibiting the construction of buildings exceeding a threshold square
footage or height, industrial complexes, or hazardous facilities along the
immediate shorefront).  Zoning ordinances also may affect subdivision practices
and the types of infrastructure development allowed in shoreline areas.
To generate funds for community-wide projects such as the purchase of open
space and beach nourishment, communities can use various taxation schemes.
Several communities along the south shore of Long Island, for example, recently
voted to establish a real estate transfer tax (exempting transfers below a certain
exchange value to protect low-income populations) to pay for the preservation of
open space.  Other common local approaches to funding shoreline protection
projects include beach user fees; hotel/motel occupancy taxes; and so-called
impact fees, which generally are tied to development projects that cause some
measurable, unmitigated impact on coastal resources.
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BOX 4.1  Combating Erosion of Siasconset Beach on Nantucket Island
Long before the well-to-do began building summer camps on Siasconset (’Sconset) Beach in the
early 1900s, Africans from the Portugese colony of Cape Verde lived for months at a time in fishing
shacks lining the coast of Nantucket Island in Massachusetts.  Fishermen by trade, they dried their
daily catch of codfish and sold it throughout eastern Massachusetts.  Eventually, some residents
added living rooms and bedrooms to their shacks in what is now called Codfish Park.  Since 1957,
erosion has eaten away 4 to 7 feet (ft) of land per year on ’Sconset Beach.  Several homes have
been moved.  Still others wash out during harsh winter storms, when the beach narrows to just a
sliver (see Figure 4.6).
Those who think the ocean’s march can be stopped find hope in a method discovered by accident at
the Danish Geotechnical Institute.  In 1999, the founder of the ’Sconset Beach Preservation Fund
and dozens of residents persuaded the Nantucket Conservation Commission to approve the
installation of wells, pipes, pumps, and a 2,200 stretch of 8 ft tall sand tubes in a desperate attempt
to save their homes and nearby Sankaty Head Lighthouse.  The theory is that, by lowering the water
table, these measures will make the sand drier and more porous, allowing water carried by waves to
percolate into the sand.  As the water drains, it will deposit suspended sand onto the beach.
Because less water will be rolling back from the beach into the sea, it will carry off less sand with
the backwash.  The newest plan calls for installing 18-ft-long, 8-ft-wide sand tubes into trenches
along the base of the bluff to protect it.  During winter storms, waves as high as 20 ft can tear away
at the bluff, causing homes built there to tumble down.  The geotextile tubes, or “sand sausages,”
will be covered by sand.  One will stretch 1,600 ft and the other will be 600 ft long.
Some feel it is silly to try to protect a beach when the whole island has been eroding for centuries.
“Nantucket is a sand bar that has been eroding for 3,000 years,” observed one opponent of the
effort.  “The plan may work in the short term, but there’s only one long-term solution:  They’re
going to have to move.”
SOURCE:  Adapted from Rodriguez, 1999.  See also Curtis and Davis,1997; Turner and
Leatherman, 1997.
Figure 4.6   The front of this
house on ‘Sconset’ Beach,
Nantucket was torn away by
storm waves.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1996)
CHAPTER 4 - CURRENT APPROACHES TO EROSION MANAGEMENT
65
Floodplain management ordinances typically address hazard mitigation on both a case-
by-case and community-wide basis.  Local governments, for instance, specify building
requirements—implemented through individual building permits—in high-hazard
areas as well as provisions that apply throughout the community (e.g., zoning, public
outreach, education).  Through the Community Rating System (a flood insurance
rating and community inspection program discussed in Chapter 3), communities are
encouraged to voluntarily take on approved activities that exceed the NFIP minimum
hazard mitigation requirements; communities that do so are rewarded with reduced
insurance rates.  They can achieve better ratings by instituting community-wide
measures such as erosion hazard mapping and regulation; data collection, maintenance
of nonstructural programs designed to reduce the rate of erosion; and the preparation
and adoption of erosion management plans that guide land-use development,
redevelopment, post-disaster recovery, and mitigation decisions.
Local governments also are responsible for managing their public beaches and, thus,
for protecting and restoring those areas in case of beach erosion.  Because public funds
are used to finance public beach management, local governments frequently encounter
controversy over the appropriate levels and means of protection.  In the past,
communities frequently built hard structures, such as groins and seawalls.  More
recently, however, communities increasingly have chosen “soft” engineering solutions
(e.g., beach scraping, dune stabilization, mangrove planting and maintenance) or
sought ways to fund beach nourishment projects.  They also engage in or request
federal and state assistance with post-storm responses to erosion such as rebuilding
dunes (see Figure 4.7) and beach nourishment.  In cooperative shoreline management
projects that involve several levels of government (e.g., projects supported by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers [USACE]), communities or counties play vital roles as local
sponsors.
FIGURE 4.7  After oceanfront homes at Kure Beach, North Carolina, were destroyed by
Hurricane Fran, attempts were made in 1996 to rebuild dunes along the coast.
(Photo by Robert Willett, The News and Observer, 1996.  Reprinted with permission
of The News and Observer Publishing Company, Raleigh, N.C.)
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In a survey of more than 400 coastal communities nationwide, Godschalk et al. (1989)
determined the frequency of use of particular coastal hazard management measures in
the late 1980s.  Selected measures that are particularly relevant to erosion hazard
management are shown in Table 4.2 which shows that some of the less effective
management tools (e.g., measures ranked 10, 11, 12) are used more often than others,
including the top-ranked approach.  Godschalk et al. (1989) attribute this pattern largely
to the political obstacles encountered in both the policy-making and implementation
phases.  Their research revealed that the most important hurdles to the enactment of such
management measures include generally conservative attitudes toward government
control of private property rights, a perception that communities can “weather the
storm,” inadequate financial resources, other local problems that are more pressing, and
opposition from real estate and development interests (Godschalk et al., 1989).
An additional major constraint on community-wide coastal erosion management is a
general lack of appropriate staff, resources, and technical expertise at the local
government level.  Local agencies seldom employ their own geology experts or coastal
zone or floodplain managers.  If, among all other local management challenges, the
erosion problem assumes a priority status, then a community may be able (usually with
financial and technical assistance from county and state governments) to commission an
environmental impact statement (EIS) or other technical studies on the extent of, and
management options for, the erosion problem.  Such an environmental assessment was
undertaken in 1997 in the Village of Quogue on Long Island, NY; it resulted in the
establishment of a no-hardening rule along the community’s oceanfront properties.
More comprehensive assessments are under way in the town of Southampton, N.Y., and
city of Ocean Shores, Washington, which are seeking to strengthen and clarify local
codes on shoreline protection and develop long-term solutions to erosion problems (see
Box 4.2 and Box 4.3).  Such assessments are usually the important first step toward the
development of a more comprehensive and systematic coastal erosion management
scheme at the local level.  Again, financial restrictions often limit even the compilation
of a scientific and policy option assessment.
Within and across communities, nongovernmental institutions have developed and
implemented creative efforts that combine recreation and education with important
aspects of beach management.  In Oregon, for instance, members of a coastwide
environmental group are being asked to watch the progress of shoreline change at
“erosion hot spots” (see Box 4.4).  In Galveston, Texas, an independent school district
developed a high school beach monitoring program, which not only provided students
with hands-on learning opportunities but also furnished the city with useful data (see
Box 4.5).  In southern Maine, coastal residents are trained by state geologists to measure
beach profiles and gather essential data for the development of beach management
plans.  Such projects are of great educational value, usually improve understanding of
coastal processes, give insight into differing positions on shoreline protection, and
ultimately can lead to greater buy-in and ownership of a chosen management option.
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In many coastal areas, communities are beginning to develop regional, in-state shoreline
management approaches that are organized around, for instance, a watershed, bay, or
littoral cell.  The shift to regional approaches, which frequently involve state and federal
agencies, has resulted in part from a recognition and improved understanding of
sediment transport processes and the downdrift impacts of individual communities’
shoreline protection activities.  Examples of such regional approaches can be found in
southern Maine, Hawaii, Oregon, and southern Washington.  The advantages include
pooling of local resources; mutual education and fostering of understanding and
collaborative ties; and increased political leverage with state and federal institutions that
could provide legal, technical, or financial assistance (Moser, 1998).







Type of Measure Type of Responsec
# %
1 109 27 Special hazard area ordinance Planning
2 152 38 Dune protection regulations Regulatory
3 185 46 Locating public structures and building to
reduce storm risk
Nonregulatory
4 216 54 Shoreline setback regulations Regulatory
5 118 29 Acquisition of undeveloped land in
hazardous areas
Public land ownership and
direct land management
6   12   3 Acquisition of damaged structures in
hazardous locations
Public land ownership and
direct land management
7   84 21 Transfer of development potential from
hazardous to non-hazardous sites
Nonregulatory
8 118 29 Locating capital facilities to reduce/
discourage development in hazardous areas
Nonregulatory
9     9   2 Building relocation program Nonregulatory
10 354 88 Zoning ordinance Regulatory
11 347 86 Subdivision ordinance Planning
12 340 84 Comprehensive/land-use plan Planning
13 103 26 Hazard disclosure requirements in real
estate transactions
Nonregulatory
14   56 14 Acquisition of development rights or scenic
easements
Public land ownership and
direct land management
a  This column shows how selected measures rank in relative effectiveness in reducing storm-related
hazards, as perceived by the respondents to a community survey.  The scale ranges from 1 to 14,
with 1 being the most effective.
b  A total of 403 communities are represented.  The # column indicates the number of communities
using a particular measure; the % column indicates the percentage of the total.
c  Some measures may involve regulatory, planning, and nonregulatory aspects.  The measures were
categorized based on the primary modality of implementation.
SOURCE:  Adapted from Godschalk et al. (1989)
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BOX 4.2  Assessing Erosion Management Options for Southampton, Long Island
Those who have built on the shorefront of Southampton, New York, are no strangers to the hazards
of living along a dynamic barrier beach or the problems of long-term erosion.  So far, they have had
to deal mostly with the seasonal fluctuations of the beach and occasional hurricane or severe
Nor’easter, from which the beaches usually recover in the following calmer season.  Long-term
average erosion rates are on the order of 1.5 feet (ft) per year or less, with the exception of areas near
structures that run perpendicular to the shore, which have increased erosion rates significantly by
intercepting the littoral drift (Leatherman et al, 1999).  In addition, the phenomenon of longshore
sand waves—the periodic wave-like accumulation and downdrift movement of sediment with the
littoral current—can produce temporary “erosion hot spots” (lasting 1 or more years) moving along
the shore.  With seasonal beach width fluctuations of up to 200 ft, these combined shoreline
movements can produce significant threats to individual properties and structures.
Since 1988, the town of Southampton has administered New York’s Coastal Erosion Hazard Area
Act through a local ordinance.  Although the town has encouraged both the elevation and relocation
of structures back from the shoreline, it has permitted structural protection measures as long as they
are located 25 ft landward of the landward toe of the dune or natural protective feature and meet
certain minimum standards.  Since the early 1990s—when Long Island experienced several severe
winter storms from which the beaches did not entirely recover—numbers of applications for both
emergency and non-emergency shoreline hardening structures have increased significantly.
Eventually, the town began recognizing the potentially negative impacts of hard structures on its
most valuable resource—the beautiful beaches—and therefore began to favor nonstructural solutions
to recurring erosion problems (see Figure 4.8).  In response, the town denied several permits for
bulkheads and other hardening structures.  The subsequent political and legal fights among residents,
the town, and the state led the town to initiate a general environmental impact study (GEIS) to assess
the local erosion problem and the range and feasibility of management options over the short- and
long-term.  Still awaiting the final GEIS, state and local officials expect that the town will follow the
example of one of its incorporated villages, Quogue, and establish a no-hardening rule for its shore,
instead requiring the relocation of threatened structures back from the encroaching sea and/or soft
protection measures.  Given the generally deep lots along the oceanfront of Southampton, this option
is feasible and cost-effective in most cases.
FIGURE 4.8
Erosion has uncovered the
bulkheads intended to protect
the houses behind a dune in
Southampton, N.Y.
(Photo by Susanne C. Moser, October 1998)
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BOX 4.3  Learning to Deal with a New Problem:  Ocean Shores, Washington
For much of the latter half of this century, Washington State has experienced seasonally punctuated
and locally confined “hot-spot erosion” along its open-ocean shoreline, especially on either side of
jetties built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to protect inlets and the entrances of harbors.
More frequently, the state had to deal with the unpleasant side effects of too much sand:  the
obstruction of the ocean view by growing dunes; “drowning” of houses, roads and other
infrastructure under sand; extension of access roads to the beach; and property rights issues around
the newly created land.  In the late 1970s, however, researchers noted that the shoreline accretion
rates had begun to slow, and by the late 1980s, the trend seemed to have reversed.  Erosion became
more common, even if still confined to a number of hot spots.  One of these erosion hot spots
emerged north of the Grays Harbor jetty in the city of Ocean Shores.
Ocean Shores is a destination resort and retirement community of some 3,000 year-round residents,
10,000 part-time residents, and up to 60,000 visitors during peak summer weekends.  The city
awoke to the growing erosion threat in the early 1990s.  For several years, erosion had eaten into
the city’s southern end, the prime location for the homes of new arrivals who wanted to live and
retire in the county’s fastest-growing coastal community.  Erosion was perceived as a big problem
after several severe winter storms began to threaten a $20–$30 million condominium complex as
well as a significant portion of the city’s infrastructure located behind the primary dune.  Although
both the state and city recognized shoreline protection, wave action, erosion, and flooding as coastal
management challenges, neither was really prepared to confront the emerging crisis with an explicit
and well thought out erosion management strategy, and neither had the necessary funds to
implement such a strategy.
In a race against time, spurred by El Niño years with severe winter storms, a flurry of action was
initiated to find an acceptable short-term and feasible long-term solution.  The condo owners
organized to privately fund, and more effectively lobby for, emergency protection of their
investment.  Subsequently, a two-tiered stone revetment (locally known as a wave-bumper) was
permitted and built in front of the condos, albeit on the public beach.  In addition, private
consultants and several coastal communities lobbied the U.S. Congress and state legislature for
funds to study and develop short-term and long-term management responses to the erosion problem.
The governor convened a Task Force on Coastal Erosion to develop statewide recommendations,
and coastal communities signed an inter-local agreement to coordinate lobbying and management
efforts.   Local and state agencies launched a major public education and awareness raising
campaign through workshops, public meetings, the local press, and improved collaboration between
local and state agencies.
In Ocean Shores, the city conducted a general environmental impact study  (GEIS)—first with the
help of consultants, then increasingly in collaboration with state agencies, the USACE, and the
independent Battelle Memorial Institute—to determine the city’s long-term management strategy.
A strong effort was mounted to solicit public input through a Citizen’s Involvement Committee as
well as policy and technical advisory committees.  As of October 1999, a final recommendation
was pending upon the completion of the review period of the draft GEIS. An emergency geotube
barrier was built to prevent the breaching of the primary dune – the thinning natural barrier
protecting the city’s infrastructure and properties at the south end of town.
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BOX 4.4  Keeping an Eye on “Erosion Hot Spots” in Oregon
For 28 years, the Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition (OSCC)—an all-volunteer,
nonprofit environmental advocacy group—has been keeping an eye on issues affecting the
state’s coast.  It is also the only environmental group that gets involved in the politics of
coastal erosion management in Oregon.  In the coalition’s early years, it actively fought to
get coastal hazard and coastal land use goals into the state’s land-use plan (Oregon
Department of Land Conservation and Development, 1995); since then, the OSCC has
watched how state and local communities are implementing the plan.  Its members file
legal complaints and submit testimony regarding permit decisions, work with local adopt-
a-beach groups to assess how well Oregon is ensuring public access to the coast, and
participate in research and stakeholder processes that deal with coastal hazards (Oregon
Sea Grant, 1994).  The coalition also helped create a land trust in central Oregon while
entertaining a variety of other ongoing activities and programs.
One of these programs was initiated roughly 5 years ago by the OSCC (Fran Recht,
President, Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition, personal communication to Susanne
Moser, November 11, 1998).  In this “Mile-by-Mile Coast Watch Program,” volunteers
(only some of whom are OSCC members) regularly observe what is happening along a
particular stretch of the coast.  Part of their job is to keep an eye on local erosion hot spots
and what happens to them as the seasons change.  The information gathered is channeled
back to the OSCC, which uses it to formulate coastal conservation strategies, initiate
political action, and raise awareness in local and state agencies and the broader population.
Recht says the volunteers not only learn more about their coastal environment but also
“develop a real sense of ownership for the stretch of coast they are watching,” which may
be the best guarantee of conservation of the extensive dunes, sandy pocket beaches,
species-rich estuaries, and steep cliffs from which countless locals and visitors enjoy
breathtaking views of the Pacific coastline.
CHAPTER 4 - CURRENT APPROACHES TO EROSION MANAGEMENT
71
BOX 4.5  Hands-on Learning About Coastal Change in Galveston, Texas:
Research and Education Combined
In 1997, the Bureau of Economic Geology (BEG) at the University of Texas at Austin
initiated an innovative collaboration with Ball High School, the city of Galveston’s only
public school.  Geologists Roberto Cruteros and Jim Gibeaut of the BEG began to develop a
hands-on beach monitoring class for Ball High sophomores, juniors, and seniors.  What
motivated the geologists was their own experience of working with state and local officials,
who often failed to understand and appreciate coastal dynamics, seasonal shoreline
variability, and long-term shoreline change.  So the pair launched an enhanced science
education program with more than $35,000 in funding and staff support from the newly
established Texas Coastal Zone Management Program (Lutz, 1998).  Several Texas oil
companies contributed matching funds, hoping that someday these students might work for
them and understanding that public education is a crucial ingredient in enhanced coastal
stewardship.
The goal of the program is to teach students and teachers about coastal dynamics and help
them to appreciate this highly dynamic environment.  Participants learn how to measure
topographic beach and dune profiles; monitor weather conditions, the state of the sea, and
the rate of long-shore drift; identify dune vegetation; and analyze the collected data.  They
get a course in local geography, geology, botany, meteorology, math, and computer-based
statistics all in one—an experience that fosters teamwork, communication skills,
observation skills, and problem-solving strategies.  Over the two years that BEG has been
working with Ball High—a pilot project eventually to be expanded to other coastal Texas
high schools—students have caught on quickly and “do a great job” (Jim Gibeaut,
University of Texas at Austin, personal communication, February 8, 1999).  With in-class
theoretical training and practical guidance during the outdoor learning sessions, Ball High
students are the first links in a beach monitoring network that eventually will span the Texas
coast.  The geologists are helping students develop a World Wide Web site on which their
data and photographs will be posted.  Eventually, Ball High students will be connected with
students from other high schools who will learn to monitor beaches along their own
stretches of the coast.
Although the project seems to require a lot of effort, Gibeaut asserts that every bit is worth
it.  He is certain that the project will be successful:  Students learn about the local
environment and geological principles, gain experience analyzing and interpreting data and
performing field work, and acquire computer skills.  They also have fun, even in the rain.
And it helps to know that they are contributing to a real research project.
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APPROACHES AVAILABLE AT THE STATE LEVEL
Since the passage of the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (P.L. 92-
583), coastal states have been central players in the management of coastal
resources and shorefront areas, acting as intermediaries between federal agencies
and local governments and as active shapers of coastal policies at all levels.  As
summarized by a recently completed National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) study of the effectiveness of state coastal zone
management programs (henceforth referred to as the effectiveness study),
State coastal programs have resulted in more attention to issues
such as erosion, sea level rise, and cumulative adverse impacts
resulting from development on receding beach and bluff
shorelines and sensitive natural habitat areas.  States (coastal
management programs) have been at the forefront of addressing
shoreline use conflicts such as the demand for shoreline armoring
to protect existing upland structures to the detriment and loss of
natural beach systems (Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998).
A variety of physical, socioeconomic, historical, political, and institutional
factors influence how the 30 coastal states and various territories have addressed
their respective problems related to shoreline change.  Some states (e.g., Oregon,
California, Maine) have coastal zone management programs that predate the
CZMA and thus were among the first to establish comprehensive, federally
approved state programs.  Others (e.g., Georgia, Texas, Ohio) historically
engaged in more limited, piecemeal coastal land use and shoreline management
but recently have strengthened their efforts and now participate in the federal
Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP).  As of 1999, 32 of 35 coastal
states and territories had developed programs under the CZMP, protecting more
than 99 percent of the nation’s oceanic and Great Lakes coastline (National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1998).  Only Indiana, Minnesota, and
Illinois do not participate in the CZMP (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 1999b).  Although Minnesota does not participate in the CZMP,
it does have a state shoreland management program begun in the late 1960’s that
sets standards for development along Lake Superior, including environmental
setbacks.
Thus, the states differ widely in experience, institutional structure, and capacity
for managing coastal erosion.  These factors, together with legal and political
constraints (e.g., state laws, attitudes, activism related to property rights; other
overriding state management concerns), determine to a large extent which
shoreline management policies are adopted by a state.  Accordingly, states differ
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widely in their preferred approaches to coastal zone management and shoreline
protection (Knecht et al., 1996).
The effectiveness study (Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998) also examines the
broad range of processes and tools used by states to protect resources in coastal
shorefront areas.  These processes and tools are grouped into four basic shoreline
management approaches: regulatory measures and planning tools; direct land
management, restoration, and acquisition; non-regulatory measures; and
research, education and outreach.  One-third of the coastal states have
established specific beach, coastal erosion, or special (hazard) area management
programs that use and combine any number of these processes and tools
(National Research Council, 1990; Platt, et al. 1992a).  The use of the five basic
approaches by each coastal state and territory is summarized in Table 4.3 and
described below.
Regulatory Measures
Regulatory measures for shoreline management prescribe specific rules and
conditions for land use, construction, and development.  These measures have to
meet procedural and substantive due process requirements and be established by
a legislative body or another authorized governmental agency.  In general, they
are implemented on a case-by-case basis through activity-specific permits to
individuals (Buck, 1996).  They usually include a determination of the inland
extent to which any coastal regulations apply and name the state and local
agencies authorized to administer the regulations.  These measures also define
the types of activity regulated and specify any restrictions (or exceptions) with
respect to
• new construction or reconstruction of residential and commercial buildings
through setbacks and control zones;
• construction or repair of shoreline stabilization structures;
• pedestrian and vehicular access or traffic in shorefront and dune areas; and
• use or alteration of dune and other shoreline habitat areas (Bernd-Cohen and
Gordon, 1998).
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TABLE 4.3  Coastal Zone Management Tools Used by Statesa and Territoriesb to Protect Beaches, Dunes, and Bluffs
Tools AK AL AS CA CT DE FL GU HI LA MA MD ME MI MP MS NC NH NJ NY OR PA PR RI SC VA VI WA WI all
Regulatory tools and plans = 10
Restrict construct. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 27
Setbacks * * * * * * * * * * * 1 * * * * * 2 * * * * * * * 23
Control areas * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 1 * * * * * 2 * * * * * * * 27
Restrict armoring * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 28
Restrict access * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 23
Protect habitat * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 25
Permit compliance * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 28
Local plan * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 22
Special area plan * * * * * * * * * * * * 12
Other plans, controls * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 22
Direct land management = 6
Shoreline in parks * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 29
Protect natural areas * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 25
Dune restoration * * * * * * * * * * * * * 13
(Re)nourishment * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 17
Armoring/repair * * * * * * * * * * * 11
Land acquisition * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 21
Nonregulatory* tools = 5
Restrict investment * * * * * * * * * * * * * 13
Investment incentives * * * * * 4
Disclosure * * * * * * 6
Education, tech. assistance * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 29
Fin. Assistance * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 20
Research tools = 6
Setbacks, risks * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 19
Beach profiles * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 23
Nat. area inventory* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 28
Technical reports * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 29
Aerial photos * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 29
Sea level rise consideration * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 25
Total = 25
a  In Mississippi, all beaches are artificial and open to the public, with no regulation above mean high water.  In Pennsylvania, the only major beach is publicly owned
and under state management.  No information is provided for Georgia and Texas.
b  Abbreviations:  AS, American Samoa; GU, Guam; MP, Marianas Islands; PR, Puerto Rico; VI, Virgin Islands.
SOURCE:  Adapted from Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998.
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Twenty-three states and territories have some form of shoreline setback policy in place
(Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998).  Table 4.4 lists coastal setbacks and control zones for
each state and territory, any exceptions, and the entities with regulatory responsibility for
implementation.  The stringency of these policies and degree of enforcement vary both
within and across states.  New York, for example, has a regulatory setback requirement
within erosion hazard areas but has not implemented it in certain locations, such as Fire
Island and Westhampton Beach (see Figure 4.9).  North Carolina’s coastal management
regulations are among the strictest in the nation; the state’s regulations include mandatory
setbacks for new construction within ocean hazard areas, prohibitions on the use of erosion
control devices, land acquisition, and local planning requirements (see Box 4.6)
Twenty-seven states define control zones for a broad range of geographic and resource-
specific definitions of control areas, and 23 states use a combination of setbacks and control
zones.  Twenty-eight states regulate the construction of shoreline stabilization structures,
and 23 states regulate both pedestrian and vehicular access to the beach and shoreline.  Sand
mining, sand scraping, dune alteration, and other forms of beach system alteration are
regulated by 25 states.  To document the implementation of their regulations, most states
use permit-tracking systems and compliance tools (i.e., some combination of oversight,
field inspection or aerial surveillance, and penalties for noncompliance), but the technical
sophistication of, and resources available for, such compliance checks vary significantly
(Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998).
FIGURE 4.9  The house with its pilings on Fire Island, NY indicates long-term beach erosion.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1979)
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TABLE 4.4  Coastal Setbacksa and Control Zones by State:  Provisions, Exceptions, Types, and Regulatory Authority




Exceptions Extent of Control Zone (Regulated Area) and Provisions Regulatory Responsibility
AL 40 feet (ft) landward of crest




SF Construction 40 ft inland from crest to the 10-ft contour regulated; repairs
allowed if <50% damaged
State
AK None Construction and all new activities in hazardous (flood, storm surge, and littoral
process) and erosion hazard areas regulated; inland extent based on land-use




AS 25 ft for residential, 50 ft for
commercial development
Standard distance Land-use permits within 200 ft of MHW denied if subject to shoreline erosion,
or if it diminishes access or degrades resources; building permits required in
coastal hazard areas; permits required for grading, excavation, fill, and steep
slopes
Territory
CA No state setback, some local
setback requirements
n/a n/a State coastal development permit required for activities from MHT to 1st public
road or 300 ft from beach/bluff or MHT if no beach; covers beaches/dunes,
rocky shores within 300 ft of top of coastal bluff, and any development in a





CT None All activities regulated above MHW inland to 1,000 ft, or 100 ft from inland





DE  100 ft landward of seaward-




 Yes, if land not
sufficient
 Area landward of setback (100 ft landward  of 7-ft > NGDV), running along the
Delaware Bay and around to the Atlantic (~100 ft wide in north to ~12 miles
[mi] wide in south); letter of approval needed for building; post-storm
reconstruction prohibited if structure damaged >75% or foundation damaged
>50%; exceptions




policies in control zone
FL 30-year erosion line for major
structures from SHWL
Erosion rate SF Permits for activities within an area from SHW to the landward extent of the
100-year floodplain (ranges from a few to several hundred feet wide)
State (delegation to local
level not realized to date)
GAc None Permits required for certain activities and structures from the submerged
shoreline lands to the 3-mi limit of state ownership, the sand beaches to the
ordinary high water mark, and the “dynamic dune field,” defined as the
dynamic area of beach and sand dunes, the ocean boundary that extends to the
ordinary high water mark, the landward boundary of which is the first
occurrence of either a live native tree 20 ft in height or greater, or of a structure
existing on July 1, 1979
State
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Exceptions Extent of Control Zone (Regulated Area) and Provisions Regulatory Responsibility
 GU  Ocean shore public access
zone (between MLW and 25
ft inland from 2 ft contour)
 Uniform zone and
contour
  Territory-wide land-use plan, zoning, policies, guidelines; permits required for
activities in seashore reserves (seaward of the 10 fathom contour, all islands,
and inland from MHW to 10 meters or inland edge of public right of way);
flood hazard area permit required for new and expansion activities, but not for
repairs
 Territory
HI 40 ft; along most shorelines to
upper reaches of wash of
waves, usually evidenced by











In special management areas (at least 100 yards inland or further to include
certain resources or reach up to road), permits for development with adverse
ecological impacts or >$25,000; Land Use Commission can reclassify land use;
permits required in conservation district






LA None In coastal zone, bounded by inland boundary of the intracoastal waterway,






MA None On tide-flowed tidelands, filled tidal flats between waterway and first public
way, or 250 ft from water, state waterway permit required for any new
construction or fill; for coastal beaches, dunes, barrier beaches, banks, there are
state performance standards but no restrictions on private rebuilding (relocation
of willing sellers preferred); within 100 ft of 100-year floodplain or 100 ft of
back of beach, dune, flat, marsh, meadow, or swamp, local permits are required
for all projects; voluntary local land-use plans may impose additional
regulations
State and local




On coastal sand dunes, permits required for all activities and within shoreline
zone (250 ft from NHM) for multi-family and other development.
State
ME  seaward of frontal dunes (V-
zone) and in sea level rise
area; no setback in back
dunes; setback 75 ft for
residential; 25 ft for general
development/
commercial; 250 ft from
NHWL in natural resources
protection areas (100-year
flood zone, certain wetlands,
and >20% steep slope areas)
Distance
and resource
In coastal sand dunes (mapped by state; frontal dunes extend inland 125–175 ft
from MHW or from the seaward edge of dune), permit required for any activity;
in back dune areas there are size limits, mobility, and elevation requirements; in
unorganized areas, same regulations as in municipal shoreline zones
(regulations within 250 ft from NHW)
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Exceptions Extent of Control Zone (Regulated Area) and Provisions Regulatory Responsibility
MI Sand dune setback 100 ft
landward from crest of first
landward ridge, not a fore
dune; bluff high risk area
setback 30-year erosion







Within designated critical dune areas (within 2 mi of OHWM), permits for
development, silvaculture, recreation affecting dune areas; additional
regulations for land within 250 ft of critical dune areas possible; from bluffs
eroding at >/= 1 ft per year over past 15 years and high-risk erosion areas,
extending as far as 1,000 ft landward from OHWM, permits required for
development, some reconstruction/repair; for areas within 500 ft of a stream or
the Great Lakes, “earth change” permit required for changes to natural cover or
topography; local zoning within 100 ft of OHWM of Great Lakes possible
State; local sand dune
protection ordinances
optional, based on state
model ordinance
MS None n/a n/a None n/a
NC Structures less than 5,000 ft2,
setback landward of 30-year
erosion rate, crest of primary
dune, toe of frontal dune, 60 ft










rate or 120 ft
from mean
vegetation line
Permits for all construction within areas of environmental concern (extending
from MLW to a variable distance inland depending on erosion; including
ocean-erodible, high-hazard flood, inlet hazard, and unvegetated beach areas on
barrier islands); local land-use planning (including hazard mitigation element)
mandatory in coastal counties but implementation weak
State for major
developments/
projects; local  for plans
and minor projects based
on state standards










Activities prohibited or restricted in tidal buffer zone (100 ft inland from HOTL
along tidal waters); permits for activities in wetlands (include beaches and dune
areas, back dunes,  relict dunes); shoreland development permits required for
activities, subdivision of area 250 ft landward of OHTL; state subsurface
disposal permits and siting setbacks from water bodies
State and local (based on
state regulations)
 NJ  In V-zone, no residential
development; in erosion
hazard areas (30 times erosion
rate for 1–4 DU, 60 for larger
DU) from variable baseline;
all permanent structures set














 Within coastal zone (inland boundary unclear), permits required for all facilities
(commercial, industrial, housing > 24 units, since 1994 also SF); since
1988/1990 activities (SF, commercial, and shoreline stabilization) regulated
within 500 ft of MHW; development limits in certain areas (e.g., barrier
islands) based on environment growth, development potential; no development
on dunes, overwash areas, beaches, coastal bluffs
 State; voluntary local
planning must meet state
standards
MP 0–35 ft from shoreline, no
construction; 35–75 ft from
shoreline, no visual




Activities regulated through permit program within APCs (150 ft inland from
MHW), i.e., shoreline areas (ocean beaches,  rocky headlands, but not top of
cliffs), lagoons and reefs, wetlands/mangroves, ports/industrial areas, and major
sitings within the territory; uses prioritized (prevention of beach erosion is high
priority)
Territory
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Exceptions Extent of Control Zone (Regulated Area) and Provisions Regulatory Responsibility







and if erosion is
not increased
In erosion hazard areas and natural protective feature areas (structural hazard
area is 40-year erosion zone and any beach, dune, shoal, bar, spit, barrier island,
bluff, wetland, and associated natural vegetation); permits required for all
activities; relocations need permits and are required when within 10 ft of
receding edge
State and local
 OR  No new buildings within
"beach zone;" no building on
beaches, active foredunes,
other conditionally stable
foredunes subject to ocean
undercutting and wave
overtopping, and intertidal
plains subject to ocean
flooding (V-zone)







 In ocean shore recreation areas (between extreme low tide and vegetation line),
permit required for improvements; seaward of vegetation line, removal/fill
permit required for most types of shoreline alteration; statewide land-use goals.
apply to state and local permits; special permits for coastal shorelands (at least
100 ft landward of ocean shore); mandatory local plans
 State and local
PA Only setbacks from bluffs,
based on recession rate and
type of structure: residential,
50 years; commercial, 75









Local planning and zones apply within and landward of  setbacks Local planning,
administration of state
regulations
 PR  6 meters (m) from public right
of way; 50 m setback for
development from TMZ
(shoreline); 2.5 times height
of building setback for all
structures built within 400 m
of TMZ
 Uniform distance









 Commonwealth-wide land-use policies and zoning districts; activities within
1,000 m (or further to include important resources) of shoreline and on islands
regulated,/permitted; flood area permits for activities in flood-prone areas;
restrictions on nonconforming uses in  submerged lands, tidally influenced land
 Territory
 RI  50 ft from coastal features or
25 ft from coastal buffer zone;
30 times erosion rate for 1–4
DU, 60 times erosion rate for
larger DU in critical erosion
areas; dune construction
setback on 3 barrier beaches
seaward of utilities/wall of
existing development; no













 Within 200 ft of a coastal feature, permit required for certain activities; permits
tied to zoning, coastal feature protection, and type of activity; construction on
or alteration of dune areas restricted or prohibited; on all barrier beaches, new
infrastructure prohibited; on undeveloped barriers, construction/alteration
prohibited, only soft structural protection; on moderately developed barriers,
new development prohibited, maintenance, rebuilding allowed
 State
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Exceptions Extent of Control Zone (Regulated Area) and Provisions Regulatory Responsibility





State policies, local beach management plans are basis for decision in 40-year
erosion zone; construction permitted but size- and location-dependent; no
erosion control as part of building; exceptions for certain structures and
activities; repair and rebuilding restricted depending on degree of damage;
removal of structure located on active beach required
State and local
TX None N/A No construction is permitted seaward of the vegetation line.  Structures erected
seaward of the vegetation line (or other applicable easement boundary) or that
become seaward of the vegetation line as a result of natural processes are
subject to removal.
State
VA 30-year erosion rate or 20
times local recession rate from
MHW for barrier islands
Erosion rate Public interest
activities
On coastal primary sand dunes and beaches, permits required for certain uses State and some
counties/cities for local
permits
VI No obstruction within 50 ft of
MLT or seaward of natural
barrier, whichever is shortest
Distance In use districts (consistent with territorial coastal policies), permits required;
coastal zone permits required for major and minor activities within first tier
whose landward boundary is mapped, based on natural and artificial features
Territory
WA No state setback, but there
may be local setbacks
n/a n/a Within 200 ft of shore, shoreline substantial development permit required; local
shoreline master plans
Local (with state review)
WI 75 ft from OMHW Uniform distance Piers, boat
hoists,
boathouses
All development within 100 ft of OHWM regulated State, with local
administration of setbacks
a  Setback distance is measured as a uniform distance (in feet or meters), as a zone of a certain width measured from a defined resource feature, as a function of the site-specific
erosion rate, or as a combination of these measures.  In summary, 22 states have state-set setbacks.  Two states (CA, WA) have local setbacks.  Five states (Alaska, Conn., La.,
Mass., Miss.) have no setbacks.
b Abbreviations for territories:  AS, American Samoa; GU, Guam; MP, Marianas Islands; PR, Puerto Rico; VI, Virgin Islands.
c  These data are from Georgia Department of Natural Resources, 1999.
   Key:
APC:  area of particular concern NHWL:  normal high water line
DU:  dwelling unit OHWL:  ordinary high water line
HOTL:  high ordinary tide line OMHW:  ordinary mean high water
MHW:  mean high water SF:  single family housing units
MHW(L):  mean high water (level) SHWL:  seasonal high water line
MLT:  mean low tide TMZ:  territorial maritime zones
NGVD:  national geodetic vertical datum
SOURCE:  Adapted from Bernd-Cohen and Gordon (1998)
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BOX 4.6  North Carolina’s Setback Policy and Other Shoreline Management Policies
North Carolina’s Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) of 1974 prescribes a shoreline
policy that recognizes the unstable nature of barrier islands and storm- and erosion-related
coastal hazards.  Its primary elements are mandatory setbacks and a no-
hardening/stabilization rule in hazardous shoreline areas.  The CAMA defines a setback as
the minimum distance from the ocean that structures (houses and commercial buildings)
can be constructed.  The Act also defines areas of environmental concern (AECs) in which
its regulations apply.  In the so-called ocean hazards areas (including ocean-erodible areas,
high-hazard flood areas, inlet hazard areas, and unvegetated beach areas), the setback
regulations are as follows:
The setback line is located:
 For small structures (<5,000 square feet [ft2] total floor area):
• 30 × long-term annual erosion rate landward of the first line of stable vegetation,
unless this line is seaward of the primary dune; in the latter case, the setback is
measured from crest of the primary dune; or
• a minimum of 60 ft where erosion rate is <2 ft per year (yr);
 For large structures (>5,000 ft2 total floor area):
• 60 × long-term annual erosion rate or
• 30 × long-term annual erosion rate plus 105 ft (if erosion rate is >3.5 ft/yr)
landward of the first line of stable vegetation; or
• a minimum of 120 ft from the first line of stable vegetation or measurement line.
No development is allowed on or seaward of the frontal dune.  Structures also must be
located landward of the crest of the primary dune unless that rule would preclude any
practical use of the lot, in which case development may occur seaward of the primary
dune, but landward of the erosion setback line.  To preserve the protective function of
frontal and primary dunes, no development can involve significant removal or relocation
of dune sand or dune vegetation.  Mobile homes cannot be placed in ocean hazards areas
at all unless they are located in mobile home parks that existed prior to June 1, 1979.
The relocation of structures with public funds away from the eroding shore must meet all
minimum setback requirements.  The relocation of supporting structures and infrastructure
(septic tanks and other essential accessories) entirely with nonpublic funds must be
relocated the maximum feasible distance landward of the present location; septic tanks are
not allowed seaward of the primary dune.
North Carolina also does not allow permanent erosion control structures (bulkheads,
seawalls, revetments, jetties, groins, breakwaters) along its open ocean coast.  The only
exceptions to this rule include cases in which bridges or “only access” roads to substantial
population centers on barrier islands, historical sites of national significance, or
commercial navigation channels of regional significance are imminently threatened; when
such a measure would be vital to public safety and all other nonstructural, soft, or
temporary erosion responses have proven inadequate; and the hardening would be limited
in scale and extent and not cause adverse impacts to adjacent areas.
(continued,)
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BOX 4.6, continued
North Carolina does allow, on a case-by-case basis, experimental erosion response
measures that include innovative technology or design.  The state also allows one-time
temporary erosion control structures in cases in which opportunities for relocation and
beach bulldozing have been exhausted.  Imminently threatened roads, associated rights of
way, principal structures, and associated septic systems may be protected temporarily by
sandbags (3–5 ft wide, 7–15 ft long, and up to 6 ft high) placed above mean high water
and parallel to the shore.  These sandbags may remain in place for a maximum of 2 years
from the date of approval for small structures (<5,000 ft2) or up to 5 years for larger
structures (>5,000 ft2), roads and bridges, or any structure located in a community actively
seeking beach nourishment.  After that period or when the temporary protection no longer
is needed, sandbags must be removed at the property owner’s expense unless they have
been covered up by sand and vegetated so they look like “natural and stable” dunes.
Beach nourishment, beach bulldozing, and dune establishment and stabilization are
allowed but require permits depending on the size of the project.
Currently, the CAMA’s Coastal Reserve Program and Public Beach and Coastal
Waterfront Access Program provide specific authority to acquire coastal property.  The
latter program was established in part to address storm, flood, and erosion hazards.
Because of a lack of state funding, that program has been used rarely since the late 1980s,
but a new state fund for land acquisition recently enabled the state to acquire unbuildable
lots.  In addition, local governments are authorized to acquire land under various sections
of the General Statutes.  Few owners offered unbuildable lots for public acquisition after
hurricanes Bertha and Fran; perhaps more will be forthcoming in the wake of Tropical
Storm Dennis in 1999, which lingered for days off the Outer Banks and caused extensive
erosion damage.
SOURCES:  Godschalk, 1998; Pilkey et al., 1998; Price et al., 1999; Williams et al.,
1999).
CHAPTER 4 - CURRENT APPROACHES TO EROSION MANAGEMENT
83
Planning Tools
Planning tools are designed to guide land-use and development patterns while
assuring public safety and infrastructure services.  Such plans usually contain or
set the stage for enforceable policies, such as those described above.  According
to NOAA’s effectiveness study (Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998), planning tools
vary substantially, both in scope and in the geographic extent to which they
pertain.  They also differ as to whether plans are voluntary or mandatory and in
the degree of protection afforded through the plans’ provisions.
For example, plans may cover a state’s entire coastal zone, the whole state, or
only specially defined areas (e.g., inlets, beaches, bluffs, reefs, wetlands, dunes,
erosion or hazard areas).  States may have a planning framework that sets
guidelines and constraints on local plans, or they may encourage or require local
governments to develop their own land-use and development plans for either the
entire community or specifically defined resource management areas only.  The
latter approach usually entails some limited state financial and technical support
for the development of local plans.  In addition, through FEMA’s Hazard
Mitigation Assistance Program, states and communities can get federal planning
and technical assistance grants.
According to the effectiveness study, 28 of the 29 coastal states and territories
studied use some type of planning affecting their shoreline areas, 21 rely on local
permit delegation in combination with local planning, 23 use special area
management plans or other plans; and 10 use more than one planning tool
(Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998).
Direct Land Management, Restoration, and Acquisition
All states with federally approved programs under the CZMP also own some
stretch of the coast and are responsible for managing these coastal public trust
lands and waters (e.g., state parks, wildlife refuges, historic sites, recreational
areas).  States also often obtain public easements—and usually management
responsibility—for privately held land, and they engage in cooperative
agreements with other public landholders to jointly manage public land.  Most
coastal states protect some natural coastal areas deemed particularly worthy or
vulnerable to human disturbance, but the degree of protection, use, and
management of eroding shores varies.
The majority of states (21) with federally approved programs under the CZMP
also have land acquisition programs through which areas worthy of protection or
repeatedly affected by coastal hazards and damaging erosion losses can be
bought from private owners (Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998).  States often pool
acquisition funds from various sources, request matching federal funds, and
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financially and technically assist local governments in their land acquisition
projects.
Such intergovernmental collaboration increases the bidding power and number
of lots that can be acquired.  Generally, land acquisition offers a way to
permanently reduce or eliminate vulnerability to flooding and erosion hazards,
and, hence, to reduce the long-term economic impact on structures in hazard-
prone areas.  It also helps to implement or achieve other hazard mitigation goals,
such as increases in flood retention capacity, preservation of habitat, and
provision of open space and public beach access (Godschalk, 1998).  On the
other hand, land acquisition frequently provokes objections by local
governments (on the basis of property-tax loss, high cost of acquisition, long-
term maintenance burden, etc.) and private landowners (on the basis of loss of
desirable location, etc.).  In oceanfront areas, land acquisition is limited by high
land values.  It is difficult to compile data on the extent and expense of land
acquisition because record keeping is inconsistent across the nation and many
states do not maintain records at all (Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998;
Godschalk, 1998).
States also are centrally involved in co-funding and designing engineered
shoreline protection measures, both hard and soft.  Delaware, for example, has
adopted a policy of shoreline stabilization through a long-term commitment to
beach nourishment as a means of managing erosion.  Because they have more
financial resources than local governments do, states frequently pay all or the
larger portion of the “local share” in USACE shoreline protection projects.
Occasionally, states also co-fund shoreline armoring or beach nourishment
projects that do not involve the USACE (Duke University Program for the Study
of Developed Shorelines, 1998).
States also use other incentive or assistance programs to aid or promote certain
shoreline protection or development practices.  For example, some states (e.g.,
North Carolina, Texas, Hawaii) have created, or are in the process of
establishing, beach nourishment funds.  Occasionally, states provide financial or
technical support to communities for the relocation of public or private structures
and the creation, restoration, or re-vegetation of disturbed dune areas (e.g.,
Massachusetts, Maine), or buyouts of repeatedly damaged properties (e.g., New
Jersey, Florida, Minnesota, Ohio, Alabama).  State agencies concerned with
shoreline protection may provide guidelines and encourage only a limited set of
mitigation practices even though a wider set of options is legal.  For example, in
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Hawaii, armoring of the shoreline is currently
legal.  Yet in these states, as in most others today, shoreline management
agencies try to direct protection efforts toward nonstructural and soft engineering
approaches because of the threat of, or experience with, the increased erosion
and beach loss often associated with hard shoreline protection (Bernd-Cohen and
Gordon, 1998; Moser and Cash, 1998).  A few states (e.g., Louisiana and
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Florida) mandate the beneficial use of dredged materials, requiring that dredged
sediment meeting certain quality standards be placed on beach areas in need of
sand rather than re-deposited offshore (Bernd-Cohen and Gordon, 1998).
Information Provision - Disclosure and Mapping
In contrast to regulatory measures, nonregulatory tools and processes are
designed to influence coastal activities and land-use choices by systematically
deterring or promoting certain developments and practices by legal, economic, or
other informal means.  These measures may or may not be specific to particular
coasts or hazards.  Some states (e.g., Rhode Island) impose public investment
restrictions on certain areas (e.g., erosion-prone areas) to eliminate development
incentives for private individuals.  Conversely, states may provide investment
incentives in less-hazardous areas or for specific types of activities deemed
beneficial for shoreline protection.  South Carolina, for example, follows a
policy of promoting development in certain areas while discouraging
development in others (in combination with land acquisition) (Moser, 1997).
Some states (Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, and
South Carolina) have instituted notification or disclosure laws based on the
rationale that flooding history, erosion risk, or other hazard exposure data for a
particular structure or property is relevant to an informed purchase or
development.  These states require that this information be made available to a
potential buyer or developer in a timely and understandable manner.  The
underlying assumption is that the disclosure either will deter buyers and
developers from choosing hazardous locations or will encourage them to
mitigate the hazard (Godschalk, 1998).  However, the voluntary disclosure of
risks has proven to be an ineffective means of ensuring that this information is
public, accessible, and known at the time of purchase or transfer (Godschalk,
1998) (see Box 4.7).  Several other coastal states are developing disclosure laws
to boost their hazard management and mitigation efforts.  A related measure in
California is a state-defined limitation on liabilities if structures are built
knowingly in hazardous locations.
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BOX 4.7  Mandatory Hazard Disclosure Laws:  South Carolina, Texas, Massachusetts,
and Ohio
South Carolina’s ocean-related hazard and flooding notification requirement is established in
the state’s Coastal Tidelands and Wetlands Act.  The seller of a coastal property must notify a
potential buyer of the ocean-related hazards prior to the signing of a real estate agreement.  The
properties and locations affected are determined on the basis of definitions provided in the law.
Although all types of properties are affected, South Carolina has no standard form and relies on
private enforcement of the policy.
The disclosure requirement in Texas is almost identical to that in South Carolina, except for the
reliance on both state and private enforcement.  In both states, notification usually is provided,
and the programs seem to fulfill their purpose.
Massachusetts, by contrast, requires disclosure only in cases involving risk from coastal
flooding.  The program places the responsibility for notifying a potential buyer on the seller
and/or the real estate agent, uses maps and definitions to identify affected properties, and
requires the use of a standard form to notify a buyer prior to the signing of any real estate
agreement.  State and private enforcement of the policy rests on the threat of triple damages
under state unfair trade provisions.
Ohio established a 30-year erosion hazard boundary along the Lake Erie shoreline, effective
June 1, 1998.  Owners of property located within the 30-year erosion hazard boundary are
required to notify buyers of the erosion hazard through the state’s standard real estate
disclosure form.  There has been only one appeal of the erosion hazard mapping boundary.
SOURCE:  Godschalk, 1998
Many coastal states identify and map eroding shores and maintain updated
information on shoreline change resulting from major storms, inlet migration, or
other processes (e.g., beach nourishment projects).  Updated maps showing the
erosion rates are used to support both regulatory and nonregulatory measures,
strengthen post-storm recovery, and identify areas with high post-storm
vulnerability.
Some states, such as Florida and Texas, provide information on specific areas at
greater risk from erosion.  Florida, for example, identifies and maps critical
erosion areas, defined as “areas where there exists a threat to or loss of one of
four specific interests—upland development, recreation, wildlife habitat, or
important cultural resources” (Florida Department of Environmental Protection,
1999).  Critical erosion areas also may include “peripheral segments or gaps
between identified critical erosion areas which, although they may be stable or
slightly erosional now, [must be included] … for continuity of management of
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the coastal system or for the design integrity of adjacent beach management
projects.”
Figure 4.10 shows the critical erosion areas map for Volusia County, Florida.
The map divides eroding shoreline areas into three categories:  critical erosion,
critical inlet shoreline, and noncritical erosion.  Similar maps have been
produced for all coastal counties in Florida, spanning 217.6 miles (mi) of critical
erosion and another 114.8 mi of noncritical erosion statewide.
As an extension of mere hazard disclosure and mapping, all states with federally
approved programs under the CZMP use some of their resources to finance,
support, or undertake research; prepare technical reports; perform coastal land
inventories; and educate the public and reach out to particular constituencies.
Frequently, scientific program staff collaborate with academic researchers (e.g.,
in Maine, Hawaii, Oregon, North Carolina) in the actual research; at other times,
research on coastal hazards is conducted on a consultancy or competitive grant
basis by outside researchers (e.g., university researchers, independent engineers).
Outreach to specific groups frequently occurs in collaboration with NOAA-
funded Sea Grant extension services (e.g., in Wisconsin, Hawaii, South
Carolina), state floodplain management programs, or other relevant
governmental and nongovernmental institutions.  Public education on coastal
erosion and other shoreline hazards encompasses direct technical assistance to
local planners and decisionmakers or private individuals; information
dissemination through World Wide Web sites, coastal journals, or technical
newsletters; special events (e.g., conferences, fairs, beach clean-up days, slide
shows, field excursions); and public notifications in the mainstream news media
or letters to property owners of especially affected coastal areas.
Education and outreach are intended to expand public understanding of, and
public debate on, coastal issues.  But the duration and effectiveness of public
education and outreach efforts vary among states.  States also face a significant
problem in reaching absentee landowners who invest in shorefront property but
do not actually live in the areas for most of the year.  Such property owners often
are among the most affected by erosion hazards but have little first-hand
experience with, or understanding of, coastal dynamics; moreover, they rarely
participate directly in the political debate and solution-finding process in the
state or community.
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FIGURE 4.10  Several critical erosion areas are noted in this map of the Volusia
County, Florida, shoreline.
SOURCE:  Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, 1999
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APPROACHES AVAILABLE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Federal programs dealing with coastal hazards generally, and with coastal erosion in
particular, have evolved over time.  In most cases, they are closely tied to state and
local efforts.  Like the approaches to erosion management at other levels, federal
coastal hazard policies are a combination of attempts to eliminate or reduce risks by
modifying the loss potential or hazard, affect the causes of hazards, adjust to losses
from hazards, and transfer risks from those most severely exposed to a broader
population (Burby, 1998).  The following review of federal activities relating to
shoreline protection and erosion control reveals an evolution in approach driven by a
growing understanding of coastal processes, an increase in coastal erosion problems,
and changes in the federal government’s role in managing coastal hazards.  The
range of federal approaches available to manage coastal erosion, shown in Figure
4.11, includes:
1. shoreline protection,
2. provision of federal incentives for state planning,
3. withdrawal of federal subsidies and development incentives,
4. direct regulation,
5. public ownership, and
6. federal disaster assistance.
These approaches are discussed below.  Policy options for incorporating erosion into
the NFIP are described and analyzed in chapter 6.
Shoreline Protection
The federal government conducts shoreline protection projects involving
community, state, and/or federal agencies.  From the early decades of this century
until very recently, the USACE has led federal shoreline protection and erosion
control works.  The history of the USACE’s involvement in shoreline protection
reflects the general evolution of federal coastal erosion policies from in situ
structural protection (e.g., seawalls, jetties, breakwaters, dredging, sand transfer
facilities) to a more flexible range of approaches, including soft engineering
approaches (e.g., sand scraping, beach nourishment, dune stabilization) and retreat
and relocation (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1976; National
Research Council, 1990; Platt et al., 1992a; Platt, 1994; Pilkey and Dixon, 1996;
Maddox, 1998).
The USACE first began carrying out its mission in 1824, but it did not become
responsible for shoreline protection until the early twentieth century (Platt, 1994).
For the first six decades of its work in this area, the USACE typically instituted
structural, hard engineering responses to local coastal erosion problems.
EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS
90
FIGURE 4.11  Events and laws pertaining to federal shoreline protection date back to the
1930s but have become more numerous in recent years.
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Table 4.5 lists total expenditures for the USACE Shore Protection Program from
1950 to 1993.  As of 1993, the USACE had completed the construction of 82
large projects.  Twenty-six of these, authorized in the 1950s and 1960s, are not
included in the expenditure data because of either their small scope and cost or a
lack of sufficient data.  The remaining 56 large shore protection projects
protected a total of approximately 210 mi of shoreline and cost a total of nearly
$1.5 billion (in 1993 dollars) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1996).
Major projects include both armoring (e.g., seawalls, breakwaters, revetments,
groins) and beach nourishment.  The list understates the true volume of shoreline
protection activities because it does not include projects that are small and
specially authorized or that do not require special Congressional authorization.
Furthermore, the USACE does not keep track of projects that do not pass the
reconnaissance or feasibility phases (i.e., that were denied federal assistance) or
are completed without federal involvement (C. Chestnutt, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, personal communication, August 12, 1998).
TABLE 4.5   Total Expenditures for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Shoreline
Protection Projects 1950–1993 (adjusted to 1993 dollars)






Initial beach restoration $426.0  58    $730.4
Periodic beach nourishment $270.9   64    $420.4
Structures $153.9   50    $308.5
Emergency measures   $30.2 100      $30.2
TOTAL $881.0   59 $1,489.5
SOURCE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1996
In 1971, in response to a Congressional mandate, the research branch of the
USACE produced a National Shoreline Study, which, prior to the present study
by The Heinz Center, was the only nationwide survey of coastal erosion
problems (although additional erosion databases have been compiled through
academic research) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1971). Critics of the 1971
study noted several shortcomings, including a lack of clear definition of the
various degrees of erosion severity identified in the survey, the use of various
measurement methods that made comparison across regions difficult, and the
coloring of findings by the agency’s political agenda (Platt, 1994).
Even so, the 1971 study marked the beginning of a shift in the USACE’s
philosophy away from hard structural erosion management and toward soft
structural approaches or combinations of the two.  The study also recognized that
humans cause and exacerbate coastal erosion and propagated a new perspective
calling for the inclusion of erosion management in comprehensive coastal zone
management (Ricketts, 1986).  In 1999, the U.S. Congress, through the
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reauthorization of the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA, P.L. 106-53),
directed the USACE to prepare a report on the state of U.S. shores.  This report
will provide updated information on the extent of coastal erosion and its
economic and environmental effects, and make recommendations regarding
appropriate levels of federal and nonfederal participation in shoreline protection.
A comprehensive record of beach nourishment projects of all sizes was compiled
by the Duke University Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines (1998)
based on searches of publicly available records at the federal, state, and
community levels.  Table 4.6 provides an overview of the results (Pilkey and
Dixon, 1996), showing the beach nourishment experience of U.S. coastal states
(except for Pacific states) from 1921 through January 1998.  In a separate
publication, Duke researchers reported that 30 West Coast beaches along more
than 30 mi had been replenished by 1988 (the actual number of nourishment
projects is higher because some sites have been nourished more than once)
(Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).
Several noteworthy facts about the practice of beach nourishment can be gleaned
from Table 4.6.  For instance, East Coast and Great Lakes shorelines lead the list
in terms of total number of projects and the re-nourishment ratio (i.e., number of
projects per site).  New England and the Gulf Coast have had similar numbers of
smaller nourishment projects, but the Gulf region had more expensive projects at
fewer, repeatedly nourished sites.  It is important to note that the regional and
state totals of beach nourishment projects reflect not only the physical severity of
coastal erosion but also political effectiveness in obtaining funds for nourishment
projects.
Also interesting is the cost-sharing picture that emerges from these data.
Clearly, the federal government is by far the largest financier of beach
nourishment projects, funding more than 77 percent.  Projects in which a state is
the primary funding source are rare, but states and local governments together
take the lead in more than 13 percent of these documented cases.  Projects in
which local governments and/or private entities are the major sponsors constitute
almost 9 percent of the total, a surprisingly large proportion given the high cost
of these projects.  The fact that nearly 23 percent of projects are funded primarily
by state, local, and/or private entities indicates that, even if the cost-benefit ratio
of a project does not justify federal funding, there is a significant need, demand,
and willingness to protect the shoreline through soft, multi-objective measures,
limited only by the financial means of the sponsors.  The contributions of
nonfederal sponsors also may be related to the long completion time of federal
projects (8–15 years) (Pilkey et al., 1998).
The 1999 WRDA reauthorization increases the nonfederal share for periodic
beach nourishment on a phased-in basis from the current 35 percent to 50
percent in 2003.  The nonfederal cost for initial construction of shore protection
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projects remains at 35 percent.  In addition, the 1999 WRDA requires the
USACE to count the flood losses avoided by nonstructural projects just as they
do for structural projects in benefit-cost analyses.  It also authorizes the USACE
to reevaluate (at the request of a nonfederal interest) a previously authorized
project and consider nonstructural alternatives in light of this new treatment of
benefits.
Regional and national trends over time and across the total number of projects
(1,305 nourishment episodes in almost 400 locations) confirm that beach
nourishment has become an important practice in shoreline management (see
Figure 4.12).  Beach nourishment became a significant practice in the early
1960s, reflecting shifts in the national economy as well as changes in the
willingness of various administrations and sessions of the Congress to fund large
beach nourishment projects (C. Chestnutt, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
personal communication, August 12, 1998).  The profusion of beach
nourishment since the 1960s reflects a change in approach to shoreline
protection within the coastal engineering community, increasing recognition of
the harmful ecological and aesthetic impacts of shoreline hardening, and the
realization that, although property might be better protected from erosion with
armoring than without, the beaches themselves are the most frequent casualties
of shoreline hardening.  The loss of beaches, in turn, has severe economic
impacts on the tourism and recreation industries, and it usually necessitates
beach nourishment for an indefinite period of time (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).
FIGURE 4.12  Beach nourishment has become increasingly popular in the United
States since 1950.













*Note: Three years of data scaled up to 5-year basis
SOURCE:  Adapted from Duke University Program for the Study of Developed
Shorelines, 1998.
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TABLE 4.6  Regional and State Summary of Beach Nourishment Experiences (1921–1998)













   ME     15     6   2.50        6,778,180 100.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
   NH       8     3   2.67      25,575,329   71.0   0.0 16.1 12.9
   MA     81   62   1.31      56,410,146   87.5   0.0 12.5   0.0
   RI     11     8   1.38        3,255,838   50.0   0.0   0.0 50.0
   CT     44   37   1.19      48,259,564   50.0   0.0 50.0   0.0
Reg. Total   159 116   1.37    140,279,057   66.3   0.0 24.8   8.9
 EAST COAST
   NY     73   25   2.92    523,099,957   63.2   0.0   5.9 30.9
   NJ   124   43   2.88    312,720,819   54.4   0.0 42.7   2.9
   DE     33   13   2.54      46,895,882   55.6 22.2   8.9 13.3
   MD       6     1   6.00      65,977,063   83.3   0.0 16.7   0.0
   VA     48     3 16.00      78,814,630   68.8   0.0   0.0 31.3
   NC   108   16   6.75    146,156,213   93.9   0.0   2.0   4.0
   SC     28   13   2.15      90,034,254   48.2   0.0 22.2 29.6
   GA       8     2   4.00      34,062,300   62.5   0.0   0.0 37.5
   FL   144   41   3.51    443,204,832   73.6   0.0 19.1   7.3
Reg. Total   572   75   7.63 1,740,965,951   68.9   2.0 16.0 13.2
 GULF COAST
   FL   113   39   2.90    224,752,576   70.8   0.0 26.4   2.8
   AL       2     2   1.00        1,870,000 100.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
   MS     13     4   3.25      56,052,218   41.7   0.0 58.3   0.0
   LA     16     4   4.00      54,529,849   50.0   0.0 50.0   0.0
   TX     14     6   2.33      24,637,623   80.0   0.0 10.0 10.0
Reg. Total   158   55   2.87    361,842,265   67.6   0.0 29.6   2.8
 GREAT LAKES
Erie     54     9   6.00      77,905,646   89.6   0.0   0.0 10.4
Huron     26     7   3.71        5,168,858   92.3   0.0   7.7   0.0
Ontario       3     2   1.50        2,847,266 100.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
Superior     53   11   4.82        9,551,403 100.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
MI   280   30   9.33    100,804,089   93.8   0.0   1.1   5.1
Reg. Total   416   59   7.05    196,277,262   94.0   0.0   1.3   4.8
NATIONAL
 TOTAL
1305 387   3.37 2,439,364,535   77.2   0.9 13.3   8.6
 a  No data are available for the Pacific Coast states or island territories; therefore, the national total
underestimates the actual total.
b  Total adjusted cost is the total estimated cost adjusted to 1996 dollars.  Total estimated cost includes
both known costs and estimates for projects with unknown costs.  Estimates are determined by using
the mean cost by funding category or the mean regional cost in project-year dollars.
c  The main funding source is known for roughly 89 percent of all projects; other levels may share the
costs.  Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Duke University Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines, 1998
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With this increase in beach nourishment activity, more research than ever is
being conducted on the environmental and economic impacts of such projects
(e.g., Cordes and Yezer, 1995; National Research Council, 1995; Pompe and
Rinehart, 1995).  Researchers have found that the economic benefits of beach
nourishment (in terms of both averted storm impacts and recreational use of
beaches) are significant in cases in which the replenished beach remains in place
for multiple years (see Figure 4.13) (Pilkey and Dixon, 1996).  But a long-term
commitment to continuous re-nourishment, especially after unpredictably spaced
events such as major storms, poses an enormous financial challenge to
sponsoring agencies (National Research Council, 1995; Pilkey et al.,1998).
Experience with the durability of replenished beaches has been highly variable
because of unpredictable weather events, differences in sediment quality and
grain size, significant scientific uncertainty about littoral currents and sediment
transport conditions, and inconsistency in project construction quality.  Some
beaches, such as Miami Beach (a $64 million project completed in 1981), are
fairly stable and considered “successful” nourishment projects, whereas others,
such as Ocean City, New Jersey (a $5 million project completed in 1982),
washed away within a few months (National Research Council, 1990; Pilkey and
Dixon, 1996).
Many researchers agree that the impacts on ecological communities in the source
area, immediate disposal area, and downdrift from the nourished beaches are not
fully understood (Marsh and Turbeville, 1981; Naqvi and Pullen, 1983;
Gorzelany and Nelson, 1987; Nelson, 1993; Rakocinski et al., 1996; Hillyer et
al., 1997).  There are indications of some relatively short-lived but still
significant impacts on burrowing organisms, which have difficulty penetrating
the hard, artificial beach surface.  Sand accumulating on near-shore coral reefs
appears to add significant stresses to, and can even destroy, those communities
(C. Fletcher, University of Hawaii, Department of Geology and Geophysics,
personal communication, March 12, 1998).
The recent history of the USACE’s involvement in federal shoreline
management is marked—in large part because of the economics of continual
shoreline protection—by policy struggles between the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government and even within the Corps itself, between the
legacy of hard engineering responses to coastal erosion and calls to retreat from
the receding shoreline.  In 1995, the Clinton Administration recommended that
all federal participation in the construction of new shore protection projects be
terminated and directed USACE districts to refrain from proposing new
shoreline protection projects for fiscal year 1997.  The Congress rejected this
proposal and continues to appropriate funds for shore protection projects
(American Coastal Coalition, 1998a, 1998b).
The USACE thus continues to carry out hard structural shoreline protection and
beach nourishment.  Yet it also recently suggested, in its Challenge 21 proposal
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to the Congress, that at-risk houses and communities be relocated out of the
floodplain before damage occurs—a policy proposal very much akin to FEMA’s
Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program (Maddox, 1998).  In the 1999 WRDA,
the Congress authorized Challenge 21, formally known as the Flood Mitigation
and Riverine Ecosystem Restoration Program, and provided $200 million over
the next 5 years in funds, with a cap on the federal cost per project at $30
million.  This program is designed to finding more-sustainable solutions to flood
problems by examining nonstructural solutions in flood-prone areas while
retaining traditional measures where appropriate.
FIGURE 4.13   Erosion is very serious in Ocean City, MD, as shown here after a
winter nor’easter.  This was taken prior to beach nourishment.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1983)
Federal Incentives for State Planning
A second, indirect federal approach to shoreline protection is to provide states
with incentives to incorporate coastal hazards into their management and
planning.  In the late 1960s, the federal government began developing a federal
coastal zone management program, an effort that, in 1972, resulted in the Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA) (Brower and Carol, 1984; Godschalk, 1992;
Platt, 1994).  The Act serves as a framework legislation that sets broad national
policy goals but leaves it to the states to decide whether to participate in the
federal CZMP and how to implement those goals.  To assure adherence to
national coastal policy goals, state coastal programs need federal approval and
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are regularly reviewed and updated.  With federal approval, states can receive
funds and technical assistance from NOAA’s Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management (OCRM) to implement their program goals.
The 1972 CZMA recognized coastal erosion as a significant concern but did not
contain any provisions dictating how to deal with it.  In large part, erosion was
thought to be the management responsibility of the USACE, and, to the extent
that it was seen as a land-use issue, perceived as a local regulatory responsibility.
The influential report Natural Hazard Management in Coastal Areas (National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1976) paid explicit attention to coastal
flooding and coastal erosion.  Around that same time, a House of
Representatives committee report also recommended including a shoreline
erosion planning process within the CZMA to encourage states to assess their
erosion problems and develop possible management strategies.  This planning
process was included in the 1976 reauthorization of the CZMA (P.L. 94-370).
The 1980 reauthorization (P.L. 96-464) added coastal hazards, erosion, and sea
level rise to the range of pressures on coastal resources (Section 303[2]B) but did
not include any performance standards for hazard mitigation.
In 1990, the CZMA was reauthorized (P.L. 101-591) and substantially
strengthened through the creation of the Section 309 Enhancement Grants
Program.  Through this program, states can receive additional funds to
strengthen their programs in eight areas, including natural hazards management
and the consequences of sea- and Great Lakes-level rise.  A review of Section
309 enhancement activities across ocean-bordering and Great Lakes states found
that one of the three most frequently cited and funded priority areas was coastal
hazard management; the other two were cumulative and secondary impacts of
coastal development and wetland preservation (Bernd-Cohen et al., 1995).
Although previous federal support for the states’ coastal zone management
efforts contributed to the recognition and understanding of coastal hazards—and
encouraged but did not require states to deal with these problems—the Section
309 program holds states accountable by withholding federal funds if states do
not achieve or demonstrate program changes.  Thus, with hazard management
clearly a critical enhancement area, the federal incentives approach has been
strengthened.  Moreover, NOAA’s recent effectiveness study concluded that the
states have successfully created, implemented, and refined planning tools and a
variety of regulatory controls on development in high-hazard areas.
The National Estuary Program administered by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA), in place since 1987, is another important program
of federal incentives for states and communities.  Currently encompassing 28
estuarine areas nationwide, this program is designed to preserve, restore, study,
and make accessible coastal wetland areas.  Program decisions and activities are
carried out by committees of local government officials, private citizens, and
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representatives from various federal agencies, academic institutions, industry,
and estuary user groups (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1999).
Withdrawal of Federal Assistance and Development Incentives
One of the long-standing debates in coastal hazards management is whether or
not, and to what extent, governmental assistance (e.g., direct incentives, disaster
relief, insurance, shore protection activities, infrastructure provisions) actually
promotes rather than deter development and growth in hazardous coastal
locations (Cordes and Yezer, 1995; Leatherman, 1997; Federal Insurance
Administration, 1998; Shipp-Evatt, 1999).  In the late 1970s, damages from
coastal disasters, especially on the most exposed and fragile coastal barrier
islands, reached unprecedented levels.  As a result, significant changes were
made in federal policy on barrier island development.
Since the enactment of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in
1969, EISs have been required for development projects on barrier islands.  In
addition, the amended 1976 CZMA, the 1977 Clean Water Act (CWA) (P.L. 95-
217), and President Carter’s Executive Orders 11988 and 11990 of 1977 were
aimed in part at restricting barrier island development.  Despite these policies,
rapid development continued unabated on barrier islands.  In another attempt to
control development, the 1982 Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) (P.L. 97-
348) established the Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS).  The Act is
restricted to designated undeveloped barrier islands and does not apply to
developed—but equally vulnerable—barrier islands.  Moreover, the Act does not
explicitly prohibit development on barrier islands, but rather restricts federal
expenditures within designated CBRS units.  As one recent review found,
“development pressure in most of the areas studied existed before NFIP and
continued even after NFIP was selectively withdrawn” (as in the case of the
CBRA) (Shipp-Evatt, 1999).  In addition, the policy of issuing no flood
insurance in the CBRS has proven difficult to implement, although this may be
less of a problem in the future as mapping and geographic analysis tools become
more widely available at the local level.  A 1992 report by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) “found not only that significant new development
continued to occur in certain CBRS units after the law was enacted, but also that
(national flood insurance) coverage was written on 9% of the residences
sampled” (Pasterick, 1998).  Finally, the CBRA has been highly vulnerable to
political pressures in the Congress, as evidenced in the continuing political
maneuvering to redraw the boundaries of the CBRS (e.g., Bettelheim, 1998;
Caribbean Conservation Corp., 1998).
In 1990, the Congress strengthened the law and extended the CBRS substantially
with the passage of  the Coastal Barrier Improvement Act (P.L. 101-591).  The
CBRS originally was composed of 186 units encompassing 250,000 acres.
Today, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) administers a system that
includes 585 units in 22 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, adding up to
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almost 1.3 million acres and approximately 1,200 mi of shoreline (U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 1998a).  There are also 274 "otherwise protected areas," a
category added by the 1990 Act for barrier islands within lands reserved for
conservation purposes and for which flood insurance is similarly not available
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1998b).
Direct Regulation
Another federal approach to the management of coastal erosion is direct
regulation of activities in vulnerable areas.  Although land use and planning
regulations are largely under the purview of state and local authorities, the
federal government reserves the right to regulate activities that affect
environmental protection.  Among the pertinent pieces of regulation, the Clean
Water Act (CWA), through which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) becomes involved in shoreline protection matters, is the most
significant.  Section 404 of the Act requires permits for dredging and the
discharge of dredged and fill materials.  Section 404 is administered by the
USACE, which grants permits for beach nourishment, replenishment activities,
and wetland development.  The permits are reviewed according to USEPA
guidelines, which are based on a number of federal environmental policies and
laws (e.g., the NEPA, Endangered Species Act [93-205]).  The USEPA also
requires EISs or assessments for projects and retains final permitting authority.
Public Ownership and Management
The federal government also can address coastal erosion through the purchase of
land and the management of publicly owned land.  Acquisition programs have
not been widely used because of the high cost of coastal properties.
Nevertheless, under the lead auspices of the U.S. Department of the Interior,
particularly its National Park Service (NPS) and FWS, and to a lesser extent
through NOAA, the federal government has acquired and manages a wide
variety of public lands along the coast, including
• national seashores and lakeshores (228,716 acres);
• CBRS units (1.3 million acres, 1,276 mi of shoreline);
• portions of military lands (e.g., Camp Pendleton, Cape Canaveral);
• national marine sanctuaries;
• homes purchased in buyout programs; and
• cultural features (e.g., Cape Hatteras) (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 1998; National Park Service, 1997).
The reserves managed by NOAA cover nearly 440,000 acres of land and water
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1996).  Federal ownership
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of shore lands is frequently complemented through adjoining state, local, and
private land ownership, where the land is held in trust and protected from
development through conservation easements.
Until 1978, the NPS attempted to stabilize eroding shores under its authority.
Since then, despite some ongoing internal debates, it generally has adopted a “let
nature have its way” policy, trying to avoid intervention in natural shoreline
processes.  At Cape Hatteras National Seashore, the NPS have been actively
building dunes to prevent overwash and flooding of the main Outer Banks
highway (e.g., Route 12).  Conflicts with neighboring property owners (both
public and private) negatively affected by the NPS policy have led to some soft
forms of accommodation, dune stabilization, and relocation of park facilities
(Kuehn, 1981; Platt, 1985; Mantell and Duerksen, 1987; Platt et al., 1992a).  The
long debate over the relocation of the Cape Hatteras lighthouse is a most
prominent example.  Since 1996, the NPS also has supported FEMA in its post-
disaster open space planning process through its Rivers and Trails program
(Hanson, 1996).
In 1999, the Clinton Administration launched the Lands Legacy Initiative, a land
preservation package totaling $1 billion aimed at the protection and
rehabilitation of a variety of vulnerable land and ocean areas, including coastal
wetlands, estuarine areas, reefs, fisheries habitats, dredge areas, etc.  This
proposal allocated $90 million dollars, a 55 percent increase, to the Coastal Zone
Management Act Program to help states implement Critical Coastal Area
Management and Restoration Plans (NOAA, 1999a; NOAA 1999b).  These
funds can be used to acquire lands, undertake additional efforts to protect
wildlife habitat, protect life and property from coastal hazards, and revitalize
ports and urban waterfronts (White House, 1999).  The initiative again marks the
Administration’s shift from its previous position against all shoreline protection
policy toward a policy that places beach nourishment, erosion management, and
open space acquisition at its center.  In the Fiscal 2000 Omnibus Appropriations
Bill (H.R. 3194 and Public Law 106-113), the 106th Congress set aside $600
million for the Lands Legacy Initiative, including $450 million for the Land and
Water Conservation Fund, an increase of more than $85 million over the
previous year’s funding (Schowengerdt, 1999).  A total of $420 million was set
aside in the LWCF for Federal land acquisition funds, including $26 million to
manage and protect marine sanctuaries and coral reefs (Wilderness Society,
1999).
In addition, FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program provides funds to states
and communities to implement long-term hazard mitigation measures following
a major disaster declaration.  The program can be used to fund projects to protect
both public and private property, including (but not limited to) land acquisition.
Under this program, FEMA does not purchase land directly; rather, the local
government purchases and holds title to the land.  A deed restriction then is
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placed on the property requiring that the local government maintain the land as
open space (Executive Office of the President, 1998).
Finally, the 1988 Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L.
100-707, Section 5170c) provides for the possibility of using up to 15 percent of
the “estimated aggregate amount of (disaster assistance) grants to be made” for
mitigation projects, including property acquisition and relocation assistance (i.e.,
movement of structures out of high-risk flood and erosion areas).  The funds
authorized through the Stafford Act can be used for all (insured or uninsured)
properties in disaster areas eligible for federal assistance as long as the property
acquired, and from which a structure has been removed, is kept as open space or
in recreational use in perpetuity thereafter.  Critics argue that the buyouts can
result in a payment under the NFIP to the property owner that is much larger
than a claims payment and, hence, serve as a deterrent to the purchase of flood
insurance (Pasterick, 1998).  This shortcoming has been acknowledged by
FEMA, which currently is trying to coordinate its approaches.
Federal Disaster Assistance
Federal Disaster Assistance  was not originally designed to address erosion
hazards, but over the years, emergency erosion management was included.  The
Federal Disaster Assistance Program began modestly with the Disaster Relief
Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-875), which marked the first of a series of laws that would
progressively commit the nation to spending tens of billions of dollars on relief
and recovery from natural disasters.  Initially, its benefits were limited to
covering local public costs; later, the benefits would be extended to include
private enterprise and individuals as well.   After the Disaster Relief Act of 1970
(P.L. 91-608), the federal government assumed a permanent role as the primary
source of funds and expertise for dealing with major (and some lesser) disasters.
As originally established by the Congress, the federal program was to be limited
in terms of the federal assistance and funding to be supplied, and contingent on a
disaster declaration by the President that federal assistance was required to
supplement state and local capabilities.  These limitations have been greatly
eased over time, and disaster declarations are being issued more readily and for
wider areas than they were in the past.  In fiscal year 1996, a record 72
declarations were issued, followed by 49 in 1997 and 62 in 1998.  In addition,
the costs of disasters to the federal government have risen dramatically.
FEMA and to a lesser extent other federal agencies provide post-disaster
assistance, which in some cases is related to coastal shorefront development and
protection.  According to Platt (1999), the scope of both individual assistance
and public assistance for U.S. disasters is very broad.  Individual assistance
includes temporary housing, individual and family grants, unemployment
compensation, food coupons, crisis counseling, and legal services.  Public
assistance covers debris removal; repair, restoration, or replacement of public
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facilities of many types (including beaches and trees in certain cases);
community disaster loans to cover shortfalls in local tax revenue due to a
disaster; and emergency response costs of states and local governments.  All of
the foregoing are subject to a 25 percent nonfederal cost share, unless it is
reduced or waived by the President.  The 1994 NFIRA changes strengthened
requirements to purchase flood insurance as a condition of receiving disaster
assistance grants and marked the beginning of the federal policy of linking
disaster assistance to hazard mitigation to prevent or minimize future losses.
The federal government also offers assistance to victims of disasters through
Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program, which provides
assistance not only to small businesses but also to homeowners, tenants, and
nonprofit organizations.  Loans are made to such victims of disasters to help
cover uninsured losses.  Most SBA loans are made at below-market interest rates
for long terms (up to 30 years); the borrowers’ savings on interest as compared
to market rates constitutes a federal subsidy.  Disaster victims deemed incapable
of repaying a loan (e.g., from the SBA) can obtain individual and family grants
from FEMA.  However, these grants are small (the maximum amount per grant
is $13,000) and intended to cover only immediate recovery needs.
Finally, the USACE can assist communities in post-disaster shore protection
efforts.  As of 1999, emergency beach repair projects costing up to $7 million are
funded through the USACE’s annual budget and do not require further
Congressional approval (U.S. Congress, 1999).
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES BY LEVEL OF
RESPONSE
As outlined in this chapter, no single entity is responsible for responding to
coastal erosion, and there is no single solution or set of solutions that fits the
many different coastal situations along U.S. shores.  The various approaches to
erosion management available to individuals, communities, states, and the
federal government are summarized in Table 4.7.
Overall, states are leaders in studying and devising policies, land-use plans,
regulations, building standards, and other programs for addressing coastal
storms, floods, erosion, and in studying the underlying causes of sea level rise,
cumulative development in shorefront areas, and shoreline protection.  States
differ widely, however, in their specific institutional and managerial approaches;
they also vary significantly in their needs for, and length of experience with,
different strategies.  States with the most comprehensive shoreline management
programs tend to have:
• strict enforcement of building codes,
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• land use regulations,
• strong public education and outreach programs, and
• coordination with federal and local agencies regarding shore protection and
management.
The federal government has primary roles in major soft and hard structural
shoreline protection projects; offering research, planning, and management
incentives to states and communities; direct regulation; public ownership of
significant stretches of coastal areas; and in providing for disaster assistance,
hazard mitigation, and flood insurance.  It also restricts federal expenditures
within coastal barrier resource system units and regulates development in
wetland areas.  Moreover, federal agencies make risk information available,
either directly or indirectly, in various formats to all levels of government and to
individuals.  Any changes to the NFIP need to be viewed within the broad policy
and decision-making context described in this chapter as well as the realities of
different shoreline characteristics, including the degree of development, local
economic resources, and severity of the erosion problem.
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CBRS    Coastal Barrier Resources System
CZMA    Coastal Zone Management Act
FEMA    Federal Emergency Management Agency
FWS    U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
NFIP    National Flood Insurance Program
NOAA        National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPS        National Park Service
USACE        U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USEPA        U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
USGS        U.S. Geological Survey
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Approximately 300,000 to 350,000 homes and other buildings are located in the
first 500 feet (ft) of land along the U.S. coastline, outside of major urban areas.9
Although the water’s edge is an appealing place to live, it is also a risky one, and
many of these homes will be damaged by flooding or coastal erosion over the
next several decades.
This chapter focuses on the extent of the coastal erosion problem both today and
over the next 60 years assuming no changes are made to current coastline
management or policy.  A conceptual model showing flood and erosion
processes on the low-lying shorelines of the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, and
the bluff shorelines of the Pacific and Great Lakes is described.    Projections of
expected damage from flooding and erosion within the field surveyed
communities are estimated within three progressively narrow risk zones – 500
feet inland from the shoreline, the V-zone, and the 60-year EHA.  The estimates
of expected damage are extrapolated nationwide.  Analyses of the effect of
erosion on property value and rates of coastal development are presented in this
chapter and considered in the analysis of policy options in chapter 6.  Chapter 6
describes a series of possible changes in policy and discusses how these changes
might alter the trends observed today.
                                                          
9 As discussed later in this chapter, this estimate excludes structures in the high-density
portions of major urban areas such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami.
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Approximately 85,000 homes are located within a 60-year erosion hazard area
(EHA), that is, on low-lying land or bluffs likely to erode into the ocean or the
Great Lakes over the next 60 years.  Within the high flood hazard V-zones of the
Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts, erosion damage almost doubles the risk of
damage from flooding alone.  Along the Pacific and Great Lakes coasts, where
bluffs are common, the risk from cliff or bluff erosion dominates. Nationwide,
erosion may be responsible for approximately $500 million in property loss to
coastal property owners per year, including both damage to structures and loss of
land.
These conclusions are based on detailed field measurements and mail survey
information collected on approximately 3 percent of the buildings located within
about 500 ft of the shore.  As explained in greater detail in Appendix C, The
Heinz Center sent field survey teams to measure and photograph 11,450
structures in 18 counties.  Additional information on these same structures was
obtained from county assessor and similar offices, and detailed questionnaires
mailed to the owners.  Data was collected and analyzed on 120 miles of
shoreline, or about 1 percent of the U.S. coastline outside of Alaska and Hawaii.
This is far more information than ever has been assembled before on the narrow,
risky coastal edge.  Although the impact estimates below are reconstructions of
the past and projections of the future, they present the best picture available of
the impact of coastal erosion.
FLOOD AND EROSION DAMAGE TO COASTAL
STRUCTURES
This chapter simplifies the flood and erosion processes described in chapters 2
and 3  to help untangle the complex and highly related physical and engineering
aspects of these events in ways that are meaningful to policy interventions such as
insurance and mitigation.  Homes, businesses, municipal buildings, recreational
facilities and other structures built on the shoreline face a variety of risks.  They
are buffeted by occasional severe tropical or extra-tropical storms and may be
damaged by flooding, erosion, and wind.  Such storms occur only periodically,
and, after they hit, may not recur for many decades—or again the next year.
The risk of damage from flooding is greatest within a zone running along the
ocean that typically spans a few tens of feet to a few hundreds of feet in width,
although occasionally much further inland in low lying areas.  This V-zone—or
high-velocity zone—is defined for the most part by the height of the waves that
are expected from a storm of the size that has a 1 percent chance of occurring in
any given year.  As explained in chapter 3, coastal erosion is considered in flood
zone mapping only retrospectively (i.e., through flood zone remapping) but not
prospectively.
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Structures located in areas that are susceptible to erosion are subject to another,
rather different type of risk.  Severe storms not only directly cause structural
damage, but also can erode away the protective beach, dunes, and eventually the
land beneath a building’s foundation (see Figure 5.1).  After a storm, it may be
impossible to distinguish between structural damage caused by the enormous
force of a wave crashing into a house and damage caused by that same wave
undermining its foundation.  Regardless, in an eroding area, the land and house
will sooner or later be lost.
The distinction is clearer when considering houses built on high bluffs above the
oceans (as often occurs along parts of New England and the West Coast) or high
cliffs along the Great Lakes.  Flood damage in the house is not a problem; the
water never gets as high as the bluff.  However, the bluff beneath the house can
erode, and when the foundation is reached, the house will be lost or damaged
sufficiently to become uninhabitable.  Thus, although few of the houses are
subject to flood risks, many still are affected by erosion.
FIGURE 5.1  The bluff below this house in South Shore of Nantucket eroded away,
causing the house to pitch forward towards the ocean.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1996)
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This process is illustrated in Figure 5.2.  The cross section of a “stable” bluff is
shown in Figure 5.2(a) from the water’s edge to several hundred feet inland.  In
Figure 5.2(b), the same cross section is shown during a storm or higher than
average lake level, with the base (or toe) of the bluff being eroded away by
waves.  The top of the bluff eventually becomes unstable as erosion undercuts the
bluff.  Figure 5.2(c) depicts the new profile after the bluff stabilizes, with the
edge of the bluff further inland than before.
FIGURE 5.2   Bluff erosion on a typical shoreline progresses in several stages.  A
stable bluff is depicted in (a); the same bluff during a storm or higher than average
lake levels is shown in (b).  The new bluff profile is shown in (c).
(a)  Stable bluff
(b)  Same bluff during a storm or higher-than-average lake levels
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In contrast to the bluffs along the Pacific and Great Lakes coasts, the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts typically have low-lying shorelines and are subject to different
flooding and erosion processes.  Coastal V-zones that are susceptible to erosion
face greater risks of damage to structures than do similar regions that are not
eroding.  Figure 5.3 displays these processes as a sequence through time.  Figure
5.3(a) illustrates a cross section of the coastline from the ocean’s edge inland
several hundred feet.  In Figure 5.3(b), the same cross section is shown during a
hurricane, with the ocean waves inundating and damaging several houses.  If the
storm also erodes the coastline, then the profile might look like Figure 5.3(c), in
which the house that was closest to the ocean has been destroyed and the
remaining houses are now closer to the ocean.  Figure 5.3(d) depicts a second
storm of the same size as the first hitting the coast several decades later.
Figure 5.3(d) differs in two important ways from Figure 5.3(b).  First, because
the coastline has eroded (50 to 100 ft over 30 years is fairly common for the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts), storm wave heights at each house now are somewhat
further inland and higher than they were before and, therefore, are capable of
causing greater damage.  Second, some of the houses that were not previously
within the high-hazard V-zone now are located there.  When built, these houses
were in what the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) classifies as
an A-zone (i.e., subject to some flooding but likely not with waves of a velocity
that can, for example, damage a wall).  Now, because of erosion, these houses
are subject to the bigger and higher velocity waves that they were not designed
to withstand.
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FIGURE 5.3  A low-lying coastline subject to storms and erosion can change
dramatically over time.  A typical pre-storm profile is shown in (a); the same area
during a hurricane is depicted in (b).  The new profile after the hurricane has eroded
the coastline is shown in (c).  Decades later, a second hurricane hits the area, as
shown in (d).
(a)  Typical pre-storm profile
(b) During a hurricane
(c) New profile, after the hurricane erodes the coastline
(d) Decades later, a second hurricane
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There are four risks to be concerned about in these low-lying coastal areas:
1. Flood damage.  Waves and storm surge from a coastal storm of sufficient
magnitude can destroy a house (see Figure 5.4).  One key determinant of the
magnitude of the risk is how the height of the first floor of a house compares to
the expected height of waves generated by a storm of a magnitude that has a 1
percent chance of occurring in any given year.  Engineering studies by FEMA
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have concluded that a wave 3
ft above the height of the first floor of a house will have sufficient force to cause
damage equal to half the value of the house.
2. Direct erosion damage.  If a storm is of sufficient magnitude to erode the
coast to a position further inland, then houses in the way will be damaged.  Some
may be left standing, but they will not likely be habitable anymore (or might be
condemned for being in public waters).
3. Higher wave heights.  Once the coastline has shifted inland, flood
elevations for the same magnitude storm will be farther inland and higher, and
thus can cause more damage.
4. Higher and more powerful waves in areas not previously subjected to
high velocity waves.  Houses that were constructed in lower risk A-zones with
less-stringent building codes can be subjected to waves of V-zone intensity.
FIGURE 5.4  Storm surge has destroyed the lowest floor of this house in Buxton, NC
.
(Photo by Stephen P. Leatherman, 1974)
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FORECASTS OF FLOOD AND EROSION-RELATED
DAMAGE
It is possible to model quantitatively the flood and erosion processes listed
above, recognizing that it is still a simplification of a much more complex
problem.  In this section, flood and erosion damages are projected for the
Atlantic, Gulf, Great Lakes, and Pacific shorelines of the United States.  The
procedures used to estimate projected damages are explained in Box 5.1 and
Appendix D.  As part of this study, FEMA provided The Heinz Center with
maps for 27 counties along all four coastlines of the United States.  The maps
included projections of how the coastline may move inland because of erosion
and, where applicable, both expected flood heights from a 1 percent chance
(“100-year”) storm today and 60 years from today.
The maps of today’s expected flood heights are those used by local governments
within these counties to enforce building codes, by FEMA and insurance agents
to set flood insurance rates, by home builders to design houses, and by the
general public to understand flood risks when purchasing their homes.  These
maps are based on results from computer models that generate storm wave
profiles from detailed field survey information, wave heights from historic
storms, and other data from similar sources.
The projections for 60 years from today were prepared by coastal scientists and
engineers in each state, who used historical shoreline changes to determine a
long-term average rate of erosion (Leatherman, 1983; Crowell et al., 1999).  An
example of a 60-year EHA map is shown in Figure 5.5.  Future storm wave
profiles were estimated with a much simpler procedure.  Although several states
and communities have prepared similar maps portraying the risks from erosion,
definition of the erosion hazard area varies by state, and for many communities,
no maps are available at all. The data and procedures used to generate the 60-
year shoreline position forecasts are described in more detail in Appendix B.
The Heinz Center hired teams of surveyors to measure the exact location and
height of (and collect other information on) about 10,000 houses within about
500 ft of the shoreline in 18 of the 27 counties.  Combining the two sets of
information, along with the previously mentioned structural damage
relationships developed by FEMA and the USACE, The Heinz Center was able
to estimate the magnitude of coastal risks faced by these structures today and
several decades hence.
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BOX 5.1  Estimating Damage to Structures
This chapter presents estimates of the expected damage from flooding and erosion over the
next sixty years in Atlantic, Gulf, Pacific, and Great Lakes coast communities.  These
estimates rely on three data sources: 1) field measurements of about 10,000 structures, 2)
projections of shoreline movement based on maps of shoreline position over the past 50 to 100
years, and 3) maps of expected storm wave heights.  Damage was calculated structure by
structure, then summed by community across three progressively narrower classifications: 1)
within 500 feet of the shore, 2) within the V-zone, and 3) within the 60-year erosion hazard
area.
These estimates present  “snapshots” of expected damages over the next six decades to
structures that exist today. Structures are considered “destroyed” after they move seaward of
the shoreline, which is typically defined in this study by a vegetation line or front edge of a
dune or bluff.  A structure is not included in future damages once it is destroyed. The
estimates shown in tables 5.1 to 5.4 are for three decades from today and, again, do not
include future construction.   The estimates of damages are expressed as the annual dollar
value of losses per $100 of value. For example, suppose a $100,000 house experiences
$30,000 worth of damage in a big storm.  In reality, such damage occurs only rarely, on the
time scale of decades rather than years.   If such damage is expected to occur once every 30
years, its annual expected damage is $1 per year, per $100 of house value.
The expected damages reflect three types of risks on eroding shores. One risk is direct flood
damage.  Our estimates were developed using a damage model developed by FEMA and the
US Army Corps of Engineers which calculates expected damage as a function of the elevation
of the structure and the expected flood height (Base Flood Elevation).
A second type of risk is increased flood damage caused by inland migration of the shoreline.
As the shoreline moves inland, the base flood elevation rises, and structures previously
located outside the V-zone may now be subject to wave attack.  We estimated the increased
damage caused by rising flood heights by taking the difference of future flood damage and
current flood damage.  We also identified which structures are expected to switch from the A-
zone to the more risky V-zone within a given decade, and recalculated flood damage.
The third type of risk is direct erosion damage.  As the shoreline moves inland, both the land
and structure will eventually be eroded away, to the point at which rebuilding is impossible.
The method used to estimate this loss is simple.  In the decade in which erosion loss occurs,
total damage is assigned for that structure. The decade of loss is determined using the distance
of the structure (obtained by GPS field measurements) from the erosion reference feature and
the erosion rate. Within the decade in which erosion loss occurs, expected flood damage over
the decade is subtracted to avoid double-counting of flood and erosion loss.  In reality,
however, it is almost impossible to discern whether the cause of loss was erosion or flooding.
On the Atlantic and Gulf, the total expected damage to structures (not including wind) is the
sum of 1) direct flood damage; 2) increased flood damage caused by inland migration of the
shoreline; and 3) direct erosion damage.  Much of the Pacific and Great Lakes shores are only
subject to direct erosion damage, because most of the structures there are built up on bluffs.
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FIGURE 5.5  This 60-year erosion hazard area map for Dare County, North Carolina, shows
current and projected shoreline and property at risk.
CHAPTER 5 - THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EROSION
121
The estimates presented throughout this chapter assume that communities will
not respond to erosion by nourishing or hardening their beaches or implementing
state or local setbacks regulations.  The range of responses historically used by
coastal communities are explored in Chapter 4 and Appendix F.  Of course,
some communities will respond to erosion risks, so the loss estimates presented
here will likely be high.  It was beyond the scope of this study to determine how
many communities would find it cost effective to nourish or harden their
beaches.
Figure 5.6 quantifies each individual component (e.g., flooding, erosion-related
flooding, and direct erosion damage) of the coastal hazard for about 4,000
houses in 20 communities along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. These estimates
are based upon field survey measurements of structure elevations and current
and projected flood heights.  The damage measure shown is the expected annual
average damage in dollars per $100 of house value.  Thus, a V-zone community
with a “loss cost” of $1 per year (yr) per $100 of house value will experience, on
average, damage of $10 per $100 of house value after 10 years, $20 per $100 of
house value after 20 years, and so on.  This community-wide measure averages
damage across all the houses in only the V-zone—which is typically a subset of
the coastal area surveyed in this study.  Most of the damage will be concentrated
in just a few days when major storms hit.  Some houses will be completely
destroyed, whereas others will remain untouched.
As shown in Figure 5.6, the communities of Nags Head and Holden Beach,
North Carolina, both have average loss costs of $1.00–$1.50/yr per $100 of
house value.  In Nags Head (located in Dare County), most of the damage
forecasted is from direct erosion losses, and the remaining 10 to 20 percent is
attributed to intermittent flooding.  Almost the opposite is expected in Holden
Beach (located in Brunswick County), where about two-thirds of the loss is from
flood damage to structures currently in the V-zone.  The remaining one-third is
mostly from direct erosion losses, but some additional flood damage is expected
to structures that were originally in the lower flood risk A-zone but ended up in
the V-zone as the shoreline moved inland.  The erosion rate at Holden Beach is
lower, but houses are built lower relative to the peak floods expected in the area.
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FIGURE 5.6  Communities differ in their susceptibility to flooding, erosion-related
flooding, and erosion.  Estimated loss costs (i.e., projected damage to structures) 30
years from today, averaged across the V-zone, are shown.
Notes:  This graph shows estimated damages to structures, by community, thirty  years from
today.  The damage is expressed as $/year per $100 of value and includes flooding, erosion
related flooding from landward movement of the shoreline, and direct erosion damage.
Longer bars indicate higher projected damage; shorter bars indicate lower projected damage.
$0.00 $0.50 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00 $2.50 $3.00
Gulf of Mexico
Captiva, FL










Saint Simons Island, GA






















CHAPTER 5 - THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EROSION
123
Averaged across all the communities in the sample, the following picture
emerges, summarized in Table 5.1.  Averaged over the V-zone at 30 years from
today, the total expected flood and erosion damage is in the range of $1.37/yr per
$100 of house value.  About $0.67/yr per $100 is erosion-related—$0.52/yr per
$100 from direct erosion loss and $0.15/yr per $100 from the inland
consequences of an eroding shore.  The remaining expected damage of about
$0.70/yr per $100 of house value is from intermittent flooding.
Beginning in 1981, FEMA required new or substantially improved houses built
in the V-zone to be elevated on pilings to account not only for the expected 100-
year flood but also wave impacts.  Because of the higher base flood elevation
and other requirements—such as dune protection and restrictions on use of fill—
these houses experience lower damages than do structures built before the
requirements went into effect.  Within the “post-1981” class, expected flood
damage is $0.32/yr per $100; about half that of all structures.
Table 5.2 presents similar forecasts of flood and erosion damage averaged over
successively smaller regions:  a 500 ft wide strip of shoreline, the V-zone, and
the 60-year EHA.  Like the results in Table 5.1, these numbers are for study sites
on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.  About 85 percent of V-zone structures and 95
percent of structures in the 60-year EHA are located within 500 ft of the
shoreline.  Within this narrow strip, expected flood and erosion damage averages
$1.00–$1.10/yr per $100 of house value.  About $0.60/yr per $100 of house
value is expected from today’s level of flood damage.  Another $0.37/yr per
$100 of house value is expected from direct erosion damage, and the remaining
$0.10/yr is from increasing erosion-related flood damage.
Table 5.2 also shows expected damage within the 60-year EHA.  Expected
damage in this region is quite a bit higher than that expected in the V-zone.
Total annual expected damage increases to more than $2.00/yr per $100 of house
value, primarily because of a near-tripling of direct erosion damage.  Note, too,
that expected flood damage in this region is somewhat lower than the V-zone
damage, illustrating that the houses most susceptible to erosion damage are not
limited to those most susceptible to flood damage, and many of the houses most
susceptible to flooding are not particularly susceptible to erosion.
As discussed earlier, the situation on the Great Lakes and Pacific coasts is
somewhat different.  In these regions, eroding bluffs are common.  On the Great
Lakes, all of the structures along the eroding shores of our sample areas are up
on bluffs.  Along the Pacific coast, study areas include both sandy beaches and
bluffs, sometimes alone but often together.
For example, three of the Pacific Coast sample communities have high flood
hazard V-zones, much like those along the Atlantic and Gulf.  Two of these
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communities, Aptos, California, and Otis, Oregon, also have structures within a
60-year EHA; one area, Watsonville, California, does not.  The average expected
flood damages within these Pacific Coast V-zones are shown in Table 5.3.
These values can be compared to those shown for Atlantic and Gulf coast
communities in Figure 5.6 and Table 5.1.  Flood damages are much higher on
the Pacific Coast than the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts because the structures are
built lower relative to the peak flood elevation.  Another difference between the
Pacific Coast communities and the typical Atlantic and Gulf community is that
they also contain structures susceptible to erosion that are up on bluffs.  Table
5.3 also shows the average expected erosion damage to structures built on bluffs.
Estimates of average expected erosion damage in the Pacific Coast V-zones
could not be reliably determined because many of the Pacific Coast maps
provided to The Heinz Center included information on rates of erosion of the
bluffs, but not the beach.
Although the data are sparse for the Great Lakes, some counties (e.g., along the
Wisconsin shoreline) have very low percentages of structures within EHAs
whereas others have percentages comparable to those observed on the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts.  Because of a lack of representative measurements across these
varying lake shoreline environments, Table 5.4 shows a range of estimates of
expected annual erosion damage in the Great Lakes, rather than an average.
Figure 5.7 displays the percentage of structures susceptible to long-term erosion
within a strip 500 ft wide along the shore in 16 counties.  As is evident, there is a
fair degree of variability within all regions.  The percentages of structures within
500 ft of the shore are greater along the Atlantic, Gulf, and probably Great Lakes
shorelines than along the Pacific.  The following section, extrapolating results
nationwide, presents regional estimates of expected flood and erosion losses in
all four regions.
TABLE 5.1   Projections of Flood and Erosion Damage for Typical Communities on






Flood damage expected from today’s level of
flooding
$0.70 $0.32
Increase in erosion-related flood damage inland $0.15 $0.06
Direct erosion damage $0.52 $0.45
Total damage $1.37 $0.84
a  Expected annual damage to current structures averaged across the entire V-zone, 30 years
from today.
Damage is expressed in dollars per year per $100 of house value.
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Flood damage expected from today’s
level of flooding $0.60 $0.70 $0.48
Increase in erosion-related flood damage
inland $0.10 $0.15 $0.17
Direct erosion damage $0.37 $0.52 $1.54
Total damage $1.07 $1.37 $2.19
a  Expected annual damage to current structures averaged over 500 feet, V-zone, and 60-year
Erosion Hazard Area. Damage in $ per year, per $100 of house value, expected 30 years from
today.






500 feet Inland from
Top of Bluff
Flood damage expected from today’s level of
flooding $2.56 $0.00
Increase in erosion-related flood damage inland
unknown N.A.
Direct erosion damage unknown $0.10
Total damage >$2.56 $0.10
a  Expected annual damage to current structures averaged over entire V-zone and 500 feet inland from
the top of the bluff. Damage in dollars per year, per $100 of house value, expected 30 years from today.
TABLE 5.4   Projections of Flood and Erosion Damagesa for Great Lakes Communities
Type of Damage
Averaged Across 500 feet
Inland from Top of Bluff
Flood damage expected from today’s level of flooding $0.00
Increase in erosion-related flood damage inland




a  Expected annual damage to current structures averaged over 500 feet inland from the top of
the bluff. Damage in dollars per year, per $100 of house value, expected 30 years from today.
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FIGURE 5.7  The percentage of structures within 500 feet of shore in the 60-year
erosion hazard zone varies by region.
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EXTRAPOLATING RESULTS NATIONWIDE
As discussed in Chapter 2, between 300,000 and 350,000 structures are located
within 500 ft of the 10,000-mile coastline of the lower 48 states.  This estimate is
based on housing data from the most detailed publicly available information
from the 1990 census.10  Combining these data with estimates of coastal erosion
assembled by Robert Dolan of the University of Virginia, The Heinz Center
projected that about 25 percent of these structures—about 85,000 in all—are at
risk from erosion over the next 60 years.  These estimates do not include
structures in the densest areas of large coastal cities, such as New York, Chicago,
Los Angeles, and Miami.11  Much of this shoreline is already heavily protected
from erosion through hard shoreline protection structures.
The distribution by region of these susceptible structures is shown in Table 5.5.
About 80 percent are found along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, hence the heavy
focus of this chapter on the impacts in these regions.  Although these nationwide
estimates are based on data and methods that are different from those used for
the more detailed analyses of structures in the 18-county sample, there is
reasonable agreement between the two.
As shown in Table 5.5, about 53,000 structures along the Atlantic coast, or 30
percent of the structures within 500 ft of the shoreline, are located within the
projected 60-year EHA.  About one-third of these structures are located in the 0-
to 30-year EHA, and two-thirds are located further back in the 30- to 60-year
EHA.  Another 13,000 structures are located within the 60-year EHA on the Gulf
Coast.  A higher percentage of structures along the Gulf are in the 30- to 60-year
EHA (56 percent) than the 0- to 30-year EHA (44 percent), but the difference is
not as great as it is along the Atlantic.  On the West Coast, an estimated 4,000
structures, or 5 to 10 percent of the structures within 500 ft of the shore, are
within the 60-year EHA.  Finally, along the Great Lakes, again about 30% of the
structures within 500 ft of the shore are likely within the 60-year EHA, but
because of data limitations, our confidence in this estimate is low.  Again, in
these last two regions, most of these structures are up on bluffs and have not
participated in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
The estimates above are for structures in place today.  Forecasting growth over a
period of decades in a strip only a few hundred feet wide is virtually impossible.
It is possible, however, to tally the number of empty lots present in the 18-county
                                                          
10  The most detailed information released by the Bureau of the Census is at the “census
block group” level.  The Heinz Center extracted housing density from several thousand
coastal block groups averaging 4 square miles each on the Atlantic shoreline and 70 square
miles each on the Gulf of Mexico shoreline.
11  Census tracts with housing density greater than 10,000 units per square mile (including
roads and open space) are excluded, eliminating structures along about 300 miles of
coastline.
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sample and use this as an estimate of potential growth.  Whether houses are
actually built on these empty lots depends on a host of factors, including the
possible changes to the NFIP discussed in the next chapter.
The last row in Table 5.5 presents estimates of the number of structures within
the 60-year EHA assuming that all empty lots are filled.  In the Atlantic Coast
counties, about 30 percent of available lots  are still available for building.  On
the Gulf Coast, close to 45 percent may be available for building, whereas on the
Pacific coast, only about 10 percent of the lots in the sample are currently empty.
It was not possible to count empty lots along the Great Lakes shoreline.  If these
estimates are indicative of the larger regions, then the total number of structures
within the 60-year EHA could grow to more than 120,000 over the next several
decades.











  Miles 2,300 2,000 1,600 3,600 9,500
  Percentage of total 24% 21% 17% 38%
Structures within 500 feet of shoreline
  Number 170,000 44,000 66,000 58,000 338,000
  Percentage of total 50% 13% 20% 17%
Structures within 60-year erosion hazard area (EHA)b
  Number 53,000 13,000   4,600 16,000   87,000
EHA structures as % of those
within 500 feet of shoreline
31% 29%   7% 28%
Structures within 60-year EHA assuming all open lots are filled
  Number 76,000 22,000 5,200 >16,000c >120,000
a  All estimates exclude structures in major urban areas.  The analysis assumes these structures
will be protected from the erosion hazard.
b  The 60-year EHA is determined by multiplying local erosion rates by 60 years.
c  Data on open lots not available for Great Lakes
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
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CURRENT AND PROJECTED COST OF EROSION
The value of land and property exposed to erosion risks is substantial.  Along the
Atlantic Coast, a “typical” house in the 0- to 30-year EHA is worth about
$360,000.  Typical property values in this EHA are lower along the Gulf of
Mexico ($250,000) and Great Lakes ($190,000) but significantly higher on the
Pacific Coast ($1.4 million). In the following sections, two complementary
measures of the economic impact of erosion are presented:  (1) the annual cost of
damaged structures and lost land and (2) reduced property values because of
perceived risks of erosion.
Annual Cost of Erosion
The annual cost of erosion is the sum of the expected annual damage to
structures plus the loss of land.  Assuming no additional beach nourishment or
structural protection, The Heinz Center estimates that about 1,500 homes and the
land on which they are built will be lost to erosion each year.  To the owners of
these properties, this is a loss of about $530 million per year.  Because the
amenities offered by a waterfront property are not really lost, but rather are
passed to the house behind if a property erodes, the loss to communities is lower.
This loss is estimated at about $410 million per year.
Many houses that may be lost to erosion will have flood insurance.  Part of their
losses will be covered by the NFIP; flood insurance, however, covers damage to
structures only, not the loss of land..  For example, within the Atlantic region,
the typical policy in V-zones covers up to $150,000 of damage.  Thus, assuming
that all of these houses carry insurance—and that all of the damage occurs
during storms and, therefore, is covered under the NFIP rules—about $200
million per year would be reimbursed to these property owners.
However, not all homeowners buy insurance.  Results from the University of
Georgia mail survey indicate that roughly half the houses in high erosion areas
on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts are covered by insurance, because these houses
are also at risk from flooding.  However, on the Great Lakes and Pacific coasts,
where bluff erosion is the predominant situation, 10 percent or fewer of these
houses are insured by the NFIP.  Assuming current enrollment rates and that
most erosion losses occur during storm periods and are covered, the payout from
the NFIP over the next few decades for erosion losses is estimated at about $80
million per year.  Table 5.6 presents a nationwide summary of the expected
annual economic cost of erosion.
Table 5.6 estimates losses for existing structures only, without accounting for
additional growth stemming from the development of vacant lots.  Table 5.7
compares estimates of erosion along the Atlantic coast today to the higher losses
projected decades into the future.  Development density in the 30- to 60-year
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EHA is higher than in the 0- to 30-year zone; accordingly, future damage, even
with no further growth, also may be higher.  The development of vacant lots
located within the 60-year EHA also may increase the expected losses.  Table
5.7 presents annual costs, assuming that all vacant lots within the 60-year EHA
(on average, about 30 percent of total lots) are developed.
TABLE 5.6   Nationwide Estimates of Cost of Erosion: Average Annual Losses to











$320 $50 $110  $50 $530
Communityb
$260 $50   $70  $30 $410
National Flood Insurance Fundc, assuming 100% enrollment:
$130 $20   $10  $30 $200
National Flood Insurance Fundc, assuming current enrollment
  $70 $10     $1    $2   $80
a  Loss of structure and land.
b  Loss of structure and land, not including the “amenity value” of the oceanfront, which is
transferred from owner to owner.
c  Payments from the  National Flood Insurance Fund are for damage to structures and
contents only.
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
TABLE 5.7  Estimates of Cost of Erosion Along the Atlantic Coast: Variation in





30 to 60 Years from
Today (Existing
Structures Only)







National Flood Insurance Fund d, assuming 100% enrollment
 $80 $180 $260
National Flood Insurance Fund d, assuming current enrollment
  $40  $90 $130
a  Vacant lots are, on average, about 30 percent of total lots.
b  Loss of structure and land.
c  Loss of structure and land, not including the “amenity value” of the oceanfront, which is
transferred from owner to owner.
d  Payments from the National Flood Insurance Fund are for damage to structures and
contents only.
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
CHAPTER 5 - THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EROSION
131
The projections of expected erosion losses have a fair degree of uncertainty;
actual losses may be higher or lower than the losses shown in Table 5.6 and
Table 5.7.  The estimates of expected losses are particularly sensitive to the
average annual erosion rate and growth rates.  These estimates assume that the
forecasted rates of shoreline change will remain constant in the future.  Several
factors, however, may cause erosion losses to depart from the long-term average.
Factors that could reduce erosion losses include increased use of such mitigation
measures as seawalls, armoring, beach nourishment as well as fewer severe
storm events.  Factors that could increase erosion losses include decreased beach
nourishment and increased development density and housing values within
EHAs.
Effect of Erosion on Current Property Values
Clearly, once erosion destroys a house and claims enough of the land that
rebuilding on the lot is impossible, the owner has lost the full value of the
property.  As shown in Table 5.5, an estimated 53,000 structures along the
Atlantic Coast fall within the zone likely to be lost to erosion over the next 60
years.  But the loss in value is not an “all or nothing” proposition.  Houses close
to a rapidly eroding shore are worth less than otherwise identical houses that are
close to shores that are relatively stable.
To test this assertion, The Heinz Center’s research collaborators at the University
of Georgia examined field measurements and mail survey responses for about
1,200 structures in seven Atlantic Coast counties.  These were houses for which
the information was complete enough to enable sales price to be linked to a
series of characteristics, including house size and age; lot size; number of
bedrooms; wood or brick construction; distance from, and erosion rate of, the
nearest shore; elevation above expected flood heights; and whether the beach is
nourished or armored.  The statistical procedure used is explained in Box 5.2.  A
more complete explanation and presentation of results is included in Appendix D
The University of Georgia researchers conclude that there is a statistically
significant correlation between house price and the number of years until the
nearest shore is likely to erode and reach the house.  This relationship, for a
typical waterfront property 100 ft from the water, is shown in Figure 5.8.  Along
the Atlantic Coast, a house that is 100 ft from the shoreline, but expected to
reach the water in 50 years, is estimated to be worth about 90 percent of an
identical house also located 100 ft from the shoreline, but expected to reach the
water in 200 years.  Similarly, a house estimated to be within 10 to 20 years of
an eroding shore is worth 80 percent of one located 200 years away.  This varies
somewhat from region to region, but the Atlantic Coast results are typical.
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BOX 5.2  Estimating the Effect of Erosion on Property Value
The effect of erosion on property value was estimated by analyzing the primary
components of coastal property values  (e.g., house size, ocean view, neighborhood,
etc.) and then comparing typical properties in eroding and non-eroding areas.  The
statistical technique used to estimate these relationships was regression analysis—a
procedure used to understand complex relationships that are not easy to spot upon first
inspection.  This type of analysis is used not only to estimate such relationships, but also
to predict how certain changes (such as distance away from the shoreline) may lead to
other changes (such as property value).  “Hedonic price analysis” is the specific form of
regression analysis used in this research (see Freeman, 1993).
Hedonic price analysis uses market sales prices of houses in a given area as a dependent
variable (i.e., that which is to be explained).  Many independent variables (i.e., factors
that affect the price) can be included, such as number of bedrooms and square footage.
These are structural characteristics that should have an effect on the price of a house.
Neighborhood characteristics are usually included as well (such as distance from an
urban center).  Both types of independent variables should affect the value (and
therefore sales price) of a house.  Environmental factors can also affect the sales price
(see MacDonald, 1987).  For research on coastal hazards, such factors include whether
the property is ocean or lakefront; the house’s elevation above the forecast height of a
100-year flood; and the distance from, and erosion rate of, the shore.  Hedonic price
analysis allows researchers to estimate the relative contribution of the independent
variables to the house sales price, which, in turn, implies the value of those factors to
consumers.
Once such an analysis is conducted, the model can also can be used to predict how
housing prices will change given a change in one of the independent variables.  For
example, if erosion rates increased by 1 foot per year, how would housing prices be
expected to change?  Or, if beaches were nourished, what would happen to housing
prices?
Table 5.8 includes model estimates that provide some insight into current losses
in property value as a result of erosion.  For this analysis, the 60-year EHA was
divided into two zones:  the shoreward side, up to 30 years from the coast; and the
somewhat less risky 30- to 60-year zone (that is, the landward half of the 60-year
EHA). Along the Atlantic Coast, a “typical” house in The Heinz Center sample is
28 years old and has four bedrooms and 2000 ft2 of floor space on a 14,500 ft2 lot.
About half of the properties within 500 ft of the shoreline are on the oceanfront.
Such a house located in a non-eroding area is worth between $420,000 and
$440,000. However, the homes in the landward half of the 60-year EHA are
estimated to be worth $20,000 to 37,000 less today as a result of erosion.  Those
in the shoreward half of the 60-year EHA are worth about $61,000 to 80,000 less
today as a result of erosion. The difference in property value reflects the buyers’
perceptions of the erosion risks and, subsequently, reduced offers for eroding
properties.
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By adding up these figures across the 53,000 structures currently inside the 60-
year EHA on the Atlantic Coast, The Heinz Center estimates a current loss in
property value to the owners of these homes of approximately $1.7 to 2.7 billion.
This estimate represents consumers’ judgment, as revealed through market prices,
of how much less these houses are worth as a result of the risks posed by coastal
erosion.  Similar estimates of current loss in property value are shown for the
Gulf of Mexico, Great Lakes, and Pacific Coast regions.
Table 5.9 presents a summary of the economic impacts of erosion nationwide.
The estimated loss in property values for the 87,000 houses within the 60-year
EHA nationwide is $3.3 to 4.8 billion.  Again, this is how much less these houses
are worth today in comparison to identical houses in areas that are eroding slowly
or not at all.  If houses are built on all the empty lots within the 60-year EHA,
then the loss in property value might total about $4.5 to 6.5 billion.
The present value of 60 years of such losses at an interest rate of 5 percent per
year is about $10 billion per year, somewhat higher than the decline in house
value estimated above, but quite close.  “Net present value” is the total value
today of a series of future payments. Thus $10 billion dollars in the bank today
would cover payments of about $500 million per year for 60 years, at an interest
rate of 5 percent per year.
FIGURE 5.8  Coastal erosion reduces property values in the United States, albeit
more quickly in some regions than in others.
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Note:  Results for the Gulf of Mexico are not statistically significant.
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TABLE 5.8   Loss in Property Value Caused by Erosiona








$61,000–80,000 $17,000–20,000 $48,000–66,000 $313,000–347,000
30- to 60-year
EHA
$20,000–37,000 $7,000–11,000 $24,000–43,000 $69,000–95,000
Typical property
value c
$410,000 $270,000 $260,000 $1.3 million
a  This table estimates how much less properties are worth today as a result of the risks posed by coastal
erosion.  Property values are compared to a structure located 100 years from the shoreline (lower
bound) and 200 years from the shoreline (upper bound).
b  Erosion hazard area.
c   Typical property values within 250 feet of the coastline (including both eroding and non-eroding
areas)
TABLE 5.9  Estimated Economic Impacts of Erosion in 60-Year Erosion Hazard Areas










Loss in property value
$1,700–2,700 $100–200 $600–900   $900–1,000 $3,300–4,800
Loss in property value, assuming all empty lots are filled
$2,500–3,800 $200–300 $800–1,100 $1000–1,200 $4,500–6,500
HAZARDS AND COASTAL DEVELOPMENT DENSITY
In addition to examining the effect of coastal hazards on property prices, The
Heinz Center was interested in determining whether there is an effect on
development.  A team of researchers at the George Washington University (GW)
reconstructed 35-year development histories of 120 blocks of homes within
seven of the counties inventoried.  Four of the counties were on the Atlantic
coast, two were on the Gulf of Mexico, and one on the Pacific coast.
The researchers used statistical regression methods to examine whether the
amount of land developed in each block was related to the risk of erosion
(whether it was in the front half of a 60-year EHA, the back half, or outside of
the EHA); the risk of flooding (whether it was in a V-zone or not); as well as
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other factors, such as whether it was a waterfront block.  The GW team also
explored whether the availability of flood insurance under the NFIP affected the
density of development.
Just as erosion appears to have an effect on property prices, so, too, does it seem
to affect the density of development.  For blocks within the front half of the 60-
year EHA (that is, the ocean side, or the 0- to 30-year zone), blocks closer to the
ocean in years had a lower development density.  A difference of 15 years—half
the width closer to the ocean—reduced development density by about 10
percent.  In the back half of the EHA (the 30- to 60-year zone), the effect of
location within the zone was small and not statistically significant.  Outside the
60-year EHA, development was denser in blocks closer to the ocean in years.
This finding was significant in one model specification but not in another; the
results may merely be indicating that, outside of the EHA, development density
is more rapid in areas closer to the ocean.
The GW team also found that flood risk affects development density.  In the
absence of insurance and other programs to reduce flood risk, development
density would be about 25 percent lower in V-zones than in areas less
susceptible to damage from coastal flooding.  However, the researchers also
found a correlation with the availability of flood insurance (and the
programmatic changes that occurred along with it).  During the early phases of
the NFIP in the late 1960s and early 1970s (i.e., the “emergency phase” prior to
the development of Flood Insurance Rate Maps [FIRMs]), development density
was about 15 percent lower in areas now classified as V-zones than in areas less
susceptible to flooding.  After the release of the FIRMs and associated building
code changes, beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing through the early
1980s, development density was about 10 percent lower in V-zones.  Thus, it
appears that although development density is still lower than average in areas
identified by the NFIP as high-risk flood areas, the difference is less than it was
before the program.  The implications of these findings for bluff and cliff areas,
where the NFIP currently does not pay for erosion losses, are explored in the
next chapter.
Although development density has increased, total flood damage is lower than it
would have been if the program had never been enacted (or if insurance
availability was restricted in coastal areas), because of the program’s floodplain
management and building code requirements (described in chapter 3).  Structures
built after the program’s V-zone building requirements went into effect in 1981
are expected to sustain significantly less flood damage than older structures built
prior to the NFIP.  Figure 5.9(a) and Figure 5.9(b) show structures built prior to
and after the NFIP building requirements went into effect.
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FIGURE 5.9 Structures built prior to the implementation of National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) building requirements and State setback regulations
differ significantly from those built afterwards, as shown by these examples in Dare
County, North Carolina.  The older structure, shown in (a), is built on piers and
located in the V-zone.  It is not designed to withstand the high-velocity forces
associated with wave attack.  The newer structure, shown in (b), is elevated on
pilings above the base flood elevation in accordance with NFIP requirements.  It is
located in the lower risk A-zone.  The lower floor, used for parking and storage, is
enclosed by open wood lattice-work designed to keep the structure free of
obstruction in the event of a flood.  Both structures are within the 60-year erosion




SOURCE: The Heinz Center
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Figure 5.10 shows expected flood damage to structures by year built on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts.  Prior to 1970, expected damage from flooding within
coastal V-zones was $0.90–$1.25/yr per $100 of house value.  As the program
was phased in after 1970 (communities in the sample adopted NFIP building
codes beginning in 1972 and continuing through 1985), expected flood damage
to new structures dropped.  By 1985, expected flood damage to new structures
had dropped to $0.30–$0.35/yr per $100 of house value. These estimates were
determined by averaging expected flood damage by year built in 5-year
increments.  Building dates were obtained from county assessment records and
flood damage is calculated at expected flood heights today.
FIGURE 5.10  Expected flood damage to new structures has been dropping over
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The decrease in damage attributable to improved building practices as a result of the
program has been considerably greater than the increase in development density.
Overall, the damage to structures built after 1981 lower than it would have been if
development had occurred at the lower densities, but at higher expected flood and
erosion damage, that would have occurred if the program had never been adopted.
This is illustrated in Tables 5.10 and 5.11.
The first column of Table 5.10 displays development density per unit area.
Development density observed in The Heinz Center study sites in 1980 (i.e., houses
built 1980 and earlier) is scaled to $100 per unit area.  By 1997, density had increased
by about 60 percent to $161 dollars per unit area.  According to the results of the GW
researchers statistical model, development density might have been closer to $153 per
unit area by 1997 if the NFIP had not been adopted, about 5 percent lower than the
density observed in 1997.  The second column displays the changes in expected annual
flood and erosion damage per $100 of house value.  The expected annual flood and
erosion damage to V-zone structures built 1981 or earlier in our Atlantic and Gulf
Coast samples is $1.32/yr per $100 of house values.  By 1997, expected damage to
structures had declined to $1.14/yr per $100 of house value, a drop of about 14
percent.  Again, much of this decline is the result of improved building standards and
floodplain management for which the NFIP was in large part responsible.
The last column in Table 5.10 displays expected damage per area, which depends on
both development density and the susceptibility of each structure to damage.
Expected damage per area in 1980 was $1.32 per unit area.  By 1997, this has grown
to $1.83 per unit area.  If the NFIP had not been adopted, the rate of growth might
have been somewhat lower, but the expected damage per structure higher.  Overall, the
results of this analysis indicate that damage from flood and erosion is about 10 percent
lower today than it would have been if the NFIP had not been enacted.
Table 5.11 presents similar information, but isolates the effect on houses built after
1980, that is the effect on houses built after the program matured into its current form.
The GW researchers statistical model estimates that the density of structures built
within the V-zone after 1981 may be 15 percent higher than it would have been if the
NFIP had not been adopted.  However, the expected average annual flood and erosion
damage to these structures dropped close to 35 percent. Thus, overall, the damage to
V-zone structures built after 1981 is between 25 and 30 percent lower than it would
have been if development had occurred at the lower densities, but higher expected
damage, that would have occurred absent the NFIP.
The program’s environmental impacts could not be ascertained.  Development density
did increase under the program, so it is plausible that environmental damage increased
as well.  However, other aspects of the program, such as encouragement for dune
protection, may have mitigated this trend.  The Heinz Center hopes to explore this
question in a future study.
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TABLE 5.10  Effect of National Flood Insurance Program Requirements on











Observed: 1980 $100 $1.32 $1.32
Observed: 1997 $161 $1.14 $1.83
Hypothetical: 1997, no NFIP $153 $1.32 $2.02




Hypothetical: % change 1981-
1997,
no NFIP
+53%    0% +53%
Difference with
NFIP, 1997
  +5% -14%   -9%
TABLE 5.11  Effect of National Flood Insurance Program Requirements on Development












Observed: Pre-1981 construction $100 $1.32 $1.32
Observed: Construction built 1981-
1997
  $61 $0.84 $0.51
Hypothetical: Construction 1981-1997,
no NFIP
  $53 $1.32 $0.70
Difference with NFIP,
1981-1997 only +15% -36% -27%
EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS
140
 REFERENCES
Crowell, M., M. Honeycutt, and D. Hatheway.  1999.  Coastal Erosion Hazards Study:
Phase One Mapping.  Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue (28): 10–20.
Flick, R.E., and E.H. Sterrett.  1994.  The San Diego Shoreline:  Shoreline Erosion
Assessment and Atlas of the San Diego Region, Vol. I.  Sacramento, Calif.:  California
Department of Boating and Waterways.
Freeman, A.M.  1993.  The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values.
Washington, D.C.:  Resources for the Future.
Leatherman, S.P.  1983.  Shoreline mapping:  A comparison of techniques.  Shore and
Beach 51:28–33.
Lichtkoppler, F.  1998.  Lake Erie shore erosion:  Fact Sheet 19.  Ohio Sea Grant College
Program.  Available at http://www.sg.ohio-state.edu/publications/erosion/fs-019.html.
MacDonald, D.N., J.C. Murdoch, and H.L. White.  1987.  Uncertain hazards, insurance, and






The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was adopted to address the risks
due to flooding but not the closely related risks from coastal erosion which were
poorly understood at the time.  This chapter presents a series of policy options to
better incorporate coastal erosion into the NFIP, examining the advantages and
disadvantages of each one based on the analyses conducted by The Heinz Center
and its consultants.  To provide a context for the analysis, the chapter opens with
a description of the “building blocks” of the NFIP—information, insurance, and
mitigation—and a summary of how the public responds to them.
BUILDING BLOCKS:  INFORMATION, INSURANCE,
AND MITIGATION
To understand how the NFIP combines information, insurance, and mitigation, it
is useful to recall the intent of the U.S. Congress in creating the program.  The
NFIP was enacted to limit increasing expenditures on flood control and disaster
relief, provide a pre-funded mechanism to indemnify more fully the victims of
flood-related disasters, and get communities to adopt and enforce floodplain
management measures to reduce future flood damage.   However, the 1968 Act
and 1970 amendment that created the emergency program—which offered
reasonably priced flood insurance in exchange for voluntary state and local
government actions to enforce floodplain management measures—did not work
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as well as intended.  By mid-1973, only about 2,000 communities had joined the
NFIP and fewer than 300,000 property owners had purchased flood insurance.
Beginning with statutory changes in 1973, Congress amended the program
several times to correct its shortfalls and further its original goals. Today,
approximately 20,000 communities in all states and jurisdictions have joined the
NFIP and 4.1 million property owners have purchased flood insurance.
The first component of the program is to identify the risk and get the information
to the public, lenders, insurance and real estate agents, and state and local
governments.  To do this, the NFIP published Flood Insurance Rate Maps
(FIRMs) covering approximately 165,000 square miles (mi) of flood-prone
areas.
The second component is to assure the purchase of sufficient insurance and the
enrollment of adequate numbers of communities and individuals to curtail the
expansion of federal disaster relief and flood control programs.  Insurance has
been made readily available through the re-involvement of the insurance industry
under the “write your own” (WYO) program.  Under this program, the insurance
purchaser and insurance agent have a wide selection of insurers from which to
choose.  The WYO program has proven to be very effective in providing prompt
claims adjustments and payments after a catastrophic flood or hurricane.
Changes in the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 have increased
enrollment and will likely continue to do so.
The third component is to encourage wise use of the floodplain.  Most states
have delegated their land-use authorities to local governments (though a few,
such as South Carolina and California require state permits.)  Therefore, the
NFIP requires communities to adopt floodplain management requirements,
including performance standards for new construction and substantial
improvements to existing buildings located in special flood hazard areas on the
FIRMs.  The increased insurance rates and restricted coverage offered for
noncompliant buildings are deterrents to this type of construction.  Conversely,
the reduced rates offered for compliant buildings serve as incentives for
communities and builders to exceed the NFIP floodplain management
requirements.  In addition, post-disaster property purchase and relocation
projects are encouraged.  Through the use of NFIP funds, other Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mitigation and prevention funds, and
funds from other government sources, more than 20,000 pieces of property have
been removed from primarily riverine floodplains.  Virtually all of these areas
are now open land space with no buildings.
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Attitudes Towards Natural Hazards and Mitigation and Insurance
Purchase Decisions
The reduction or distribution of erosion losses through mitigation or insurance
requires participation by property owners, coastal communities, and financial
institutions.  However, experience with natural disasters shows that many
individuals underestimate the risk they face.  Consequently, they tend to not
invest adequately in either insurance or mitigation measures that could lower
their risk.
Studies of mitigation adoption in hazard-prone areas of the United States have
concluded that individuals are not willing to invest voluntarily in mitigation even
if they or their friends and neighbors sustained heavy damage in recent disasters
(Kunreuther, 1997).  For example, after Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992,
most residents in hurricane-prone areas apparently did not make cost-effective
improvements to existing dwellings that could reduce the damage from another
storm.  A July 1994 telephone survey of 1,241 residents in six hurricane-prone
areas along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts revealed that 62 percent had not
installed hurricane shutters, used laminated glass in windows, installed roof
bracing, and/or made sure that side walls were bolted to the foundation either
before or after Hurricane Andrew (Insurance Institute for Property Loss
Reduction, 1995).   
Likewise, the voluntary purchase of insurance is low.  The University of Georgia
mail survey to coastal property owners found that 40 percent of the structures in
The Heinz Center study sites were covered by flood insurance.  Only 9 percent
of the homeowners participated voluntarily; the remaining 31 percent had to
purchase insurance to be eligible for federally backed mortgages.
Experience with earthquake insurance provides additional insight into
perceptions of risk and decisions about whether to purchase insurance.  In the
case of earthquakes, perceived risk is a major predictor of insurance purchases.
In a study by Palm (1990), respondents to a mail survey were asked to estimate
the probability of a major earthquake damaging their community or home.  The
responses consistently distinguished the insured from the uninsured.  Those with
higher perceived vulnerability to future earthquakes were more likely to buy
earthquake insurance than were those who believed that an earthquake was
unlikely to affect their home or community.
There appears to be no evidence suggesting that individuals refuse to purchase
property insurance because they expect to be bailed out by the government
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should they sustain damage.12  The only empirical findings on this question,
from a survey undertaken more than 20 years ago, suggest just the opposite
pattern.  Although most uninsured homeowners were aware that the Small
Business Administration (SBA) provided aid to victims, they had little
knowledge of the terms of the loans, and most did not anticipate turning to the
federal government for relief if they sustained damage from a disaster.  In fact,
the data suggest that most homeowners expect to rely on their own resources or
bank loans.  Their decisions not to purchase insurance were due  primarily to
other factors, such as not perceiving the hazard to be a serious problem
(Kunreuther et al., 1978).
Policy approaches to minimize damage and alleviate hardships in eroding areas
include insurance, land-use regulations, and support for engineered shoreline
protection.  Insurance, if designed carefully, offers an advantage over other
policy approaches in that it plays a dual role.  It rewards individuals prior to a
disaster (through lower premiums) for locating in safer areas, and it compensates
these same individuals after a disaster for any damages sustained.  However, for
insurance to be effective in both these roles, those at risk must bear a substantial
portion of the costs of residing in hazard-prone areas, or else they will have
limited economic incentive to take protective actions.
Under the current NFIP, most erosion damage is covered but not separately
identified.  One option discussed in greater detail below is to impose an erosion
surcharge on flood insurance held by those living in eroding areas.  Such a
surcharge would ensure that those most at risk pay for their potential losses and
encourage other individuals, by offering them reduced premiums, to stay out of
harm’s way.  A second option would combine a surcharge with additional
community-based mitigation requirements, to ensure at least a minimal response
by individuals who may be underestimating the risks they face.
OVERVIEW OF THE POLICY OPTIONS
The Heinz Center has constructed nine policy options, or packages of options,
that the Congress may choose to consider in responding to the coastal erosion
risks discussed in the previous chapters.  The first five are policy packages that
span the full range of possibilities, from maintaining the status quo to combining
insurance and mitigation programs similar to the current NFIP but with
additional attention to erosion hazards.  The packages are meant to be mutually
exclusive, that is, only one can be chosen.  The remaining four are options that
can be used, alone or in combination, to augment any of the policy packages.  In
                                                          
12  There is evidence, however, that many farmers do not purchase crop insurance because
they have been assisted by the federal government following natural disasters, especially
drought.  Chite (1992) summarizes the government’s willingness to provide disaster
assistance even though insurance is available.
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brief, the options are as follows:
1. Maintain the status quo (i.e., no change in policy).  Nineteen of 30 coastal
states currently incorporate erosion risks into the approval process for new
construction close to the shoreline.  However, information about erosion risks is
spotty, and both the information and its usage are inconsistent from state to state.
Although the NFIP appears to cover most erosion-related damage in low-lying
areas, current insurance rates do not reflect the variation in risk among
policyholders.
2. Erosion mapping and dissemination alone.  The simplest and least
intrusive change would be to direct FEMA to prepare maps displaying the
location and extent of areas subject to erosion and make the information widely
available.  Individuals and localities would be free to use this information as they
felt appropriate.
3. Creation of a coastal high hazard zone, including both high flood and
erosion zones.  The existing high flood hazard “V-zone” could be expanded by
FEMA to include areas susceptible to erosion damage over the next several
decades.  Most, but not all, areas susceptible to erosion are also in V-zones.
Insurance rates would be calculated in a similar manner to today’s program but
would have to be increased.
4. Mandatory erosion surcharge on flood insurance in erosion zones.  Many
homeowners pay insurance rates far lower than is necessary to cover the risks
due to both flooding and erosion.  This shortfall will have to be covered by either
other NFIP policyholders or the general taxpayer.  Congress could direct FEMA
to impose an insurance surcharge on current flood policies to cover erosion risks.
5. Erosion surcharge combined with regulatory measures to reduce
damages.  Under the current NFIP, a condition of the offer of insurance to
individuals is the community’s adoption of regulations to reduce future damage.
The Congress might follow this model and add, for example, land-use
restrictions in erosion-prone areas to the list of measures that communities must
adopt for residents to remain eligible for combined flood and erosion insurance.
 Congress could add any of the four options below to one of the policy packages
listed above.
6. Flood-related regulatory changes in erosion zones.  Erosion not only
causes damage directly, but also, over time, increases the risk from flooding.
The likelihood of damage could be lowered somewhat if FEMA directed
communities to apply building standards appropriate to the flood conditions
expected several decades from now, rather than conditions today.
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7. Erosion insurance in bluff areas susceptible to erosion but not flooding.
Although houses on bluffs overlooking the Great Lakes and ocean coasts are also
subject to erosion damage, homeowners in these areas typically have not
purchased flood insurance.  The NFIP rules currently provide insurance for
some, but not all, erosion-related damage on bluffs.  The Congress could direct
FEMA to design a program more consistent with the erosion problems in these
areas.
8. Relocation assistance and/or land acquisition.  Improved building
standards have been very successful in lowering flood damages but are unlikely
to be as effective for erosion.  Relocation of existing structures and land
acquisition are mitigation options that can lower erosion damage, but they have
not been used extensively because of the high value of coastal property.
Congress could instruct FEMA to reconsider these options—and their ancillary
environmental benefits—in the context of an expanded insurance program.
9. Shoreline protection measures (nourishment, dune restoration, and
hardening shorelines).   Along with relocation, these measures are the only
options that can reduce damage to existing structures.  The federal government
currently pays a large share of the costs of nourishing or hardening beaches,
measures sometimes used in densely developed areas.  If any of the options
above are chosen, Congress might wish to examine their implications for
shoreline protection policy and vice versa.
Key Questions for Comparing Options
To help sort through these options, The Heinz Center constructed a series of
evaluation criteria that Congress may want to consider.  These criteria reflect
possible goals for changes to the flood program.  It is anticipated that each of
these goals will be embraced by many members of Congress, but that the priority
assigned to each goal will vary.  The criteria are as follows:
• Will the public be better informed about the risks of living on the coast?
• Does the change help alleviate economic hardships from erosion damages
that do occur?
• Is the program fairer?
- Will insurance rates more closely reflect risk?
- Are additional restrictions imposed on property owners?
• Does the change lead to reduced damage to structures?
- Does it avert damage to structures not yet built?
- Does it help reduce damage to existing structures?
• Does the change lead to other desirable outcomes, such as environmental
benefits or enhanced opportunities for recreation?
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• Is the change cost-effective for affected individuals?
Figure 6.1 displays the types of outcomes Congress can expect from each of the
options above.  These outcomes are summarized below.
Will the public be better informed about the risks of living on the coast?
As previously discussed, when Congress established the NFIP 30 years ago, one
of its key goals was to better inform the public of the flood risks they face.  The
widespread availability of FIRMs has advanced that goal.  As shown in chapter
5, however, erosion poses risks today about equal to those posed by flooding
along the coast.  Options 2 through 7, which depend on the availability of
detailed erosion hazard maps prepared by FEMA, all would help better inform
the public about the risks of living along the coast.
Does the change help alleviate economic hardships from erosion damages that
do occur?
When erosion damages do occur, of the options listed above, only those that
involve insurance can help alleviate the economic hardship that such damage
entails.  Along beach areas, the NFIP appears to reimburse policyholders for
most erosion-related damage.  Whether options 3 through 5 serve to alleviate
more of the economic hardship associated with erosion depends on the details of
implementation, as discussed later in the chapter.  Altering the conditions for
coverage in bluff areas likely will expand enrollment and, thus, enhance the
benefits of insurance in these areas.
Is the program fairer?
“Fairness” is, of course, a complex and highly subjective notion.  Two aspects
are most relevant here.  The first is how closely insurance rates reflect the risks
to which each policyholder is exposed.  Options 4 and 5 include a mandatory
erosion surcharge on flood policies in erosion-prone areas to bring insurance
rates closer in line with expected damage.  Although many government programs
do spread the costs beyond those who benefit, there is no compelling reason why
this should be the case for erosion but not for flooding.
The second aspect of fairness is most relevant to options 5 and 6—those that
include regulatory restrictions.  Although regulations such as restrictions on
building at the water’s edge in the most erosion prone regions can lower property
damage and taxpayer costs of disaster assistance, some claim that this approach
imposes unfair burdens on property owners.  Again, the current NFIP is designed
to incorporate local regulatory restrictions.  It is a value judgment as to whether
and what types of regulations are justified, or whether other approaches (e.g.,
market mechanisms such as differential insurance under option 4) are preferred.
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1.  Maintain status quo       
2.  Erosion mapping and dissemination alone  ?
3.  Creation of coastal high hazard zone, 
including both high flood and erosion risks  ? ?
4.  Mandatory erosion surcharge on flood 
insurance in erosion zones  ?  ?
5.  Erosion surcharge and/or insurance combined 
with regulatory measures to lower damages  ?   
6.  Flood-related regulatory changes in erosion 
zones ?  
7.  Erosion insurance in bluff areas susceptible to 
erosion but not flooding    ?
8.  Relocation assistance and/or land acquisition  
9.  Shoreline protection measures (nourishment, 
dune restoration, and structural measures)   
Note:  A  indicates that the option is likely to help meet the evaluation criterion.  An  indicates that the option may be at cross-
purposes with the criterion.  A ? indicates that the effect is likely to be minimal or uncertain.
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Does the change lead to reduced damage to structures?
Damage to two classes of structures—-those that exist today and those that have
yet to be built—must be considered.  Only options 8 and 9, relocation and
various types of shoreline protection, can effectively reduce damage to existing
structures.  Information, insurance programs, and regulation all can influence the
design and location of structures that have not yet been built.  Options 5 and 6
(regulation) and 9 (shoreline protection) clearly can be designed to help avert
erosion-related damage.  The extent to which the information and insurance—
options 3, 4, 5, and 7—can avert future damage depends on how these
mechanisms are designed.  Option 7, expanding erosion insurance into bluff
areas, would need to be pursued with caution, because poor design might
actually lead to an increase in damage, though at the same time it would serve to
reduce the hardship if and when damage did occur.
Does the change lead to other desirable outcomes, such as environmental
benefits or enhanced opportunities for recreation?
Again, options 8 and 9, relocation of structures and shoreline protection, are
those most likely to lead to environmental improvements.  On the other hand,
measures such as the hardening of beaches can lead to environmental
degradation.
Is the change cost-effective?
Finally, whether a particular option is cost-effective depends on the
implementation and on who is paying the bill.  Providing information alone (i.e.,
erosion mapping) can be cost-effective, but only if it is widely available and used
to reduce future risks.  Insurance, if costs are completely covered by those who
hold insurance, is cost-effective for taxpayers, but each policyholder must judge
whether it is cost-effective personally.
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ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
Option 1:  Maintain the Status Quo
Over the next 60 years, erosion may claim one of four houses within 500 feet of
the shoreline.  Within this area, the expected damage from erosion is about equal
to the expected damage from flooding, yet it is dealt with in a far more cursory
fashion.
Nineteen of 30 coastal states currently incorporate erosion risks into the approval
process for new construction close to the shore.  Thus Congress may choose to
leave consideration of erosion hazards completely to the states.  However, the
availability of erosion information, its quality, and its usage are inconsistent
form state to state.
Although the program encourages communities to include erosion risks in their
permitting decisions, it does not help them acquire the needed information.
Because FIRMs do not incorporate erosion risk along with the flood risk that is
displayed, the maps may even be misleading to some users.
The current program appears to pay for most erosion-related damages in low-
lying areas, although coverage is limited on bluffs.  However, current insurance
rates do not reflect the magnitude of the erosion risk faced by any individual
policyholder.  Thus, claims by homeowners in erosion prone areas will have to
be subsidized by others.  Lastly, the regulatory components of the program were
developed primarily to avert damage from flooding.  Although quite successful
in this regard, they are ineffective with respect to erosion.  Therefore, new
structures built to NFIP standards are subject to higher risk of damage from
erosion than from flooding.
Option 2:  Erosion Mapping and Dissemination Alone
Chapter 5 displayed examples of maps showing the expected location of the
shoreline years from now.  Such maps contain highly useful information.  If
FEMA were to do nothing other than prepare them, update them as needed, and
make them readily available to communities in print and over the Internet, the
maps undoubtedly would be widely consulted.  Potential home buyers and
builders already use FIRMs that show the location of flooding risks.  Similar
maps displaying long-term erosion rates used side-by-side with FIRMs, or
FIRMs with information about erosion hazards superimposed, would provide a
much more accurate picture of the risks that coastal structures face.  The
implementation of a NFIP erosion hazard study and mapping program would
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involve revising an estimated 3,915 FIRM panels for 258 coastal counties along
12,500 miles of ocean and Great Lakes shoreline, and cost approximately $44.2
million (see Box 6.1).  Assuming the map is useful for approximately 10 years,
annual costs would be on the order of $4 to $5 million per year (yr), or $350/mi
per year.
On average, across a strip of land several hundred feet wide bordering the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts, expected losses from erosion are comparable to those
from flooding.  In some communities, the added risks from erosion far
overshadow those expected from flood alone.  Thus, it is possible to get a false
sense of security from using the FIRM alone. FEMA would be wise to correct
the misleading impression given by the partial information (i.e., flood risk only)
included on FIRMs.
It is quite difficult to estimate the effect that such information might have on
future development decisions, but the effect would not have to be very large to
justify the costs.  In Chapter 5, estimates of annual erosion losses were
presented, first assuming no growth and then assuming that all the lots that are
empty today are filled.  The difference—the losses that could be avoided if no
building takes place in areas most susceptible to erosion—is roughly $100
million/yr for the value of the structures alone.  Again, the mapping investment
needed to inform such decisions is $5 million/yr, or 4 percent of the losses
potentially avoided if all property owners were to choose to build elsewhere.
The percentage savings varies by region, however. Potentially avoided damage
to structures alone along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts average roughly
$35,000/mi per year and $10,000/mi per year, respectively. Depending on the
region, if such maps discourage more than 2 to 7 percent of development on
currently empty lots within the 60-year erosion hazard area, the investment will
be worthwhile.
Moreover, it is hard to envision another erosion-related expenditure that is likely
to be more cost-effective for reducing damage.  For example, later in this
chapter, beach nourishment is estimated to cost between $300,000 and $500,000
per year per mile of shoreline.  Thus an additional 10 miles of eroding coast
could be nourished for the same annual cost of mapping the 12,500 miles of U.S.
ocean and Great Lakes shoreline of greatest concern.
The funds required to map erosion might instead be used to improve estimates of
flood risk.  While this would be a worthwhile expenditure, far less information is
available about erosion—a risk about equal to flood in the highest risk flood
zones.  Thus, adding erosion risks to current flood maps is likely to be the more
cost-effective and useful choice.
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BOX 6.1  Costs of Erosion Mapping
The implementation of an erosion hazard study and mapping program would involve
revising an estimated 3,915 Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) panels for 258 coastal
counties along 12,500 ocean and Great Lakes shoreline miles, and cost approximately $44
million (see Table below).  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would
need to identify historical shorelines using geographic information system technology and
then use these data to estimate erosion rates.  Then, FEMA would need to prepare a report
documenting the data development process and resulting erosion rates and plot the rates
on existing FIRMs.  Plotting the erosion rates on separate maps would save approximately
$2.6 million.  Other costs include appeals, administration, printing, and distribution.
However, FEMA’s Map Service Center would prefer to plot the erosion rate on existing
FIRMS for two reasons:  The present inventory management system cannot handle two
separate products using an identical numbering scheme, and existing storage space could
not handle an additional 4,080 panels.
                       Projected Costs of an Erosion Hazards Study and Mapping Program
Activity Cost (1999 dollars)
Identification of historical shorelines $18.8 million
Erosion data analysis $13.4 million
Report and documentation (including
plotting erosion rate on existing FIRMs)a
  $8.5 million
Other (appeals processing, administrative
costs, printing, and distribution
  $3.5 million
Total $44.2 million
Average cost per mile of mapped
shoreline
$3,500
 a  Plotting erosion rates on new and separate maps would cost $5.9 million, or
$2.6 million less, lowering total costs to $41.6 million.
   SOURCE:  Hatheway, 1999.
What sorts of changes to the current NFIP would such an option require?  First,
FEMA already has a technical support division that currently prepares and
distributes FIRMs.  Erosion mapping would likely be an added responsibility of
that division.  Following a procedure similar to the one used to prepare erosion
maps for the 27 coastal counties in this study, the division could collect historic
data from maps and photos and prepare a series of nationwide erosion maps.
The maps could be distributed by the Map Service Center that already distributes
FIRMs to individuals, local governments, insurance companies, and any others
who are interested.
However, unlike flood maps, which exist primarily in printed form, erosion maps
could be designed right from the start for both electronic and print formats.  The
availability of these maps on the Internet, in an easily accessible form, could lead
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to increased use of this information.  The potential benefits of electronic access
to flood information already has been recognized by FEMA, which follows this
procedure for all FIRM remappings.
The erosion maps would need to be used with caution, however.  Although these
maps display well-defined lines, they reflect only a statistical “best guess” of
how much the shore might erode over the next several decades, based on the
long-term average erosion observed over the past several decades or century.
Such projections are extremely useful but are only as accurate as the averaged
historical data on which they are based.  Erosion maps must also be updated
periodically.
The data from which these maps are derived come from maps and aerial
photographs showing the past location of the shore, such as the high water line
or bluff line.  The availability of such maps and photos is spotty; typically, an
area is mapped or photographed only once every several decades.  Moreover, the
photos from the 1930s and 1940s can be difficult to interpret.
More significantly, erosion is a highly variable process.  Figure 6.2 displays a
typical graph of shoreline movement through time on Long Island, New York.
Again, there are usually only a few observations of shoreline location from
which to estimate future erosion rates.  This region of Long Island, mapped nine
times since 1830, has one of the longest records and is among the most
frequently mapped.  Although the shore appears to be eroding gradually at a
fairly constant rate, large storms can cause large, rapid inland movements of the
shore, which then may accrete over the period of a few years to the long-term
average trend line.  In this example, the long-term erosion rate has been about 2
ft/yr.  Large storms hit in 1933 and 1962.  In 1933, the coast appears to have
eroded about 20 ft and then returned to the long-term average trend.  In 1962, the
short-term excursion was closer to 200 ft before the coast returned to the long-
term trend.
Thus, in the near term, these maps are best viewed as displaying “risk zones”
rather than future shoreline locations.  Houses located in the 10-year zone are
more likely to be found oceanside over the next several decades than are those
located in the back of the 60-year zone.  After 10 years, the shoreline may be
close to where it is today or farther inland than the 10-year line.  If the shoreline
is recovering from a recent storm, then it may even be farther out towards the
ocean.  Over a long-term period of 60 years, the shoreline is expected to move at
a distance approximately equal to the time period multiplied by the average
annual erosion rate (e.g., 60 years multiplied by 2 ft/yr equals 120 ft).  The 60-
year line represents only the best guess of how far the shoreline will move.  It is
also important to remember that these long-term projections do not incorporate
any future interventions, such as beach nourishment or hard structures.
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FIGURE 6.2  The shoreline has moved quite a bit since 1830 on Long Island, New
York, as shown in this graph.  The solid line shows the long-term average trend in
shoreline position.  Large storms, such as the  1962 Ash Wednesday storm, can
cause rapid, substantial inland movements of the shore, which then may accrete back
to the long-term average trend line.






















SOURCE:  FIU Laboratory for Coastal Research, 1998
Option 3:  Creation of a Coastal High Hazard Area, Including Both
Flood and Erosion Zones
Among the simplest changes that Congress could make to incorporate erosion
hazards more fully into the current flood program would be to direct FEMA to
establish a single "coastal high hazard zone" encompassing the current highest-
risk flood zone (the “V-zone”) and any additional areas highly susceptible to
erosion.  Insurance rates would increase to reflect both risks.   On the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts, the combined region would be roughly 15 percent larger than
the current high-hazard V-zone.
Within the new coastal high hazard zone, 25 percent of the structures would be
within both the current V-zone and the 60-year EHA, 65 percent in the current
V-zone only, and 10 percent in the 60-year EHA only.
The Heinz Center estimates that the average expected damage in the new coastal
high hazard area would be slightly greater than in the current V-zone,
approximately $1.42/yr per $100 of coverage compared to the current V-zone
average of $1.36/yr per $100 of coverage.
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Rates could not be based entirely on flood risk, however, as they are under the
current program.  In addition to the current rates (based primarily on building
characteristics in relation to expected flood heights), all policy holders would
share equally the costs of erosion damage, about $0.70/yr per $100 of coverage.
After adjusting for FIA administrative costs and the like, policyholders would
see rate increases of about $0.92/yr per $100 of coverage. This is in addition to
current rates that vary by flood risk. Incentives to elevate structures and use
similar building methods to minimize flood damage would be retained.
However, risks related primarily to house location, such as erosion risks, would
be shared equally by all within the new coastal high hazard area.
This option contains the cost of erosion to within the coastal high hazard area,
thus eliminating future subsidies from other NFIP policy holders (such as inland
homeowners) and general taxpayers.  The NFIPs current distribution of
insurance is shown it Table 6.1.  About 2 percent of policies and coverage are
located in the coastal high hazard areas, thus the size of this new risk category
would not be overly large.
The option does not, however, bring insurance rates fully into line with the risk
faced by individual homeowners within the high hazard area.  Policyholders in
low-erosion areas still would be subsidizing those in more erosion-prone ones.

















pre-FIRM 2,407,00 $950 $263,000 $109,000 $0.36 $394
post-FIRM 1,757,00 $530 $250,000 $142,000 $0.21 $303
Total all zones 4,164,00 $1,480 $513,000 $123,000 $0.29 $355
V-zone
pre-FIRM, pre-81 48,000 $34.7 $519 $109,000 $0.67 $730
post-FIRM, pre-81 10,000 $6.1 $119 $118,000 $0.51 $602
post-FIRM, post-81 27,000 $26.3 $387 $144,000 $0.68 $981
post-FIRM total 37,000 $32.3 $506 $137,000 $0.64 $877
Total pre and post-
FIRM V-zone
84,000 $67 $1,025 $121,000 $0.65 $794
V-zone as % of total 2% 5% 2%
Data may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Federal Insurance Administration. October, 1999.
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Option 4:  Mandatory Erosion Surcharge on Existing Flood
Insurance Policies
Congress may wish to distinguish coastal hazards, as addressed under the NFIP,
into separate erosion risk and flood risk components.  If these risks were treated
separately, then policyholders with similar houses in erosion-prone areas would
pay higher premiums than would those along non-eroding shores facing
comparable risks of flooding.  The most effective approach would be to instruct
FEMA to construct a mandatory erosion surcharge applicable to all policy
holders in designated erosion-prone areas.  The surcharge must be mandatory
because the flood program already pays for most of the losses from erosion
sustained by current policyholders.  If coverage were optional, there would be no
incentive for policyholders to pay extra for coverage they get free of charge
today.  Moreover, it is not possible to distinguish adequately between damage
from flooding alone and that from erosion-related flooding, such that the Federal
Insurance Administration (FIA) could set different rates for homeowners
wishing coverage with or without erosion damage.
A flood insurance policy could remain optional, as it is today, for those who do
not hold federally backed mortgages.  But, again, if the objective is to improve
the fairness of the current program by adding an erosion surcharge, then it must
be mandatory if flood insurance is purchased.  Fairness is probably the most
compelling reason in favor of a mandatory erosion surcharge.  Homeowners in
erosion hazard areas are paying the same amount for their flood insurance as are
those in non-eroding areas, but the risks they face are greater.  Thus, either
homeowners in the non-eroding areas will be subsidizing future erosion damages
in EHAs (hence paying more than they should) or the National Flood Insurance
Fund (NFIF, established under the NFIP) will not be self-supporting and
taxpayers will be subsidizing the fund.  An erosion surcharge would help to
remedy either situation.
On the other hand, some argue that a surcharge would further complicate what is
already a rather complex flood insurance program that has separate rates for V-
zones, lower risk A-zones, and so on.  Most of the 60-year erosion hazard is
confined to the V-zone.  Moreover, the variation in flood risk within the V-zone
nationwide is not completely accounted for in today’s insurance rates.  Ignoring
the variation in erosion risk is but another simplification to keep the insurance
program simple enough to implement.
Although there is clearly merit to this argument, the magnitude of the
simplification is quite large.  In Chapter 5, results were presented indicating that,
on average, in these V-zones the magnitude of the risk from erosion was only
slightly less than that posed by flooding alone.  For new structures, the risk from
erosion, on average, is 1.5 times the risk posed by flooding.  Under the current
program, a policyholder whose house is built at the height of the expected 100-
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year flood crest will pay about twice as much for insurance as a neighbor whose
house is built 2 ft higher.  Thus, it seems inconsistent to pay close attention to the
variation in flood risk when setting insurance rates and completely ignore the
variation in erosion risk that is at least as great.
One argument voiced against an erosion surcharge is that such a policy might
increase development in erosion-prone areas, as the current NFIP has done in V-
zones.  The Heinz Center research supports the conclusion that flood insurance
has encouraged development in V-zones, but, because erosion damage already is
covered under the program, an erosion surcharge actually might lower
development in erosion-prone areas.
As discussed in Chapter 5, The Heinz Center-funded research team at George
Washington University observed that development density was 25 percent lower
in high flood hazard V-zones than in areas less susceptible to flood damage.
However, after the adoption of the NFIP, the gap narrowed.  During the early
“emergency phase,” density in V-zones averaged about 15 percent below that in
areas with lower flood risk; after the regular program began, development
density in V-zones was about 10 percent lower than in areas with lower flood
risk.13  The regular program instituted a series of changes:  Flood Insurance Rate
Maps (FIRMs) were published, insurance limits were raised, and building codes
were issued.  There is no way to estimate which of these factors was most
responsible for narrowing the gap.  Although these observed differences are
significant, the effect of the NFIP is modest in comparison to some other factors,
such as the rapid growth rates that prevail in coastal areas in general.
Again, at first glance, one might conclude that an erosion surcharge would spur
development.  However, The Heinz Center does not support this interpretation
for the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.  Flood-related erosion damage already is
reimbursed under the NFIP; thus, the question is not whether to pay for such
coverage, only whether to charge separately for it.  Although insuring damage
may have led to increased development density in the past, charging for the
coverage, when it is now offered free of charge, can be expected to lower rates
of development.
If Congress does choose to direct FEMA to establish an erosion surcharge, then
Congressional guidance regarding several additional policy questions would be
useful to the FIA administrator.  These questions are listed in Box 6.2 and
discussed below.
                                                          
13  As discussed in Chapter 5, although development density increased, overall damage as a
result of the program is expected to be lower than it would have been because houses are
better built as a result of the program’s new building codes.
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BOX 6.2  Questions to be Addressed in Designing an Erosion Surcharge
1. Should the “flood component” of insurance rates for current policyholders be
altered?
2. How many risk zones should there be?
3. Should all structures within a minimum number of feet of the shore, regardless
of the erosion rate of that shoreline, be included in the erosion risk zone?
4. Should the existing subsidy policies of the flood program also apply to the
erosion surcharge?
5. Will coverage include losses from “sunny day erosion”?
Should the “Flood Component” of Insurance Rates for Current Policyholders be
Altered?
First, Congress could provide guidance to FEMA regarding how the existing
flood insurance rate structure should be affected by the new surcharge program.
If the policyholders in areas with high erosion are required to pay a surcharge,
then should those in low or non-eroding areas be given reduced insurance rates?
The Heinz Center analyses indicate that, unless Congress chooses to subsidize
the current flood insurance policyholders for a risk that is currently being
underestimated, it should avoid doing so.
The existing rate structure for new construction in the high hazard flood zone
(V-zone) was devised by FEMA in the early 1980s by melding a simplified
engineering damage model with observations of damage that occurred during a
few major storms (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1981).  Insurance
rates are determined primarily by the elevation of a structure compared to the
expected wave crest height during a 100-year storm, and by a few other
characteristics of the structure itself.  Erosion-related damage was incorporated
indirectly into FEMA’s estimate of expected damage insofar as it was a factor in
the storms analyzed, but the effects of long-term erosion are not included in a
systematic fashion.  In Chapter 5, it was estimated that, within the V-zones of
the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, expected erosion damages alone are only slightly
less than the amount estimated by FEMA’s current damage model for flood and
erosion combined.  Therefore, The Heinz Center concluded that, although some
erosion damage might be incorporated into FEMA’s current damage model, the
erosion component is too low.
Nevertheless, Congress could direct FEMA to lower the flood component of the
new insurance rate structure that separately evaluates flood and erosion risks.  Of
course, doing so would hold down rate increases to policyholders in eroding
areas and reduce rates for policyholders in non-eroding area who may have been
paying too much.  But unless this reduction in insurance rate is quite modest,
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Heinz Center analyses indicate that the damage claims, over the long term, likely
will exceed the premiums collected.
How Many Risk Zones Should There Be?
Next, Congress must guide FEMA on how fine-grained the erosion surcharge
should be—that is, how many “risk classes” should be established.  This is both
a policy judgment and a technical one.  For example, Congress could set a single
surcharge for the entire erosion zone.  The Heinz Center used an erosion zone of
60 years as the largest zone, although this certainly could be somewhat larger or
smaller.  Sixty years is almost the life of a typical house and a zone size already
in use by several states.
The key point is not the size of the zone, but rather that a single surcharge would
apply to all flood insurance policies inside the zone.  Those closest to the shore
would be paying less than their expected share of the risk, and those farthest
landward would be paying more.
A finer-grained program could establish several zones, as recommended in an
earlier report by the National Research Council (1990).  As an example, The
Heinz Center constructed a surcharge based on three zones:  0 to 10 years from
the erosion reference feature, 10 to 30 years, and 30 to 60 years from the erosion
reference feature.  For new structures, surcharges were estimated for all three
zones such that the premiums charged within each zone would cover the cost of
insurance payouts for damage.  For existing structures, separate surcharges were
developed based on two zones:  0 to 30 years from the erosion reference feature,
and 30 to 60 years.  The rationale for the less fine-grained rating scheme for
existing structures is that once a house is built, a homeowner has no way to
avoid the highest rates that would apply in the 0 to 10 year zone, except to
decline insurance.  Someone planning a structure in the highest risk areas can
choose to build elsewhere.
However, such a program might be quite difficult to implement and apply in the
field.  For an area eroding 2 ft/yr, the 0- to 10-yr erosion hazard area would be
20 feet wide.  This would be barely discernable on a map of the scale typically
used by FEMA, thus difficult for an agent to correctly identify the appropriate
classification of a structure.  Therefore, The Heinz Center also constructed an
option with a single, 0- to 60-year EHA for existing structures and two zones, 0-
to 20-year EHA and 20- to 40-year EHA, for new structures.
Approximate rate increases for a series of surcharge options are presented in the
following five tables.  Table 6.2 provides surcharges for the simplest, the single-
zone option in which the same surcharge applies to all structures, existing and
new, throughout the entire 60-year erosion zone.  Table 6.3 displays the
surcharges for a program based on a single zone for existing structures and two
zones for new structures.  Tables 6.4 and 6.5 display surcharges for options that
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include two zones for existing structures and three for new ones.  Table 6.4
provides rates for a fixed fee over the life of the structure. Table 6.5 shows a
sliding scale with surcharges rising as a house advances to zones closer to the
erosion reference feature.   Finally, Table 6.6 shows an option where surcharges
apply only after a structure enters the 0 to 30 year zone.
The surcharges assume that FEMA remaps the erosion zones every 10 years and
after every large erosion event.  The tables display the surcharges that apply
when the program begins, and the new surcharges that would apply if a structure
is found to be closer to the shoreline in a subsequent remapping.  Again, these
are surcharges that are added to flood insurance rates.
Option 4 (Table 6.5) charges lower rates to start for structures that are estimated
to be 30 to 60 years away from the eroding shore.  However, if the fund is to
remain revenue neutral, then the surcharge must be raised after erosion results in
a structure being located closer to the shore.  Such a sliding scale may seem to be
the fairest approach, but it is more complicated to administer and more likely to
result in revenue losses if a major storm hits in the early years of the program.
Another factor in this choice of surcharge options is the effect that the new
insurance price might have on program enrollment.  Flood insurance is required
for holders of federally backed mortgages, but over half of the houses in The
Heinz Center sample do not fall in this category.  Flood insurance is optional for
those able to finance without federally backed loans.  In the mail survey by the
research group at the University of Georgia, homeowners were asked how much
they would be willing to pay for optional erosion insurance.  The analyzed
results are shown in Figure 6.3.
About half of the policyholders stated that they would be willing to pay for
optional erosion insurance if it cost less than $1−$2/yr per $100 of coverage.
However, at rates of $5/yr per $100 of coverage, voluntary participation would
be quite low.  Accordingly, one might anticipate that, under a program
establishing a single, uniform surcharge across the 60-year EHA, most of the
homeowners that voluntarily buy flood insurance today would maintain coverage
with the surcharge added.  However, with surcharges of the magnitude of those
shown for the multi-zone options, many of these same homeowners might drop
their insurance.
Within The Heinz Center study areas, roughly 41 percent of the property owners
purchased flood insurance.  Approximately 32 percent were required to have it to
obtain federally backed loans, and the remaining 9 percent of owners purchased
it voluntarily.
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TABLE 6.2  Surcharge Option 1, Surchargesa Fixed for Life of Structure, Single 60-
year Zone









0- to 60-year EHAc $2.75 $2.45 $0.75
Outside 60-year EHA
     When in 0- to 60-year zone $0.95 $0.95 $0.35
     When outside 60-year zone $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
a  Surcharges are given in dollars per year per $100 of coverage for a 1-4 family residence.
Rates for new structures and post-1981 structures are calculated to be revenue neutral within
each zone.  Assumptions:  Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) pays for 85 percent of
damage (remainder is wind damage paid for by private insurers); interest rate is 3 percent;
FIA overhead is 35 percent; subsidized structures pay 38 percent of post-81 rates.
Surcharges for existing structures are based on observed distribution of structures within a
zone; surcharges for new structures assume a random distribution of structures within zones.
b  New structures assumed to be randomly distributed; location of existing structures based
on observed distribution within Atlantic Coast counties.
c  Erosion hazard area.
TABLE 6.3  Surcharge Option 2, Surcharge a Fixed for Life of Structure, Single
Zone for Existing Structures, Two Zones for New Structures








0- to 20-year EHAc $11.40 $2.45 $.75
20- to 60-year EHA   $1.75 $2.45 $.75
Outside 60-year EHA
     When in 0- to 60-year zone   $0.95 $0.95 $0.35
     When outside 60-year zone   $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
a,b,c  See footnotes in Table 6.2
TABLE 6.4  Surcharge Option 3, Surcharge a Fixed for Life of Structure, Two Zones
for Existing Structures, Three Zones for New Structures








0- to 10-year EHAc $24.60 $7.60 $2.90
10- to 30-year EHA   $4.90 $7.60 $2.90
30- to 60-year EHA   $1.40 $1.30 $0.50
Outside 60-year EHA
     When in 0- to 60-year zone   $0.95 $0.95 $0.35
     When outside 60-year zone   $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
a,b,c  See footnotes in Table 6.2
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TABLE 6.5:  Surcharge Option 4, Surcharge a Varies Over Life of Structure for
Those Starting in 30- to 60-year Erosion Hazard Area








0- to 10-year EHAc $24.60 $7.60 $2.90
10- to 30-year EHA   $4.90 $7.60 $2.15
30- to 60-year EHA
     When in 0- to 30-year zone   $2.05 $1.85 $0.70
     When in 30- to 60-year zone   $1.00 $1.00 $0.40
Outside 60-year EHA
     When in 0- to 30-year zone   $1.50 $1.50 $0.60
     When in 30- to 60-year zone   $0.75 $0.75 $0.30
     When outside 60-year zone   $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
a,b,c  See footnotes in Table 6.2
TABLE 6.6  Surcharge Option 5, Surcharge a Required Only for Structures Inside
30-year Erosion Hazard Area








0- to 10-year EHAc $24.60 $7.60 $2.90
10- to 30-year EHA   $4.90 $7.60 $2.90
Outside 30 year EHA
     When in 0- to 30-year zone   $3.60 $3.60 $1.35
     When outside 30-year zone   $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
a,b,c  See footnotes in Table 6.2
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$0.00 $1.00 $2.00 $3.00 $4.00 $5.00 $6.00













FIGURE 6.3  The percentage of homeowners willing to voluntarily
purchase e osion policies declines as the cost rises.
Should All Structures Within a Minimum Number of Feet of the Shore, Regardless
of the Erosion Rate of that Shoreline, Be Included in the Erosion Risk Zone?
All of the surcharge alternatives presented in the preceding section are based on
expected long-term erosion rates alone, estimated from the movement of the
shoreline over many decades.  Although the shore may appear to be consistently
eroding, in many areas it is not.  Sometimes large storms can cause very large
movements of the shore inland, far past what is expected based on the long-term
trend.  Over a period of a few years to a decade, the beach accretes partway, but not
all the way, back to its old location (as illustrated earlier, in Figure 6.1).  Although
the beach may return by itself, a house that was lost to erosion obviously will not.
Thus, even in areas with low long-term erosion rates, houses close to the shore face
some risk of damage because of erosion.
Figure 6.4 displays data for 14 large storm-related erosion events recorded along
eight sections of the Atlantic Coast since about 1850.  The variability is high, but
the average distance eroded is about 140 ft inland—the distance one might expect
after 70 years given a rather typical long-term erosion rate of 2 ft/yr.  Figure 6.5
plots the erosion distances of these very large events against the long-term erosion
rate of the relevant section of the coast to determine if there is any relationship.  In
these eight sections of the coast—chosen only for the length of record available and
frequency of remapping—no relationship is apparent.  A house 50 or 100 ft inland,
no matter how low its long-term erosion rate, appears to be susceptible to large
erosion events.
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FIGURE 6.4  The extent of shore erosion varied widely among 14 major storm
events on eight sections of the Atlantic Coast, 1850−present.
Major Erosion Events, 8 regions
-400-350-300-250-200-150-100-500
Fire Island, NY; 1933
Fire Island, NY; 1962
Fire Island, NY; 1933
Fire Island, NY; 1962
Fire Island, NY; 1933
Fire Island, NY; 1962
Fire Island, NY; 1933
Fire Island, NY; 1962
Indian River Inlet, DE; 1929
Indian River Inlet, DE; 1960
Indian River Inlet, DE; 1970
Fenwick Island, DE; 1962
Assateague Island, VA; 1962
Hatteras Island, NC; 1963
feet
FIGURE 6.5  The extent of shore erosion during major storms is unrelated to long-
term erosion rates, as illustrated by this plot for 14 major storm events on eight
sections of the Atlantic Coast, 1850-present.
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Thus, in principle, it seems appropriate to use distance in feet from the shoreline
as a criterion for defining the EHA, in addition to the 10-year, 30-year, and 60-
year zones discussed previously.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to gather
sufficient data to quantify this risk and estimate insurance rates similar to those
presented in the preceding section.  It is possible to state that, in the eight areas
depicted in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5, major storm events occur, on average,
once or twice every century, and, at this frequency, erosion distances of 100 to
150 ft inland are not unusual.  Figure 6.6 presents estimates of the structures that
would be added to the 30-year and 60-year EHAs along the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts if a “distance buffer” were included to account for these large, infrequent
erosion events.  For example, 27 percent of structures within 500 ft of the
Atlantic and Gulf shorelines are located within the 60-year EHA.  Adding a
buffer zone that includes all houses within 100 ft of the shore expands the EHA
to include 31 percent of structures within 500 ft of the shore.
FIGURE 6.6  The use of a distance buffer as a criterion for inclusion in an erosion
hazard area generally would increase the number of structures affected.
Percent of Structures  Within 500 Feet from Shore
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
          30 year
erosion hazard area
30 year EHA or 50 ft.
from shore
30 year EHA or 100 ft.
from shore
60 year erosion hazard
area
60 year EHA or 50 ft.
from shore
60 year EHA or 100 ft.
from shore
60 year EHA or 150 ft.
from shore
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Should the Existing Subsidy Policies of the Flood Program Apply to the Erosion
Surcharge?
A fourth decision that Congress must make is whether to subsidize the erosion
surcharge for policyholders who either do or can obtain subsidized flood
insurance today—or even subsidize the erosion surcharge for all existing
structures.
Roughly 70 percent of the structures in V-zones were built prior to 1981 and
thus eligible for some subsidy.  Over half were built prior to the issuance of a
FIRM and are eligible for insurance rates that are between 35 and 40 percent of
the rates they would pay if the structure had been built after the issuance of a
FIRM (See Table 6.1).   However, not all eligible policyholders choose to follow
the rules that apply to subsidized structures.  A policyholder with an older house
that was built high enough may pay less for insurance under the full-risk rates
than by following the procedures used to set subsidized rates.
As mentioned earlier, erosion coverage has been a de facto part of the current
program, thus many policyholders now have subsidized erosion coverage.
Congress could take this opportunity to eliminate at least part of the subsidy, or,
if there is a desire to maintain it, direct FEMA to reduce the surcharge for these
policyholders by a percentage equivalent to that they already receive.  Congress
must also decide whether to extend subsidies to those who are eligible for it
today, but who have declined to accept it.
Congress could also instruct FEMA to offer subsidized rates to all current
policyholders.  This was the approach followed during the last major revision of
V-zone policy in 1981.  At that time, FEMA revised its procedure for estimating
expected flood heights upward.  Many structures that were built to what were
thought to be safe levels are now understood to be at greater risk.  FEMA
followed the principle that structures that were built prior to full knowledge of
the risk should not be charged full-risk rates.  Today, however, roughly 70
percent of available lots in the 60-yr EHA already have houses. Thus, if
Congress chooses to follow this principle for erosion, few structures would ever
be charged rates sufficient to cover the risks that they face.
Will Coverage Include Losses from “Sunny Day Erosion”?
Finally, Congress must decide whether to expand the coverage of the current
flood program.  Under the current program, erosion-related damage to structures
that occurs during times when there is no flooding (i.e., so-called “sunny day
erosion”) is not covered.  Except for situations in which houses are situated on
bluffs (e.g., along the Great Lakes and parts of the West Coast), most erosion-
related damage appears to occur during storm events.
The FIA’s claims records include very few instances of claims being denied
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because they were caused by sunny day erosion.  There was some concern that
this apparent lack of evidence might be misleading, because insurance agents
might be discouraging their clients from pursuing such claims at all.  One
member of The Heinz Center research team, a former insurance industry actuary,
conducted a telephone survey of 16 insurance agents active within the study
counties to determine the extent to which claims of sunny day erosion have been
discouraged.  None of the agents knew firsthand of damage from sunny day
erosion or of claims being discouraged.  Thus, if Congress chooses to
incorporate erosion damage explicitly into the rate structure, then it also might
choose to expand coverage to include damages that occur during times when
there is no flooding, with an expectation of only modest increases in the number
of claims.
Option 5:  Erosion Surcharge Combined with Regulatory and
Similar Measures to Lower Damages
As discussed in Chapter 3, the current NFIP includes both “carrots” (insurance)
and “sticks” (regulatory requirements).  The Congress established a program that
offers homeowners within a participating community the benefits of federally
backed flood insurance only if the community is willing to undertake regulatory
measures that will help to lower future damages.  Chief among these measures
are building standards that require that houses be elevated so that the first floor
is higher than the flood crest expected from a 100-year storm.
Congress might choose to apply the same philosophy to an expanded insurance
program that includes an erosion surcharge, such as the ones discussed in the
previous section.  Box 6.3 presents a series of regulatory and other restrictive
options that could be required along with an erosion surcharge.  Like the
measures in the current program, most of these would apply to structures built
after the date on which new regulations are issued.
Several of these measures would be implemented by the local communities and
states, which already are responsible for the bulk of the NFIP regulatory
requirements.  Regulatory requirements for setbacks already have been
implemented in roughly three-quarters of coastal states and territories.  Setback
requirements limit building within a specified distance from the shoreline, for
example, 75 ft from the shoreline in Maryland or outside the expected 30-year
erosion zone in New Jersey.  Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 summarize, using different
criteria, the highly varied regulations currently in place (see Chapter 4 for more
information.)  Congress could direct FEMA to establish a minimum requirement
that communities must adopt to remain eligible for the new combined flood and
erosion insurance.  States would be free to specify more restrictive requirements.
A setback specified in years from the shoreline would be most consistent with
the insurance surcharge discussed in the previous option.  Table 6.9 displays
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estimates of the impact of setback requirements on property owners along the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts.  For this analysis, it was assumed that owners of empty
lots that do not have at least 50 ft behind the stated setback distance will lose the
option to build a house.  The Table displays the percentage of currently empty
lots within 500 ft of the shoreline that would not have adequate room for a house
if a setback requirement were adopted.  Note, however, that many of these lots
are already affected by state requirements (see Tables 6.7 and 6.8), in particular
those on the Atlantic and those closest to the shoreline.
A 60-year setback requirement would constrain development on approximately
one-third of the empty lots within 500 ft of the shore.  A 30-year setback would
prevent development on roughly 20 percent of currently empty lots within 500 ft
of the Atlantic coast and about 10 percent on the Gulf.  Finally, a 10-year
setback would prevent development on approximately 15 percent of currently
empty lots within 500 ft of the Atlantic coast and fewer than 5 percent on the
Gulf.
The adoption of an additional setback requirement measured in feet would add a
margin of safety for those areas in which long-term erosion rates may be low (or
those with accreting shorelines), but that are still susceptible to storm-induced
erosion events.  Minimum requirements for both criteria (e.g., 10 years or 50 ft,
whichever is greater) would be the most robust option.  North Carolina follows
this approach, requiring a setback landward of the 30-year erosion line and at
least 60 ft from the first line of stable vegetation.
BOX 6.3   Possible Regulatory Guidelines and
Other Restrictive Measures to Lower Damages
Regulatory measures that the local community must adopt to qualify for insurance:
• mandatory setback provisions for new construction;
• building code changes to allow for easy relocation of structures, and requirements for
removal if a structure gets too close to the shoreline; and
• other building code changes.
Measures that must be mandated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency:
• denial of insurance for new structures in highest-risk erosion zones; and
• revocation of insurance for structures that end up in highest-risk erosion zones.
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TABLE 6.7  State Coastal Setback Provisions Using Erosion Rate or Combination of Measuresa
FL 30-year erosion line for major structures from SHWL
MI Bluff high risk area setback 30-year erosion projection plus 15 feet (ft)
NC Structures less than 5,000 ft2, setback landward of 30-year erosion rate, crest of primary dune, toe of
frontal dune, 60 ft from first line of stable vegetation.  For lots platted before law: structures greater
than 5,000 ft2, 60-year erosion rate or 120 ft from mean vegetation line
NJ V-zone setback for residential; 30-year erosion for 1−4 DU; 60-year erosion setback for larger
structures in erosion hazard areas; baseline for setback varies by site (crest of coastal bluff, dune
crest, first line of vegetation, landward edge of 8-ft elevation)
PA Bluff setback of 50 times annual rate of recession from the bluff face for residential; 75 times for
commercial, at least 50 ft
RI 50 ft from coastal features or 25 ft from coastal buffer zone; 30-yr erosion rate for 1−4 DU, 60-year
erosion rate for larger structures in critical erosion areas; dune construction setback on 3 barrier
beaches seaward of utilities/wall of existing development; no development on beach face, sand dune,
undeveloped barrier beaches
VA 30-year erosion rate or 20 times local recession rate from MHW for barrier islands
a  Two states (CA, WA) have local setbacks; six states (AK, CT, GA, LA, MA, MS) have no
setbacks.  No data available on MN.
TABLE 6.8  State Coastal Setback Provisions Using Distance and Various Other Measures a
AL 1040 feet (ft) landward of crest line (120−450 ft landward of MHWL)
AR 25 ft for residential; 50 ft for commercial
DE 100 ft landward of seaward-most 7-ft elevation above NGVD
HI 40 ft along most shorelines to upper reaches of wash of waves, usually evidenced by edge of
vegetation growth, debris.
MD 75 ft from NHW
MI Sand dune setback 100 ft landward from crest of first landward ridge not a foredune
ME No structures on frontal dunes seaward of 100-year floodplain and sea level rise area; shoreline
setback 75 ft for residential; 25 ft for general development/commercial; 250 ft from NHWL in
resource protection areas
NH 100 ft from HOTL bordering tidal waters
NY No moveable structures or major additions within environmental hazard areas
OR No building within beach zone; no building on beaches, active foredunes, other conditionally stable
foredunes subject to ocean undercutting and wave overtopping, and or intertidal plains subject to
ocean flooding
SC From MHW to crest of primary oceanfront sand dunes
TX No construction is permitted seaward of the vegetation line.  Structures erected seaward of the
vegetation line (or other applicable easement boundary) or that become seaward of the vegetation
line as a result of natural processes are subject to removal.
WI 75 ft from OMHW
a  See Footnotes in Table 6.3(a).
  Key:
APC            Area of Particular Concern NGVD     National Geodetic Vertical Datum
DU              Dwelling Unit NHWL     Normal High Water Line
HOTL         High Ordinary Tide Line OHWL     Ordinary High Water Line
MHW          Mean High Water OMHW    Ordinary Mean High Water
MHW(L)     Mean High Water (Level) SF             Single Family housing units
MLT            Mean Low Tide SHWL      Seasonal High Water Line
SOURCE:  Bernd-Cohen and Gordon (1998).
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TABLE 6.9  Unbuilt Parcels Affected by Setback Requirements
Type of Setback in
Force
Empty Lots Within 500 ft
of Atlantic Coast with No
Room for House a
Empty Lots Within 500 ft
of Gulf of Mexico With
No Room for House
10-year setback 14%   3%
30-year setback 20% 12%
60-year setback 32% 29%
a  Lots that do not have at least 50 feet outside the setback zone are considered unbuildable.
Many of these lots are already affected by state requirements.
A key issue associated with this option for Congress is whether the public
benefits of setback requirements outweigh the potential hardship from imposing
restrictions on how individuals may use their land.  Platt (1999), in an
examination of natural hazards policy, addresses the other side of the question
this way:  “How much should communities and individuals be expected (read
‘required’) to do for themselves as a condition of federal assistance?”
Homeowners located along an eroding shore receive two major types of federal
assistance.  First, the federal government began the NFIP because private insurers
were unwilling to insure flood and erosion risks.  By making insurance widely
available, even with the changes proposed under the previous option to align rates
more closely with the total risk to coastal houses, the government provides
enormous help to many communities. Second, if a developed strip of shore is
eroded by a major storm and a disaster is declared, public funds will likely be
used to help the community recover.  Typical activities include debris removal,
road and beach access repair, increased costs of fire and police protection, berm
and bulkhead repairs, and similar assistance to communities (rather than
individuals).  The federal government’s share of these “public” costs is 75%; the
communities receiving the aid pay the remaining 25%.  In some circumstances,
however, the federal government’s share of disaster assistance costs can increase
(Carl Frontin, Federal Emergency Management Agency, personal
communication, March 10, 2000).14
Some but not all of future public assistance costs might be avoided if a setback
were to be required.  The Heinz Center attempted to estimate how such avoidable
public disaster assistance costs compare to private damage claims for three major
storms in two of its study sites:  Hurricane Hugo in 1989 in Brunswick County,
North Carolina;  Hurricane Fran in 1996, again in Brunswick County; and a major
nor’easter in 1992 in Sussex County, Delaware.  This type of comparison can
provide a rough indication of the magnitude of taxpayer subsidy potentially
avoidable through setbacks.
                                                          
14 For example, in 1996 after Hurricane Fran, the Federal government paid 90% of total
disaster assistance costs.
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Summed over the three storms, Federal public assistance for flood- and erosion-
related damage to the coastal communities of Brunswick and Sussex County
totaled about $1.9 million (FEMA, 2000).  Again, not all of these costs would
have been avoided if a setback had been in effect.  To get an idea of the impact of
setbacks on reducing damage, public assistance funds were further broken down
into two categories: those that would be affected by a setback (e.g., repair of sand
fences and bulkheads) and those that would not (e.g., rebuilding of public beach
accesses and facilities).  Averaged over the three storms, approximately 15% to
35% of the $1.9 million paid by the Federal government for public assistance—
$300,000 to $700,000—might have been avoided if all houses had been setback
from the coast.
For comparison, the NFIP paid about $20 million in claims to V-zone
homeowners during these storms.  Thus, for the small sample of storms and
counties examined, potentially avoidable Federal public assistance costs were
roughly equal to 1 to 3 percent of the private claims paid by the FIA.
The results were highly variable from storm to storm, however, and thus must be
used with some caution. For Hurricane Hugo in Brunswick County and the large
nor’easter in Sussex County, the magnitude of potentially avoidable taxpayer
assistance equaled roughly 1 to 2 percent of insured claims.   For Hurricane Fran
in Brunswick County, potentially avoidable disaster assistance costs were equal to
roughly 50 to 80 percent of the flood insurance claims paid by FIA.
Assuming these results are representative, however, the magnitude of avoided
public assistance does not appear to be a sufficient reason to justify Federally
mandated setbacks.  (The sample covers roughly 6 percent of total V-zone claims
during the 13-year period between 1986 and 1998.)  However, further
examination of historic experience is needed.
Another option available to Congress is to direct FEMA to require communities
to adopt building code changes to reduce the impacts of erosion-related damages.
For example, structures could be designed so that they could be moved and
relocated more easily in the event that an eroding shore gets too close.  Removal
of a structure that ends up within, for example, the 10-year erosion line also could
be required.
Congress could follow a different path if there is hesitancy to assign additional
regulatory burdens to states and localities.  They might simply choose to deny
insurance—for both flooding and erosion—to new structures in the highest-risk
erosion zones.   Building in these areas would not be prohibited, but the lack of
availability of federal insurance would tend to discourage the rate of
development.  This is similar to the approach followed in the Coastal Barrier
Resources Act, discussed in Chapter 3.
EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS
172
Congress might also choose to deny or revoke insurance for all structures that end
up in the highest-risk zones, such as on the ocean side of the 10-year line.  This
would be an incentive for the owners of such structures to move them prior to
damage.  Congress could limit this option to structures built after a specified date,
that is, to “grandfather” structures built prior to the regulation.  Currently, FEMA
can deny insurance to structures that are on the ocean side of the mean high water
line, but it is unclear how often insurance is revoked once it has been issued.
Option 6:  Flood-related Regulatory Changes in Erosion Zones
Current building codes under the NFIP are based on the assumption that the
height and wave velocity from the expected 100-year flood will remain constant
over the life of the structure.  Chapter 5 presented results indicating this
assumption is invalid for erosion-prone areas.  Over time, erosion increases the
risk from flooding.
To deal with this problem, Congress could instruct FEMA to require newly
constructed houses, or houses rebuilt after substantial damage, that are located in
flood zones also susceptible to erosion to meet building codes with an added
margin of safety based on the anticipated erosion of the coast.  For example, if
Congress chose a 30-year margin of safety, then any new house expected to enter
the V-zone within 30 years—even though it may be outside of the V-zone
today—would be required to build to the more stringent V-zone standards.
Throughout the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the stricter building standards would
apply to an area 15 percent larger than today’s V-zone.
Similarly, the height of a flood crest from a 100-year storm in an eroding area is
likely to be higher in 30 years than it is today.  Averaged across the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts, flood heights are likely to be 8 inches higher in 30 years than they are
today.  The addition of a margin of safety would mean that new homes in such
erosion-prone areas might be elevated an additional 0.5 ft to 1 ft.
It was not possible to ascertain how large a margin of safety would be cost-
effective.  Clearly, building in additional flood resistance is cheaper during the
design and building phases than it is after a structure has been built.  But the
larger the margin of safety, the less likely that the additional investment will pay
off in a reasonable amount of time.  Congress could specify its intent for the
margin of safety (e.g., cost-effective at current interest rates over 30 years) and
direct FEMA to design the appropriate regulatory changes.  Such changes might
include elevating structures somewhat higher and even simpler modifications,
such as stronger deck and joist supports.
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Option 7:  Offer Erosion Insurance in Bluff Areas Susceptible to
Erosion but not Flooding
Approximately 20 percent of the homes within a 60-year EHA nationwide are
located on bluffs.  Most homes in low-lying erosion zones are also subject to
flooding; roughly half of these have flood insurance.  In contrast, 10 percent or
fewer of the susceptible structures in the bluff areas of the Great Lakes and
Pacific coasts are covered.
Coverage may be low in bluff areas because the National Flood Insurance Act, as
amended in 1973, limits coverage of erosion damage to that “caused by waves or
currents of waters exceeding anticipated cyclical levels.”  Hence, there at least
appears to be a greater likelihood of a claim being rejected for bluff areas than for
low-lying areas.  For most houses on bluffs, flooding is not a problem, so the
uncertain prospect of being reimbursed for erosion damage may be enough to
discourage the purchase of insurance.  Coverage might also be low because
homeowners are not aware of, or are not willing to believe, the risks they face.
Although the magnitude of erosion losses is lower in the bluff areas of the Great
Lakes and Pacific coasts than along the Atlantic and Gulf, expected annual
damages are roughly $100 million per year.  Congress may wish to help alleviate
the hardship from erosion in bluff areas, too, and modify the NFIP rules so that
insurance is more attractive.
If Congress does choose to expand insurance coverage in bluff areas, then it
should carefully consider the potential for such coverage to encourage
development in eroding areas.  The NFIP appears to have contributed to increased
development in flood-prone areas, but, because of the effectiveness of associated
building codes, overall damage to structures has dropped.  With erosion, however,
there is no architectural solution; once the land is lost, no structure will survive.
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether offering insurance on bluffs would increase
development as it did in low-lying areas.  People may have been more willing to
build in flood prone areas because they realized that the improved building
practices, on balance, made the decision less risky than before.  Moreover, houses
insured under the early years of the NFIP were offered heavily subsidized rates.
Such subsidies make the decision to build somewhat more attractive and in theory
will lead to both greater density and damage.
Accordingly, if coverage is expanded to include existing structures on bluff areas,
Congress might construct different rules for houses not yet built.  Congress could
just refrain from offering insurance to new houses built within erosion zones after
they have been mapped and the results communicated widely.  A fairer approach
might be to offer insurance, making certain that rates are not subsidized.  The
ability to buy insurance might also be made conditional on adoption of building
codes that allow structures to be easily moved in the event that the eroding bluff
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gets too close.
Option 8:  Relocation Assistance and/or Land Acquisition
Along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, approximately 20,000 structures are located
within the 30-year erosion zone closest to the shore.  The Heinz Center estimates
that roughly 10,000 structures are within the estimated 10-year erosion zone
closest to the shore, subject to an even more imminent hazard.  For such high-risk
structures, Congress might consider a program of relocation assistance and/or
land acquisition to encourage removal of these structures before they are
destroyed.
Relocation Assistance
Under current policy, if an insured building is damaged by a flood and the state or
community declares the building to be substantially damaged, the NFIP will help
pay to relocate the structure, up to a maximum benefit of $15,000  ($20,000 after
May 1, 2000).  This is in addition to coverage for repair of physical damage from
flooding.
Between 1987 and 1994, the Upton-Jones Program of the NFIP offered
policyholders in the highest-risk erosion zones the option of receiving 40 percent
of the insured value of the structure for removal or up to 110 percent of the value
of the structure if demolished.  The program resulted in payments for about 600
structures, only one-quarter of which were relocated.  The program was
considered a failure and eliminated in 1994.
Such a program might make more sense if linked to some of the regulatory
options discussed under Option 5 above.  If, for example, Congress chooses to
revoke insurance once a structure enters the 10-year erosion zone, or to require
relocation as a condition for obtaining insurance, then relocation or demolition
assistance can be viewed as compensation for the loss of use of the coastal
property or the drop in value because of the loss of insurance.  Although few
policyholders made use of relocation assistance under the Upton-Jones Program,
it seems reasonable to conclude that many more would be willing to do so if they
were about to lose their flood insurance.
Land Acquisition
Currently, 21 coastal states have acquisition and relocation policies or programs
specifically for hazard mitigation purposes in flood-prone or high erosion hazard
areas.  Thirteen of these 21 states have dedicated funds for direct state acquisition
or local acquisition.  In addition, many states help local governments obtain
federal post-disaster funds.  To date, land acquisition has been modest in
oceanfront areas because of high land values.
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However, as a result of damage from Hurricane Floyd in 1999, North Carolina
will spend a few million dollars of both state and federal money on buyouts.  New
Jersey is considering post-Floyd buyouts as well.  Such buyouts, or acquisition of
property, are a risk-reduction activity funded under FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program (HMGP).  This program uses a percentage of the federal money
spent on recovering from a disaster for projects that reduce future risk, including
erosion risk.  By law, FEMA can contribute 15 percent of a disaster’s cost to this
grant program.  About 20,000 properties have been purchased nationally as part
of this program since 1993, but, again, few have been in coastal areas.  Buyout
projects, although 75 percent funded by FEMA, are administered by the state and
local communities.  Under the rules for buyouts funded by FEMA, the space
bought out is deeded permanently as open land.
There are two advantages of a hazard mitigation acquisition program.  First,
acquisition offers a way to permanently reduce or eliminate susceptibility to flood
damage in the highest-risk areas.  Second, acquisition can be used to achieve
environmental protection goals (e.g., preservation of ecologically important
wetlands, maritime forest, estuarine ecosystems, and beachfront areas) and
community goals (e.g., provision of open space, parks, and public beach access).
Disadvantages include the substantial expense of acquisition itself and other
costs, such as foregone local property taxes and long-term maintenance burden
expenses, including liability (Godschalk et al., 1998).  Mandatory programs also
would provoke objections from private landowners.
To date, the primary purpose for land acquisition by governments at all levels and
not-for-profit organizations has been to provide recreational and aesthetic
opportunities and preserve natural areas.  Any reduction in damage from coastal
hazard is, for the most part, incidental to these programs.  Through private,
community, state, and federal programs of land acquisition and conservation
easements, natural areas are preserved, maintained or restored; fish, wildlife, and
other natural resources are protected; parks, beaches, launching ramps, and open
space are provided in developed areas; deteriorating urban waterfronts are
restored; and general public access to the shore is encouraged.
At the federal level, most existing programs are funded by the Land and Water
Conservation Fund, which draws revenues from federal offshore oil sales.
However, there is little direct acquisition of coastal property by the federal
government; purchases are localized and used mainly to complete assemblages of
existing national parks, seashores, and monuments.
Many states have similar acquisition programs, as do some communities and
many private, non-profit land trusts.  For example, North Carolina’s Coastal
Reserve and Public Access Program has been actively acquiring coastal areas for
resource preservation, public waterfront access, and hazard mitigation purposes.
Some of these projects have included the acquisition and relocation of roughly
500 residences in several coastal plain communities.  A 1998 survey found that,
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of approximately 1,200 land trusts surveyed, 17 percent were primarily or very
involved in protecting coastlines (Land Trust Alliance, 1998).  The Nature
Conservancy, established in 1950 to preserve endangered species, has become a
major buyer of coastal property.  The Conservancy buys available land and sells it
mainly to government agencies that agree not to develop it, and encourages
landowners to donate or voluntarily establish permanent restrictions on
development through conservation easements (Dean, 1999).
In the Fiscal 2000 Omnibus Appropriations Bill (P.L. 106-113), $600 million was
set aside for the Administration’s Lands Legacy Initiative, including $420 million
for federal land acquisition programs through the Land and Water Conservation
Fund (U.S. Congress, 1999; Wilderness Society, 1999).  Expanded activity also is
evident in the states; Maine, for example, will hold a referendum on a $50 million
bond issue for land acquisition.
Currently, there is little linkage between programs designed to acquire land for
flood and erosion hazard mitigation and those that acquire coastal lands for
recreational, aesthetic, and environmental protection benefits.  Congress could
instruct FEMA to pay increased attention to these other benefits under the
HMGP, and to coordinate with other agencies to ensure that mitigation benefits
are considered to an adequate degree in other land acquisition programs.
Option 9:  Shoreline Protection Measures
With the exception of relocation, none of the options presented above prevent
erosion damage to structures that are already built.  As the shoreline moves
inland, the structures and land in its path will be lost.  Insurance can help
compensate for these losses but clearly cannot prevent losses to houses already
built.  Regulatory measures may be effective in averting damage to new
structures, but, again, except for relocation, they are irrelevant to owners of
existing property.
The attraction of shoreline protection measures to current property owners is
clear, especially in areas with a high density of existing structures and limited
shoreline.  As reviewed in Chapter 4, these measures include beach nourishment,
dune restoration, and armoring of the shoreline with hard structures.  Individuals,
communities, and states already support many such projects.  The federal
government, primarily the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), has been an
active sponsor of shoreline protection measures.  The USACE spent about $880
million between 1950 and 1993 (in 1993 dollars) on 56 individually authorized
shore protection and beach erosion control projects.  About $700 million of the
total was for beach nourishment of about 200 miles of coast.  The total cost,
including the state and local shares, of the initial restoration and periodic beach
nourishment, exceeded $1.1 billion (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1996).
Assuming an effective life of 10 years for the initial restoration, costs have
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averaged approximately $500,000/yr per mile.  The USACE estimates that the
continued maintenance and renourishment of the 200 miles will cost roughly
$55−$60 million/yr, or $300,000/yr per mile of coastline.
The key questions for the present study are whether shoreline protection would
alter the choice or method of implementation of the other options presented
above, or vice versa.  It was well beyond the scope of this study to consider the
rationale and circumstances for federal funding of shoreline protection measures.
The preparation and distribution of erosion hazard maps that are part of any of the
other options is likely to increase the demand for shoreline protection measures as
people become more cognizant of erosion-related risks.  However, the availability
of maps covering all developed areas and prepared using uniform methods would
allow a more systematic and equitable approach to project selection and
management.  In particular, such maps allow one to estimate the magnitude of
erosion damage that might be avoided by beach nourishment for comparison to its
costs.
Expressed as damage per year per mile, the damage estimates presented in
Chapter 5 range from approximately $17,000−$480,000/yr per mile of coast.
Expected annual erosion damage exceeds nourishment costs in only one of the 10
Atlantic and Gulf coast counties in The Heinz Center sample.  Expected annual
damage in the remaining nine counties is half of the annual cost of nourishment,
or less.  Although beach nourishment also provides recreation benefits, for
federally funded shore protection projects built in the 1980s and 1990s, recreation
benefits were about one-quarter of the total (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
1996).  Thus, nourishment of additional stretches of the coast, if desired at all,
will pass a benefit-cost test for federal funding in limited, high-density areas only.
Shoreline protection measures can augment, but are not substitutes for, options
such as an erosion surcharge.
A key question for FEMA, however—if Congress chooses to add an erosion
surcharge to the current NFIP—is whether nourishment will lower the insurance
rates paid by policyholders.  Nourishment likely will reduce, but not eliminate,
erosion damage.  Nevertheless, the Congress still may want FEMA to ignore the
presence or absence of beach nourishment when setting rates, or at least offer
only modest rate reductions.  Nourishment does not, after all, permanently alter
erosion rates.  If a community abandons a nourishment program at a later date,
then it may be difficult to appropriately readjust rates.  Possibly more important,
builders of new homes may get the incorrect impression from reduced rates that
their lots are not susceptible to erosion, and they may be encouraged to build in
areas that may be subject to very high risks if, at a later date, renourishment is not
pursued.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the analyses presented in this report, The Heinz Center recommends
that Congress take, at minimum, the following two actions.  The Heinz Center
believes that these two recommendations provide significant benefits, are cost
effective, and are acceptable across most of the political spectrum.  The other
options we presented will lower damage or alleviate economic hardship should
damage occur.  Congress should consider the advantages and disadvantages of
these options within the framework of existing Federal, State, and local
programs.
Congress should instruct the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
develop erosion hazard maps that display the location and extent of coastal
areas subject to erosion.  The erosion maps should be made widely available
in both print and electronic formats.
Flood insurance rate maps do not inform current and prospective coastal
property owners of erosion risks.  The omission is substantial.  Averaged over
the highest hazard flood zone, the risk of erosion-related damage to structures is
roughly equal to the risk of flood damage.  Thus, the current maps, which show
only flood hazards, are misleading.
Without accurate information on erosion, state and local decision makers and the
general public will not be fully aware of the coastal hazards they face, nor will
they be able to make use of this information for land-use planning and erosion
hazard mitigation.
Congress should require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
include the cost of expected erosion losses when setting flood insurance rates
along the coast.
Despite facing higher risk, homeowners in erosion-prone areas currently are
paying the same amount for flood insurance as are policyholders in non-eroding
areas. FEMA should incorporate the additional risk from erosion into the
determination of actuarial rates in high-hazard coastal regions.  This will
eliminate the need for subsidies from other NFIP policyholders or taxpayers to
cover expected erosion losses.
Erosion risk can be incorporated in several ways. The simplest is to combine the
highest hazard flood zones and erosion hazard areas into a “Coastal High-Hazard
Zone.”   Erosion risk would be shared equally among all policyholders in the
new combined zone. Alternatively, FEMA could charge rates based on a refined
risk classification that separately distinguishes erosion and flood risks.  Only
those policyholders in erosion hazard areas (about one-third of the coastal high-
hazard zone) would be charged an erosion surcharge.
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Discussion of Recommendations
Given the magnitude of the risk posed by coastal erosion and the misleading
nature of the current “flood only” coastal hazard maps, FEMA should be
directed to prepare maps of erosion risks of at least the quality of current flood
maps.  Ideally, these maps should display both risks and be made available in
both paper and electronic forms.
FEMA estimates such maps, covering 12,500 miles of U.S. ocean and Great
Lakes shoreline of greatest concern, would cost approximately $44 million—less
than $5 million per year over their expected 10-year useful life.  While it is
difficult to estimate the effect such information would have on future
development decisions, the effect would not have to be large to justify the costs.
If the availability of erosion maps lowers future damage by just a few percent,
the savings would exceed the costs.  Alternative federal erosion-related
expenditures are unlikely to be more cost-effective.  For example, spending an
equivalent amount on beach nourishment would protect roughly another 10 miles
of shoreline.  And though these funds could be used to further improve existing
flood maps, far less information about erosion—a risk about equal to flood in
coastal regions—is available.
In addition to the use of erosion maps by individual homeowners and
communities, FEMA must have them if they are to include the costs of erosion
losses when setting coastal insurance rates.  As presented in Chapter 5, FEMA’s
liability for erosion losses is likely to average $80 million per year without any
further development in erosion-prone areas.  If erosion hazards are not
adequately factored into current flood insurance rates, losses will have to be
subsidized by other NFIP policyholders or taxpayers.   Losses of this level are a
small fraction of the total earned premiums collected nationwide (currently about
$1.3 billion per year), but within coastal regions, the percentage is substantial.
Table 6.10 includes estimates of insurance rate increases from several alternative
ways to charge policy holders for the cost of erosion damage.  By spreading the
costs over a newly created Coastal High Hazard Zone, rates for all policy holders
in both High Hazard Flood Zones (V-zones) and the 60-year Erosion Hazard
Area will rise roughly $.90/year per $100 of coverage.
If Congress chooses to extend subsidies to some existing structures (similar to
the current flood insurance program, which subsidizes many houses built prior to
1981), those structures would pay increases of about $.35/year per $100 of
coverage.
If rate increases are confined to only those structures in the 60-year erosion
hazard area, rates would have to rise by roughly $2.45/year per $100 of coverage
to fully cover expected losses.  Again, if Congress chooses to subsidize some (or
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all) current policyholders, following the percentages used elsewhere under the
program would lead to rate increases of roughly $1.00/year per $100 of
coverage.
Congress may prefer to treat future construction differently.  Unlike the owners
of existing houses, builders of new homes can choose where to locate. Congress
can give builders of new homes an incentive to build further back from the
shoreline within eroding areas by charging higher rates closer to the shore and
lower rates further inland.  Rate increases are shown for two zones, 0-20 and 20-
60 years.  Note that rates in the zone closest to the shoreline would have to rise
to $11.40/year per $100 of coverage—over 10 percent of the value of the house
each year.  Rate increases in the zone set back from the shoreline could then be
held to a much more modest rate, $1.75/year per $100 of coverage.
The Heinz Center’s mail survey of homeowners found that about half of flood
policyholders would be willing to buy optional erosion insurance at a cost less
than $1-$2/year per $100 of coverage (see Figure 6.3).  However, at rates
exceeding $5/year per $100 of coverage, voluntary participation would be quite
low.  Thus, most of the rate increases shown in Table 6.10 seem within the range
of public acceptability.  While the rate increase for new construction closest to
the shore may at first appear unreasonably high, to many homeowners it may
still be preferable to such alternatives as denial of insurance, or outright bans on
construction, for such risky locations.
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Combined Flood and Erosion
Coastal High Hazard Zone $0.90 $0.90 $0.35
Single Zone Erosion Hazard Area
     0- to 60-year EHA No increase  $2.45 $0.95
Two Zone Erosion Hazard Area
For New Structures
     0- to 20-year EHA No increase $11.40 N.A. c
     20- to 60-year EHA No increase   $1.75 N.A.
a  Surcharges are given in dollars per year per $100 of coverage for a 1-4 family residence.
Rates for new structures and post-1981 structures are calculated to be revenue neutral within
each zone.  Assumptions:  Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) pays for 85 percent of
damage  (remainder is wind damage paid for by private insurers); interest rate is 3 percent; FIA
overhead is 35 percent; subsidized structures pay 38 percent of post-81 rates.
b  Erosion hazard area
c  Not applicable
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AAER - Average annual erosion rate.
Accretion - May be either natural or artificial. Natural accretion is the buildup of
land, solely by the action of the forces of nature, on a beach by deposition of
water or airborne material. Artificial accretion is a similar buildup of land by
human accretions, such as accretion formed by a groin, breakwater, or beach fill
deposited by mechanical means.
A-zone - Area subject to inundation by 100-year flooding where wave action
does not occur or where waves are less than 3 feet high; designated Zone A, AE,
A1-A30, A0, AH, or AR on a Flood Insurance Rate Map.
Armor - To protect slopes form erosion and scour by flood waters. Techniques
of armoring include the use of riprap, gabions, or concrete.
Base flood - Flood that has a 1-percent probability of being equal or exceeded in
any given year. Also known as the 100-year flood.
Base Flood Elevation (BFE) - Elevation of the base flood in relation to a
specified datum, such as the National Geodetic Vertical Datum. The Base Flood
Elevation is the basis of the insurance and floodplain management requirements
of the National Flood Insurance Program.
Beach nourishment - Replacement of beach sand removed by ocean waters. It
may be brought about naturally by longshore transport or artificially by
deposition of dredged materials.
Breakaway walls - Under the National Flood Insurance Program, walls that
are not part of the structural support of the building and are designed and
constructed to break away or collapse under specified lateral loads imposed by
flood waters before transmitting damaging forces to the building and its
supporting foundation system. Breakaway walls are required by the National
Flood Insurance Program regulations for the portions of buildings below the
Base Flood Elevation in a Coastal High Hazard Area, also referred to as V-
zones, and are recommended in areas where flood waters could flow at
significant velocities (usually greater than 4 feet per second) or could contain ice
or other debris.
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Breakwater - A structure protecting a shore area, harbor, anchorage, or basin
from waves.
Building code - Regulations adopted by local governments that establish
standards for construction, modification, and repair of buildings and other
structures.
Bulkhead - Wall or other structure, often of wood, steel, or concrete, designed to
retain or prevent sliding or erosion of the land. Occasionally, bulkheads are used
to protect against wave action.
Coastal barrier - Depositional geologic feature such as a bay barrier, tombolo,
barrier spit, or barrier island that consists of unconsolidated sedimentary
materials; is subject to wave, tidal, and wind energies; and protects landward
aquatic habitats from direct wave attack.
Coastal Barrier Resource Act of 1982 (CBRA) - Act (Pub. L. 97-348) that
established the Coastal Barrier Resources System. The act  prohibits the
provision of new flood insurance coverage on or after October 1, 1983, for any
new construction or substantial improvements of structures located on any
designated undeveloped coastal barrier within the Coastal Barrier Resources
System.
Coastal flood hazard area - Area, usually along an open coast, bay, or inlet,
that is subject to inundation by storm surge and, in some instances, wave action
caused by storms or seismic forces.
Coastal High Hazard Area - Area of special flood hazard, designated Zone V,
VE, or V1-V30 on a Flood Insurance Rate Map that extends from offshore to
the inland limit of a primary frontal dune along an open coast and any other area
subject to high-velocity breaking waves of 3 feet or more in height caused by
storms or seismic forces.
Coastline - (1) Technically, the line that forms the boundary between the coast
and the shore. (2) Commonly, the line that forms the boundary between the land
and the water.
Development- Under the National Flood Insurance Program, any man-made
change to improved or unimproved real estate, including but not limited to
buildings or other structures, mining, dredging, filling, grading, paving,
excavation, or drilling operations or storage of equipment or materials.
Downdrift - The direction of predominant movement of littoral materials.
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E-zone - An area along the coast where waves and other forces are anticipated to
cause significant erosion within the next 60 years and may result in the damage
or loss of buildings and infrastructure.
Episodic erosion - Erosion induced by a single storm event. Episodic erosion
considers the vertical component of two factors: general beach profile lowering
and localized conical scour around foundation supports. Episodic erosion is
relevant to foundation embedment depth and potential undermining.
Erosion - Wearing away of the land surface by detachment and movement of
soil and rock fragments, during a flood or storm or over a period of years,
through the action of wind, water, or other geologic processes.
Erosion Hazard Area (EHA) – Area anticipated to be lost to shoreline retreat
over a given period of time.  The projected inland extent of the area is measured
in years times the average annual long-term recession rate.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) - Independent agency
created in 1978 to provide a single point of accountability for all Federal
activities related to disaster mitigation and emergency preparedness, response
and recovery. FEMA administers the National Flood Insurance Program.
Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) - The component of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency directly responsible for administering the
flood insurance aspects of the National Flood Insurance Program.
FIRM – see Flood Insurance Rate Maps.
FIS – see Flood Insurance Study.
Flood - Under the National Flood Insurance Program, a general and temporary
condition or partial or complete inundation of normally dry land areas from (1)
the overflow of inland or tidal waters, (2) the unusual and rapid accumulation or
runoff of surface waters from any source, or (3) mudflows or the sudden collapse
of shoreline land.
Flood depth - Height of the flood water surface above the ground surface.
Flood elevation - Height of the water surface above an established elevation
datum, e.g., National Geodetic Vertical Datum, North American Vertical
Datum, Mean Sea Level.
Flood hazard area - The greater of the following: (1) the Special Flood Hazard
Area or (2) the area designated as a flood hazard area on a community's legal
flood hazard map, or otherwise legally designated.
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Flood Insurance - Insurance coverage provided under the National Flood
Insurance Program.
Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) - Map of a community, prepared by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, that shows both the special hazard
areas and the risk premium zones applicable to the community. The latest FIRM
issued for a community is referred to as the "effective" FIRM.
Flood Insurance Study (FIS) -  Examination, evaluation, and determination of
flood hazards and, if appropriate, corresponding water surface elevations in a
community or communities, or examination, evaluation, and determination of
mudslide (i.e., mudflow) and/or flood-related erosion hazards in a community or
communities.
Flood-related erosion area or flood-related erosion prone area - Land area
adjoining the shore of a lake or other body of water which, because of the
composition of the shoreline or bank and high water levels or wind-driven
currents, is likely to suffer damage from erosion caused by flood forces.
Floodplain - Any land area, including watercourse, susceptible to partial or
complete inundation by water from any source.
Floodplain management - Operation of an overall program of corrective and
preventive measures for reducing flood damage, including but not limited to
emergency preparedness plans, flood control works, and floodplain management
regulations.
Frontal dune - Ridge or mound of unconsolidated sandy soil, extending
continuously alongshore landward of the sand beach and defined by relatively
steep slopes abutting markedly flatter and lower regions on each side.
Groin - A shore protection structure built (usually perpendicular to the
shoreline) to trap littoral drift or retard erosion of the shore.
High-velocity wave action - Condition in which wave heights are greater than
or equal to 3.0 feet or wave runup elevations reach 3.0 or more feet above grade.
Hurricane - Tropical cyclone, formed in the atmosphere over warm ocean areas,
in which wind speeds reach 74 miles per hour or more and blow in a large spiral
around a relatively calm center or "eye." Hurricane circulation is counter-




Jetty - A structure extending into a body of water, designed to prevent shoaling
of a channel by littoral materials and to direct and confine the stream or tidal
flow.  Jetties are built at the mouths of rivers or tidal inlets to help deepen and
stabilize a channel.
Littoral - Of or pertaining to the shore, especially of the sea.
Littoral Drift - Movement of sand by littoral (longshore) currents in a direction
parallel to the beach along the shore.
Littoral Transport - The movement of littoral drift in the littoral zone by waves
and currents. Includes movement parallel and perpendicular to the shore.
Lowest floor - The lowest floor of the lowest enclosed area (including
basement) of a structure. An unfinished or flood-resistant enclosure, usable
solely for parking of vehicles, building access, or storage in an area other than a
basement, is not considered a building's lowest floor.
Mean High Water - The average height of the high waters over a 19-year
period.
Mean Sea Level (MSL) - Average height of the sea for all stages of the tide,
usually determined from hourly height observations over a 19-year period on an
open coast or in adjacent waters having free access to the sea. See National
Geodetic Vertical Datum.
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) - Federal program created by
Congress in 1968 that makes flood insurance available in communities that enact
satisfactory floodplain management regulations.
National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD) - Datum established in 1929 and
used as a basis for measuring flood, ground, and structural elevations, previously
referred to as Sea Level Datum or Mean Sea Level. The Base Flood Elevations
shown on most of the Flood Insurance Rate Maps issued by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency are referenced to NGVD.
100-year flood - See Base Flood.
Post-FIRM - For insurance purposes, post-FIRM construction in a given
community is construction or substantial improvement of a structure that began
after December 31, 1974, or on or after the effective date of the first Flood
Insurance Rate Map for the community, whichever is later. For floodplain
management purposes, post-FIRM construction in a given community means
structures for which the start of new or substantial improvement construction
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began before the effective date of the floodplain management regulation adopted
by the community.
Primary frontal dune - Continuous or nearly continuous mound or ridge of
sand with relatively steep seaward and landward slopes immediately landward
and adjacent to the beach and subject to erosion and overtopping from high tides
and waves during major coastal storms. The inland limit of the primary frontal
dune occurs at the point where there is a distinct change from a relatively steep
slope to a relatively mild slope.
Retrofit - In floodproofing, any change made to a structure designed to reduce
or eliminate damage to that structure from flooding erosion.
Revetment – A facing of stone, cement, sandbags, or other materials built to
protect a scarp, embankment, or short structure against erosion or scour caused
by flood waters or wave action.
Sand dunes - Natural or artificial ridges or mounds of sand landward of the
beach.
Sand wave - A large wavelike sediment feature composed of sand in very
shallow water. Wavelength may reach 100 meters; amplitude is about 0.5 meter.
Scarp - An almost vertical slope along the beach caused by erosion by wave
action. It may vary in height from a few centimeters to a meter or so, depending
on wave action and the nature and composition of the beach.
Scour – Removal of soil or fill material by the flow of flood waters. The term is
frequently used to describe storm-induced, localized conical erosion around
pilings and other foundation supports where the obstruction of flow increases
turbulence.  See erosion.
Seawall - A structure separating land and water areas, primarily designed to
prevent erosion and other damage from wave actions.
SFHA – See Special Flood Hazard Area.
Shear wall - Load-bearing or non-load-bearing wall that transfers in-plane
lateral forces from lateral loads acting on a structure to its foundation.
Shore - The narrow strip of land in immediate contact with the sea, including the
zone between high and low water lines. A shore of unconsolidated material
usually is called a beach.
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Shoreline - The intersection of a specified plane of water with the shore or
beach. The line delineating the shoreline on natural ocean service nautical charts
and survey approximates the mean high water line.
Shoreline retreat - Progressive movement of the shoreline in a landward
direction caused by the composite effect of all storms considered over decades
and centuries (expressed as an annual average erosion rate). Shoreline retreat
considers the horizontal component of erosion and is relevant to long-term land
use decisions and the siting of buildings.
Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) – An area within a floodplain having a 1
percent or greater chance of flood occurrence in any given year (100-year
floodplain); represented on Flood Insurance Rate Maps by darkly shaded areas
with zone designations that include the letter A or V.
Storm surge - Rise in the water surface above normal water level on the open
coast due to the action of wind stress and atmospheric pressure on the water
surface.
Structure - Under the National Flood Insurance Program, a walled and roofed
building, including a gas or liquid storage tank, that is principally above ground,
as well as a manufactured home; for insurance coverage purposes.
Substantial damage - Damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby
the cost of restoring the structure to its before-damaged condition would equal or
exceed 50 percent of the market value of the structure before the damage.
Substantial improvement - Any reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, or
other improvement of a structure, the cost of which equals or exceeds 50 percent
of the market value of the structure before the start of construction of the
improvement. This term includes structures, which have incurred substantial
damage, regardless of the actual repair work performed.
Surge - See Storm surge.
Tsunami - Great sea wave produced by submarine earth movement or volcanic
eruption.
Undermining - Process whereby the vertical component or erosion or scour
exceeds the depth of the base of a building foundation or the level below which
the bearing strength of at the foundation is compromised.
Updrift - The direction opposite that of the predominant movement of littoral
materials.
EVALUATION OF EROSION HAZARDS
192
V-zone - also known as Coastal High Hazard Area.  Flood hazard zone that
corresponds to the 100-year floodplain that is subject to high velocity wave
action from coastal storms or seismic sources;  designated Zone VO, V1-30, VE,
or V on a Flood Insurance Rate Map.
Water surface elevation - Height of the water surface above an established
elevation datum, e.g., National Geodetic Vertical Datum, North American
Vertical Datum, Mean Sea Level, reached by floods of various magnitudes and
frequencies in the floodplains of coastal, lacustrine, and riverine areas.
Wave height - Vertical distance between a wave crest and the preceding trough.
Wind tide – The vertical rise in the stillwater level on the leeward side of a body
of water caused by wind stresses on the surface of the water.
X-zone – A flood hazard zone outside the 100-year floodplain, which have
moderate to minimal risk.  Older maps differentiate the X zone into Zones B and
C, which represent moderate and minimal flood risks, respectively.
Zone – A geographical area shown on a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM)




CBRA (Coastal Barrier Resources Act)
CBRS (Coastal Barrier Resources System)
CRS (Community Rating System)
CZMA (Coastal Zone Management Act)
CZM (Coastal Zone Management)
EHA (Erosion Hazard Area)
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
FIA (Federal Insurance Agency)
FIRM (Flood Insurance Rate Map)
GIS (Geographic Information System)
GPS (Global Positioning System)
HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development)
ICC (Increased Cost of Compliance)
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
IRC (Insurance Research Council)
NFIA (National Flood Insurance Act)
NFIF (National Flood Insurance Fund)
NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program)
NFIRA (National Flood Insurance Reform Act)
NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)
NPS (National Park Service)
NRC (National Research Council)
SBA (Small Business Administration)
SDI (Spatial Data Institute)
SFHA (Special Flood Hazard Area)
UNCED (United Nations Conference of Environment and Development)
USACE (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
USEPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency)
USFWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)






Stephen Leatherman, Chair, is Professor and Director of Florida International
University's Laboratory for Coastal Research & International Hurricane Center.
Dr. Leatherman is a nationally recognized expert in coastal erosion analysis,
computerized mapping of historical shoreline changes, and  sea-level rise impact
assessments.  He has worked directly with FEMA on numerous occasions, most
recently as a key participant in FEMA's pilot "economic impact analysis" study
in Sussex County, Delaware.  Along with Mark Crowell of FEMA, Dr.
Leatherman was the co-editor of the recently published book "Coastal Erosion
Mapping and Management" (1999, Journal of Coastal Research Special Issue).
He has also regularly provided testimony on erosion-related issues to the U.S.
Congress and served as a technical advisor to policymakers, including drafters of
the Upton-Jones Bill (part of the U.S. Housing Act of 1987).   Dr. Leatherman
has authored or edited 14 books and over 100 journal articles and reports.  He
received his B.S. in Geosciences from North Carolina State University and his
Ph.D. in Environmental (Coastal) Science from the University of Virginia.
Jeffrey R. Benoit is the Director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management
(OCRM).  His responsibility encompasses three major programs for coastal and
marine stewardship: National Coastal Zone Management, National Estuarine
Research Reserves, and National Marine Sanctuaries.  During his tenure as
OCRM Director, Mr. Benoit revitalized the National CZM Program,
championing its first expansion in over 10 years; secured state acceptance of
management plans for the Florida Keys and the Hawaiian Islands Humpback
Whale national marine sanctuaries sanctuaries; and steered the process that
created the Jacques Cousteau National Estuarine Research Reserve at Mullica
River-Great Bay in New Jersey.  Mr. Benoit has furthered discussions of
important marine issues in scientific communities around the world, and often
testifies before Congress.  He chaired NOAA’s Sustain Healthy Coasts strategic
planning team from 1994 to 1997, and chaired one of five Working Groups
established by the US Coral Reef Task Force created in 1998.  Prior to accepting
his position at OCRM, Jeff served as Coastal Geologist and later Director of
Massachusetts CZM Program.  He received his B.S. in Marine Geology from
Southampton College and Master’s Degree in Geophysical Science from
Georgia Institute of Technology.
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Michael Buckley is the Division Director, Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment Division, Mitigation Directorate, US Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).  In this capacity, he is responsible for a broad
range of activities and programs to identify and assess risk from all natural
hazards, with an emphasis on floods and flood-related hazards, earthquakes,
hurricanes, and wind.  Major programs include the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program, National Flood Insurance Program, Hurricane Program, and Dam
Safety Program.  Prior to joining FEMA in 1980, Mr. Buckley worked with a
public and private consulting engineering practice on a broad range of
responsibilities involving water resources engineering and land development.
Michael J. Colvin is a Manager with the Ohio Department of Natural Resources
(ODNR) responsible for developing and implementing Ohio Coastal
Management Program.  Mr. Colvin serves as Ohio's delegate to the national
Coastal States Organization (CSO), and chairs the Coastal Hazards Committee.
He serves on the Ohio Maritime Advisory Council, helping shape public policy
for protecting and utilizing underwater resources including shipwrecks.  Prior to
his position with the Ohio Coastal Management Program, Mr. Colvin served as
ODNR’s Environmental Review Administrator.  He has prepared and co-
authored various publications.  These include the Ohio Coastal Management
Program document and environmental impact statement (U.S. Department of
Commerce, NOAA and ODNR, March 1997), the Ohio Wetlands Priority
Conservation Plan (ODNR, 1987), ODNR Wetlands Policy (September, 1989),
and Governor’s Executive Order 90-68 on the Protection of Wetlands (October,
1990).  He served on the Ohio Supreme Court’s Board of Commissioners of the
Client Security Fund 1992-1997, serving as Vice Chair during 1996-97.  Mr.
Colvin holds a B.S. in Zoology and M.A. in Public Administration, with a
specialty in Urban Administration from The Ohio State University.
Margaret Davidson is the Director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA)  Coastal Services Center.  Ms. Davidson has been
active in coastal resource management and economic issues since 1978.  Her
professional work has focused on mitigation of coastal hazards, impacts of
climate variability on coastal resources, and environmentally-sustainable
aquaculture.  Her early experience as a lawyer in Louisiana combined with a
Master’s degree in Marine Affairs/Economics caused her to shepherd
development of a hazards initiative for the National Sea Grant Program.  Recent
efforts to coordinate development of a NOAA-wide Hazards Initiative have
contributed to the implementation of a series of local level hazards risk and
vulnerability indices with the USGS and state and local partners in Alabama,
North Carolina, Florida and Ohio.
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William G. Fry has served for over four years as the Chief Executive Officer of
Spatial Data Institute, LC., a nationwide consortium of six mapping technology
firms. In this capacity he directed the joint performance of the SDI Partner Firms
in the extremely successful Mississippi River Project, mapping over two million
acres of the U.S. Mid-West floodplains for the Corps of Engineers and US
Geological Survey.  Among other accomplishments of this innovative project,
over 4,000 man-hours of GPS surveying was completed. Prior to founding SDI,
Fry served as the Project Manager of a Technical Evaluation Contract to the
NFIP for over twenty years, and as the Project Director to FEMA's Disaster
Assistance Program's Technical Assistance Contract for over twelve years.  In
these capacities, Fry led major field operations, including mapping and
surveying, provided program consultation to FEMA, and directed over 200
technical and service personnel dedicated to FEMA initiatives. Fry received a
B.S.Civil Engineering from Duke University in 1969.  He possesses thirty years
of civil engineering and mapping experience.
Robert W. Kates, a Senior Fellow with The Heinz Center, is University
Professor Emeritus at Brown University, executive editor of Environment
Magazine and distinguished scientist at the George Perkins Marsh Institute at
Clark University.  Dr. Kates is an independent scholar with a wide range of
expertise in geography, demographic trends, and technological and natural
hazards.   Previous research includes natural hazards mitigation and adaptation,
rural resource and water development, the assessment of risk, and the impacts of
climate on society.  Dr. Kates is author, editor, or co-editor of 20 books and
monographs, and is the recipient of the 1991 National Medal of Science awarded
by the President of the United States and the MacArthur Prize Fellowship (1981-
1985).  He received his Ph.D. in geography from the University of Chicago.
Howard Kunreuther is the Cecilia Yen Koo Professor and Chairperson of the
Operations and Information Management Department at The Wharton School at
the University of Pennsylvania.  He also serves as Co-Director of the Risk
Management and Decision Processes Center.  His participation on the steering
committee brings special expertise in the areas of managing risk through loss
reduction methods and risks spreading techniques such as insurance.  He focuses
on how insurance regulatory and liability questions affect risk-management
decisions, an issue important to this project.  Dr. Kunreuther will bring risk
management and business management of risk to the table in the discussions of
this group related to erosion mapping and land-use planning.  He is a recipient of
the Elizur Wright Award for the publication  that makes the most significant
contribution to the literature of insurance and is a Distinguished Fellow of the
Society for  Risk Analysis.  Dr. Kunreuther received his A.B. from Bates
College and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
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Thomas Malone is Executive Scientist, Connecticut Academy of Science and
Engineering, University Distinguished Scholar, North Carolina State University,
and Senior Advisor and a Past President, Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research
Society. Dr. Malone left a tenured faculty position at MIT and joined the
Travelers Insurance Companies where he became a Senior Vice President and
Director of Research. His Travelers' experience provided him with a good
understanding of the complexities and nuances of actuarial work and risk
assessment. Elected a member of the National Academy of Sciences in 1968, he
served as the Academy's Foreign Secretary from 1978 to 1982. Former Dean of
the Graduate School at the University of Connecticut, he received his SB from
the South Dakota School of Mines & Technology and his ScD from MIT. The
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the World
Meteorological Organization have honored him for his contributions to
international interdisciplinary activities. He is the recipient of the Waldo E.
Smith Medal from the American Geophysical Union "for extraordinary service
to geophysics."
Rutherford Platt is a professor of geography and planning law at the University
of Massachusetts in Amherst.  He specializes in the management of land and
water resources and has focused much of his research on problems of floodplain,
wetland and coastal management.  Before coming to the University of
Massachusetts in 1972, Dr. Platt spent four years as staff attorney for the Open
Lands Project, where he specialized in advocacy of open space preservation,
farmland conservation, and highway and power plant siting. He has served on
numerous National Research Council committees, including the Committee on
Coastal Erosion Zone Management, the Committee on Flood Insurance Studies,
and the Committee on Water Resources Research Review.  He holds a JD from
the University of Chicago Law School and a Ph.D. in geography from the
University of Chicago.  He is the author of several books, most recently
“Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events.”
Francis V. Reilly retired from federal service in 1993 and currently provides
flood insurance consulting services.  From 1980 to his retirement, he served as
Deputy Administrator and Chief Actuary of the Federal Insurance
Administration, the Directorate in FEMA which administers the National Flood
Insurance Program, Riot and Civil Commotion Reinsurance Program, and the
Federal Crime Insurance Program. From 1973 to 1979, Mr. Reilly served as the
Assistant Administrator and Actuary of the Federal Insurance Administration;
from 1951 to 1972, he served as Actuary and Mgr. of the Actuarial Dept. of the
Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau from 1966-72; as Assistant Actuary from 1964-
66; and was a member of Actuarial Department from 1951-64.  He received the
rank of Distinguished Executive in the Senior Executive Service from President
Ronald Reagan in 1988 and the rank of Meritorious Executive in the Senior
Executive Service in 1986. He has been a member of the American Academy of
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Actuaries since 1967. Mr. Reilly received his B.S. Degree in Mathematics from
St. Francis College, Brooklyn, NY.
Richard Roth, Sr. is a private consultant who has almost 50 years of insurance
experience.  He has been the Chief Actuary of the American International Group,
Senior Vice President and Actuary of the Great American Insurance Companies,
and Vice President and Actuary of the CNA Insurance Companies.  He is a
Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society.  He was the first Chairman of the
Federal Insurance Administration's "Write Your Own" Standards Committee for
the National Flood Insurance Program and has received FEMA's Outstanding
Public Service Award.  Mr. Roth received his Honors Degree in Economics from
Northwestern University, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.
John Sawhill is Chairman of The Heinz Center’s Board of Trustees and
President and Chief Executive Officer of The Nature Conservancy.  Prior to
joining The Nature Conservancy, he served as a director of McKinsey &
Company, Inc. and headed the firm's energy consulting practice from 1981-1990.
Sawhill also served as Deputy Secretary of the Dept. of Energy under President
Carter.  During the Nixon and Ford Administrations, he served as Administrator
of the Federal Energy Administration; Deputy Administrator of the Federal
Energy Office; and Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy, Science,
and Environment of the Office of Management and Budget.  He is a member of
numerous federal advisory panels, including the President’s Council on
Sustainable Development and the EPA’s National Advisory Committee on
Public Policy and Technology.  Dr. Sawhill received his BA from Princeton
University and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from New York University.
V. Kerry Smith is the University Distinguished Professor, Dept of Agricultural
and Resource Economics, North Carolina State University.  He is also Director
of the Center for Environmental and Resource Economic Policy at NCSU, and a
University Fellow of Resources for the Future.  He is a leading  environmental
and natural resource economist.  He has authored 12 books and over 200 articles
and notes.  He is a past president of the Association of Environmental and
Resource Economists as well as recipient of their Distinguished Service Award.
In addition to many other areas of research, he has investigated the relationship
between beach characteristics and rental values in the Outer Banks of North
Carolina, one of the areas included in this study.  Dr. Smith received his A.B
and Ph.D. in economics from Rutgers University.
Gilbert White is Professor Emeritus of Geography at the University of Colorado
and former Director of the Natural Hazards Research Applications and
Information Center.  Dr. White is known internationally for his work with
natural hazard planning and adaptation and his research into floodplain
management and coastal resource policy.  He is widely recognized as a founding
father of national  floodplain  policy, and he has been active with various
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aspects  of  national  management since publication of his Human Adjustment to
Floods in l945, and of the task force report which he chaired on a Unified
National  Program for Managing Flood Losses in 1966.  Dr. White has chaired
several national advisory boards, committees and federal task forces concerned
with floodplain policy and resource management, and is the author of numerous
journal articles and technical reports.  Dr. White received his S.B., S.M., and
Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.
Robert White, a Senior Fellow with The Heinz Center, brings to this issue his
broad knowledge of oceanic and environmental affairs from his work as
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and
more recently as President of the National Academy of Engineering.  Dr. White
served as Administrator of NOAA during the formative years of the coastal
management program and early implementation of the distributed approach to
management of the nations coast.  This is analogous to the approach FEMA is
taking with local level implementation of erosion mapping and he will provide
critical intellectual framing to ensure this erosion mapping study includes the
local level implementation.  He has served under five presidents from 1963 to
which provided an excellent framework for understanding policy options.  Dr.
White received his BA in from Harvard University and his MS and ScD degrees
in meteorology from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
THE HEINZ CENTER PROJECT STAFF
William J. Merrell, Jr. is the President and Senior Fellow of The Heinz Center.
Prior to joining The Heinz Center, Dr. Merrell was Vice Chancellor for Strategic
Programs of The Texas A&M University System.  He continues to hold the
appointment of Professor of Oceanography at Texas A&M University.  He has
published scientific papers on many aspects of marine sciences, and serves on
several national advisory boards and committees concerned with ocean
resources.  Dr. Merrell received his BS and MA degrees from Sam Houston
State University and a Ph.D. in oceanography from Texas A&M University.  Dr.
Merrell has received the Distinguished Member Award for Research
Achievement from the Texas A&M University Chapter of Sigma Xi, the
Distinguished Achievement Award from the Geosciences and Earth Resources
Council, and the Distinguished Service Award of the National Science




Stephen V. Dunn is Deputy Project Manager for The Heinz Center's
"Evaluation of Erosion Hazards" study.  His experience includes work in coastal
hazards analysis, global change, and environmental policy.  He has worked in
government, environmental organizations, and universities on environmental
issues.  Mr. Dunn received his BA in environmental studies from the University
of California at Santa Cruz and his MES from the School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, Yale University.
Robert M. Friedman is the Vice President for Research and Senior Fellow at
The Heinz Center. Prior to joining The Heinz Center, Dr. Friedman was a Senior
Associate at the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress.  For 15 years,
he advised Congressional committees on issues involving environmental, energy,
transportation, and natural resources policy.  He directed major policy research
efforts on acid deposition, urban ozone, and climate change, among other issues.
His most recent assessment evaluated alternative approaches to environmental
policy, including traditional regulatory approaches, market-based mechanisms,
and non-regulatory measures.  Dr. Friedman received his BA from The Johns
Hopkins University and his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, Madison in
ecological systems analysis.  He is a Fellow of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science and a recipient of OTA’s Distinguished Service Award.
Sheila D. David is a Fellow and Project Manager at The Heinz Center where she
is currently managing studies for the Center’s Sustainable Oceans, Coasts, and
Waterways program.  Prior to joining The Heinz Center in 1997, she was a
Senior Program Officer at the National Academy of Science’s Water Science
and Technology Board for 21 years where she was the study director for
approximately 30 committees that produced reports on topics such as Managing
Coastal Erosion, The Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems, Protection of Ground
Water, Wetlands Characteristics and Boundaries, Water Quality and Water
Reuse, Natural Resource Protection in the Grand Canyon and Sustainable Water
Supplies in the Middle East.  Ms. David has served as an advisor and board
member of the Association for Women in Science (AWIS) and as editor of
AWIS magazine.  She is also a founder of the National Academy of Science’s
Annual Program honoring Women in Science.
Sarah K. Baish is a research assistant for The Heinz Center’s Sustainable
Oceans, Coasts, and Waterways program.  Prior to joining The Heinz Center, she
worked in a national park in Slovakia as a Environmental Management
Consultant with the U.S. Peace Corps.  Her primary responsibilities included
grant writing, organizing educational events, promoting interpretive visitor
services, and facilitating international collaborations.  Previously, she interned
with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and her work
contributed to the establishment of a humpback whale sanctuary in Hawaii.  Ms.
Baish received her B.A. in environmental science and is working towards a
masters in urban planning from the University of Virginia.
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Allison Sondak, now attending law school at Tulane University, was a research
assistant for the Sustainable Oceans and Coasts program.  Prior to working at
The Heinz Center, she was a project assistant for the National Academy of
Science’s Board on Biology.  She worked previously on fisheries and
environmental policy for the U.S. Senate and on park management at the
National Park Service.  Her interests include coastal zone policy and natural
resource management.  She received a B.A. in environmental policy at Duke
University and studied marine science and policy at the University of
Copenhagen, Denmark.
MAJOR CONSULTANTS
Joseph J. Cordes is a Professor of Economics and the Director of the Ph.D.
Program in Public Policy at The George Washington University.  He is currently
a Visiting Fellow at the Urban Institute.  He was Associate Dean for Faculty
Affairs and Programs in the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences at The
George Washington University from 1986 to 1989, and Chair of the Department
of Economics from 1991 to 1997.  Previously, he was a Brookings Economic
Policy Fellow in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, United
States Treasury Department as well as Deputy Assistant Director for Tax
Analysis at the Congressional Budget Office.  He is a co-editor of the
Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy (Urban Institute Press, 1999), and
Democracy, Social Values and Public Policy (Greenwood-Praeger, 1998). He
has published over fifty articles on tax policy, government regulation,
government spending, and nonprofit organizations. Along with Anthony Yezer,
Dr. Cordes researched the question of whether shore protection and beach
erosion control projects sponsored by the Army Corps of Engineers changed the
rate of housing development in communities where the projects are located.  The
results of this research were published in the February 1998 issue of Land
Economics.  Dr. Cordes received his BA in economics from Stanford University
and his MS and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Andrew Keeler is Associate Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics
at the University of Georgia. Dr. Keeler’s general research interests are in the
area of implementation and enforcement of environmental policy.  Recent
research on coastal land issues in Glynn County, Georgia, compared the benefits
of hard stabilization, beach nourishment, and retreat, as perceived by property
owners, businesses, and beach visitors.  Previously, Dr. Keeler worked for the
United Nations in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.  Dr.  Keeler received his BA from
the University of North Carolina and his Ph.D. in Natural Resource Economics
from the University of California at Berkeley.
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Warren Kriesel is Associate Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
University of Georgia.  In earlier research, Kriesel has estimated the effect of
shore erosion on property values on the Ohio shoreline of Lake Erie.  His current
research in Glynn County Georgia compares the benefits of hard stabilization,
beach nourishment, and retreat, as perceived by property owners, businesses, and
beach visitors.  Dr. Kriesel received his BS from the University of Wisconsin
and his Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from Ohio State University.
Craig E. Landry is a recipient of the Arthur A. and Pauline Seidenspinner
Graduate Fellowship at the University of Maryland, College Park, where he is
currently working on his Ph.D. in Environmental and Resource Economics.  His
research interests include sustainable development, coastal geomorphology,
coastal hazards, risk and uncertainty, and global climate change.  He received his
B.S.A. and M.S. from the University of Georgia in Environmental Economics
and Management.
Susanne C. Moser is a staff scientist in the Global Resources Program of the
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